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The Papua New Guinea coffee industry expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s 
from initial small beginnings in the 1950s to become a thriving industry. The early 
European planters who established the industry forged partnerships with customary 
landowner groups and other village coffee farmers by providing support services, 
centralised processing and assisting villagers to plant coffee. As a result, Papua New 
Guinea had a reputation for producing premium quality coffee and consistently 
supplied overseas markets. However, coffee production began to plateau in the late 
1980s, and coffee quality began to decline. From the 1990s to the present, the coffee 
industry has been in steady decline. 
 
The study employed a mixed methods approach of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. There were three primary sources of data: a review of the 
literature was undertaken to assess the past and present status of the industry; a cross-
section of key industry stakeholders were interviewed including growers, coffee 
industry experts, chain leaders and lead partners; and case studies were developed for 
smallholder grower groups and coffee plantations to assess their performance. 
 
Using the above methods, the thesis investigated the social, economic and political 
factors that have contributed to the decline of the coffee industry and identified 
potential strategies to reverse this trend. By analysing the experiences of successful 
and unsuccessful smallholders, block and plantation owners, the study identified the 
factors explaining the decline of the coffee industry, as well as the factors that have 
contributed to the successful resilience of a minority of coffee producers. 
 
The thesis shows that the industry is besieged by poor institutional leadership, lack of 
partnerships, land disputes, poor extension services, policy failures, lawlessness and 
poor quality and declining rural infrastructure which have all contributed to the 
decline of the coffee industry. As for the managed subsector, it is beset with poor 
management and rising costs of farm inputs including labour. These problems are 
also exacerbated by plantations and blocks’ lack of community engagement, and a 
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tendency for plantations and blocks to be managed to provide ‘prestige’ for owners 
rather than economic viability and profits. Moreover, the involvement of dishonest 
business leaders has contributed to mismanagement and the abuse of funds and assets 
in group-owned plantations and blocks which has led to their demise.  
 
Although smallholder farmers produce 85% of coffee, they follow a low input-low 
output production system. This is because of the diverse livelihood strategies 
smallholders must juggle to allocate household resources, and coffee production is 
only one part of this mix. Many sectoral and industry-based programs and projects 
for the smallholder sector and the managed subsector, have failed or only partially 
succeeded because of poor leadership, abuse of funds, lack of monitoring, and 
policies which neglected to accommodate the effect of the indigenous economy. 
Also, the financiers of coffee industry programs and projects have failed to provide 
audits, monitoring, and evaluations to ensure investments achieved their intents. 
These problems have all contributed to the decline of the once thriving industry. 
 
However, this thesis has identified some strategies that could be used to revitalise the 
coffee industry which can also be applicable to other agricultural sectors. This thesis 
found that leadership was an important factor that undergirds effective management 
and governance in cooperatives and group-owned businesses. Honest and transparent 
leadership enhanced group cohesion which resulted in more sustainable and 
successful cooperatives and group-owned businesses. Also, ‘hybrid’ transitional 
business leaders who were able to straddle both the indigenous and modern market 
systems tended to be more successful than either solely business-focused enterprises 
or ones that emphasised the indigenous economy and paid little consideration to 
market realities. Importantly, lead partners who provided institutional leadership to 
grower groups and business groups improved the successes of coffee enterprises.  
 
This thesis illustrates that in the managed subsector, prudent management of 
company revenue and investment in appropriate areas of their operations are vital to 
their success. Also, business managers and owners must be skilled and 
knowledgeable about farm and asset management so that they can deploy resources 
efficiently which can, in turn, lead to higher productivity. Additionally, business 
leaders, owners and business managers must possess local knowledge and actively 
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participate in the local socio-economy so that amicable relationships are fostered 
with villagers for the business to operate successfully. In other words, businesses 
must become socially embedded in their host communities to be successful. Those 
plantations that have implemented the above strategies have proven resilient and are 
operating successfully. 
 
There is enormous potential to increase the productivity and quality of coffee of 
smallholder farmers. Institutional arrangements that could facilitate increased 
productivity include: collective action; value chain partnerships; and agro-services. 
Cohesive farmer groups can arise from improved governance systems and 
institutional leadership leading to the establishment of sustainable grower groups. 
Providing extension services and industry incentive programs and projects through 
grower groups can elevate social capital which can lead to effective communication 
and information exchange among member farmers.  
 
Finally, the public-private partnerships framework encourages partners to collaborate 
and pool their resources and expertise to pursue common goals. These public-private 
partnerships replicate to an extent the services provided by the plantations during the 
early heyday of the PNG coffee industry. It provides a systems approach in which 
value chain actors can work in concert to improve productivity and coffee quality. 
Partnerships have led to chain leaders in the coffee industry assisting in building the 
capacity of smallholders by providing agro-services. As a result, these smallholders 
have improved productivity and are now consistently delivering good quality cherry 
and parchment coffee to chain leaders. Through the supply chain linkages between 
coffee growers and chain leaders, the quality problem has been addressed. Moreover, 
the interventions of chain leaders were driven by market imperatives and their 
investments were targeted. Thus, chain leader-smallholder relationships through 
grower groups are sustainable, especially in market accessible areas. However, in 
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When villagers become involved in commercial transactions 
[coffee production], they alter their interactions with the local 
environment, patterns of production, and social relationships. 
--Lawrence S. Grossman, Peasants, Subsistence 
Ecology and Development in the Highlands of 





This thesis will convey the story of coffee in Papua New Guinea (PNG) from the 
impressive beginnings in the 1950s to its gradual and long-term decline since the late 
1980s. It aims to establish why some parts of the coffee industry remain resilient 
while most of the industry went into decline. It does this by exploring the 
expectations and socio-cultural context of smallholder coffee production, the reasons 
for the slump in coffee production and identifies strategies that may return the 
industry to its former glory. Coffee production grew rapidly among smallholders in 
the 1950s and 1960s despite a lack of concerted government support. However, from 
the late 1980s, coffee production plateaued and went into a steady decline. Several 
studies have examined the issues in each of these periods, but gaps remain in our 
knowledge of farmers’ expectations and the factors contributing to the decline of the 
coffee industry. This thesis addresses this knowledge gap. 
This chapter commences with a description of the global context of coffee 
production and then highlights the economic importance of the PNG coffee industry 
and describes the key stakeholders in the industry. The research objectives and 
significance of the study and an outline of the thesis are then presented. 
Global Coffee 
In international commodity trade, coffee is second to crude oil. In some producing 
countries, and it applies in particular to countries that have attained their political 
independence in the 1960s and 1970s, coffee was and remains a primary export 
commodity and foreign exchange earner (Fitter and Kaplinski, 2001). The coffee 
industry worldwide engages 100 million people (Jaramillo et al. 2013; Bunn et al. 
2015) that include coffee farmers, processors, exporters, traders, bankers, civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and a host of other value chain actors. Therefore, the 
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coffee industry impacts on the lives of many millions of farming families in 
developing countries and other value chain actors.  
 
In global coffee production, Brazil leads and is followed by Vietnam and Colombia. 
The Asia/Oceania region has seen a surge in production in the last couple of years, 
mostly from Vietnam, which is the second highest producer accounting for 27.5 
million bags in 2015. In 2012/131, coffee leaf rust (CLR) (Hemileia vastatrix) 
outbreak in Central America led to losses of 2.7 million bags (60 kg gb); US$500 
million was spent on addressing the problem (International Coffee Organisation 
[ICO], 2012/13). Central American countries are slowly recovering from the effects 
of CLR. Coffee production in Africa and South America has not fluctuated from 
previous years. In 2010/11, ICO composite prices peaked at US$2.06/pound, the 
highest price was in 1976/77 at US$2.30/pound (ICO, 2010/11). In PNG, the Y-
grade (low-quality smallholder price) for green bean reached K15.49/kg on 25 April 
2011, a record price for the local industry. The main reason for the increase was 
associated with the shrinking of physical stock (certified stock) of green bean to very 
low levels worldwide (Nicholas-Fulmer, 2011) as a result of the high demand in 
emerging markets like Russia, China, and India (Harrington, 2011). The shortage in 
stock was aggravated by the unpredictability in coffee supply to markets owing to 
extreme weather conditions, which affected global coffee production (Chapter 9). 
However, in 2012, Arabica coffee prices fell by 34% from 2011 prices reflecting 
price volatility in the coffee business. The decline also relates to the coffee biennial 
production cycle. After a bumper crop, the yield will be lower in the following year. 
Global coffee production continues to rise (Figure 1.1). Average annual production 
in the last ten years was 129.2 million bags of green bean with 2013/14 world 
production at 146.8 million bags (ICO, 2015a). A total of 55 countries, mainly in 
developing countries produce coffee.  
 
Coffee consumption in importing and producing countries has increased at 2.1% per 
annum in recent years (ICO, 2015a). Importing countries like those in the European 
Union, the USA and Japan followed by Russia consume most of the global 
production. There is a stable growth in coffee consumption in emerging markets such 
as the former Soviet Union, China, and India. China and India, two very populous 
countries are beginning to adopt a coffee drinking culture. In the last ten years China 
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has experienced an annual growth of 16% in the consumption of coffee (ICO, 
2015b). Also, there is an increasing rate of coffee consumption in coffee producing 
nations. Brazil leads the group followed by Indonesia, Ethiopia, Mexico, the 
Philippines and Vietnam (Figure 1.2). Although consumption of coffee in Europe is 
stagnant, there are increases in consumption in the USA, Russia and in South/East 
Asia. Moreover, markets in South/East Asia look promising with Indonesia, Vietnam 
and South Korea where there are significant increases in consumption (ICO, 2015a).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Global coffee production and composite prices (Source: ICO, 2015a).  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Top six coffee consumption countries that also produce coffee from 2012 
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Although coffee is a primary global commodity, only a fraction of the value of the 
coffee returns to the farmer. Approximately, only 7-10% of the final sale value in 
supermarkets or coffee shops reaches coffee growers in conventional supply chains 
(Rao, 2010; Borrella et al. 2015). However, Valkila and Nygren (2010) report that 
prior to the collapse of the International Coffee Agreements (ICA) in 1989, the final 
price received by growers was approximately 20% of the final sales value. Fitter and 
Kaplinski (2001) confirm that in the price transfers in mainstream coffee chains, the 
bulk of the returns accrue to processors, exporters, importers, traders, roasters, and 
retailers. However, in recent case studies of three ‘direct’ trade value chain analysis 
of differentiated coffee2, roasters and retailers retained 77-86% of the income, while 
the balance was transmitted to coffee farmers (Borrella et al. 2015). Therefore, in a 
direct trade, coffee growers earn better returns of 14-23%. 
 
The income received in producing countries is remitted in the form of foreign 
exchange earnings. Some countries with efficient systems of processing good quality 
coffee and marketing can add value to their coffee and make more gains on freight-
on-board (FOB) prices. Coffee farmers in a few countries like Costa Rica and 
Uganda (Suruma, 2014) are receiving 80% of foreign exchange earnings. The high 
return on investment in Costa Rica is attributed to farmers supplying cherry coffee to 
central mills where high standards of processing are maintained to produce green 
bean (Adams and Ghaly, 2006). The Costa Rican farmers receive 40% of the coffee 
price on cherry delivery, and the balance is paid to them after export (Mosheim, 
2002). As for Ugandan farmers, their success in attaining better prices originated 
from the deregulation of the market in the 1990s by allowing the private sector to 
participate in marketing (Suruma, 2014). In the past, the Ugandan state had a 
monopoly on the market. 
 
Papua New Guinea’s Coffee Industry 
PNG’s total population is 7.3 million (2011 National Census), and 80% of the people 
reside in rural areas (Banks, 2014). PNG accounts for 1% of total global coffee 
production (Coffee Industry Corporation [CIC], 2008a). Coffee is cultivated in 17 
out of the 22 provinces covering the four regions of PNG: Highlands, Momase, 




Figure 1.3: Map of coffee growing provinces in PNG (Source: Kingsten Okka). 
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The Central Highlands region accounts for 90% of national coffee production, which 
is predominantly Arabica coffee. Most of the Highlands coffee production is from 
the fertile Waghi Valley spanning Western Highlands Province (WHP) and Jiwaka 
Province. In 2015, the Eastern Highlands Province (EHP) was the major producer of 
coffee (Figure 1.4). The records for provincial production are collected at coffee 
mills located in each province. Coffee mills in Goroka, the provincial capital of EHP 
purchase coffee from Jiwaka, Simbu, Morobe and Madang and these mills pay more 
on coffee prices than mills in other provinces. Thus, the EHP data over-estimates the 
production from that province. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Coffee production by province in 2015 (Source: CIC data). *Some 
production recorded for EHP is coffee produced from other provinces. 
 
According to 2011 National Census, the PNG coffee industry directly engages 
524,400 households equating to almost 2.5 million people. Coffee earnings are 
spread among a substantial proportion of the rural population, especially in the PNG 
Highlands. With declining basic government services for the vast majority of rural 
farmers, coffee income ensures basic livelihood needs are met. From 2008 to 2015, 
the average annual foreign exchange earnings from coffee were K511 million (Bank 
of PNG, 2016). PNG coffee farmers attain 70% on FOB prices while other value 
chain actors account for the balance (CIC, 2008a; Batt et al. 2009). In market 

















income. However, for farmers in remote areas of PNG, coffee is their principal 
source of income.  
 
Coffee income has a tremendous influence on the socio-economic and political 
activities of farmers. It is estimated that the average net income per year from coffee 
for smallholders in the Central Highlands is K4,900 followed by livestock at K1,219 
and sweet potato at K246 (UniQuest, 2013). Coffee is embedded in the wider socio-
economic and political landscape of rural areas. 
 
Coffee is one of six agricultural commodities that farmers in PNG produce for 
export. From the 1960s until mid-2000, coffee was the leader in export volume and 
foreign exchange earnings in the agricultural sector. Coffee was one of the key 
economic indicators used to support PNG’s efforts to attain political independence 
from Australia in 1975. In 2006, oil palm surpassed coffee to become PNG’s top 
agricultural export crop (Figure 1.5). However, many more smallholders are involved 
in coffee production than in oil palm production. Smallholders account for 
approximately 85% of total coffee production (CIC, 2008a) while only 33% of oil 
palm production is produced by smallholders (Koczberski et al. 2001). 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Composition of foreign exchange earnings in 2014 for key agricultural 















Farmers in PNG cultivate two commercial varieties of coffee: Arabica (Coffea 
arabica) and Robusta (C. canephora). Arabica is grown at higher altitudes at 1,200-
1,800 m asl. This variety has a mild taste and aroma and can fetch higher prices. 
Robusta is grown at lower altitudes at 200-800 m asl and fetches lower prices than 
Arabica coffee. Robusta coffee is used as a mix in blends to develop soluble coffee 
(Wrigley, 1988). In world trade, Arabica coffee accounts for 70% of coffee exports 
and Robusta coffee makes up the balance. In PNG, 99% of coffee exports are 
Arabica (CIC, 2009). 
 
Key Industry Stakeholders 
The CIC regulates the coffee industry with powers vested by the national 
government through the CIC Act (1991). The CIC regulates and provides extension 
services to the coffee industry. Furthermore, it provides research into various aspects 
of coffee production, processing and marketing. The CIC has a board made up of 
stakeholders from the industry and relevant national government departments. The 
smallholders have six representatives on the CIC board while the blocks3 and 
plantations/processors have one each. Three smallholder representatives come from 
the main coffee-growing provinces (EHP, Simbu, and WHP) and one representing 
each of the other three regions: Momase (Morobe, Madang, East Sepik), New Guinea 
Islands (East New Britain, New Ireland and Enga) and Southern (Central, Oro, Milne 
Bay, Southern Highlands (SHP) and Hela). The exporters, the departments of 
Agriculture and Livestock (DAL), Trade, Industry and Commerce (DTCI), and 
Treasury have one board member each. However, with the creation of new provinces 
especially Jiwaka and the recent increase in coffee production from provinces like 
Morobe Province few changes at the board level may be necessary. The present DAL 
Minister is proposing changes to governance systems concerning the board of 
commodity organisations, and these may also influence the composition of boards. 
 
The stakeholders in the PNG coffee industry comprise of key value chain actors, and 
they include growers, processors, and exporters. Other industry players include 






Currently, coffee production systems in PNG can be categorised into two broad 
systems: high input-high output and low input-low output production systems 
(Thompson, 1987). The former consists of the managed subsector and they are 
engaged in a capitalist mode of coffee production, which comprises the plantations 
and blocks. The low input-low output system involves smallholders who in addition 
to subsistence farming, also engage in simple commodity production by producing 
coffee (Thompson, 1987; Collett, 1992). The evolution of coffee production systems 
in PNG is associated with the changing socio-economic context of the society. 
Several authors have endeavoured to define coffee production systems in PNG 
(Goldthorpe, 1985; Irog, 1992; CIC, 2008a). In this study, I use three main 
production systems: smallholdings, blocks and plantations. The features of each of 
the systems are described in Table 1.1. 
 








Definition and characteristics 
Smallholder 
farmers 
Smallholdings 0-<5  Practise mixed cropping in coffee 
gardens 
 Rely mainly on family labour (little use 
of hired labour) 
 Apply low input-low output production 
 Little or no use of chemical inputs 





5-29  Developed under the government 
sponsored Twenty Hectare Development 
Scheme (THDS) or through bank loans 
 Individually or group owned 
 Use of hired labour is common 
 Agrochemicals are used both inorganic 
fertiliser and herbicides 
 Some have wet processing mills 
Plantations >30  Majority were planted by European 
planters between 1948 and 1960s 
 Either have wet or dry coffee mills 
 Heavy reliance on wage labour 
 Farm machinery and agrochemicals are 
used 






Smallholder farmers dominate coffee production, and they typically plant coffee on 
customary land. Also, smallholders pursue a range of livelihoods in addition to 
coffee farming. This variety of livelihood strategies especially food production for 
household consumption and sale to local markets compete for their labour. 
Smallholders typically practice low input-low output production system, so their 
coffee productivity is very low. There is, therefore, considerable potential to improve 
total coffee production by raising smallholder productivity.  
 
Blocks 
Coffee blocks or ‘mini-plantations’ are high input-high output system of production. 
The blocks were developed as part of a government initiative to expand coffee 
plantation development in the early 1980s. The THDS was to enable families and 
clansmen who did not benefit from the Plantation Redistribution Scheme (PRS) to 
participate in the market economy by developing medium sized coffee plantations 
(Chapters 4 and 7). However, the unequal distribution of dividends often results in 
internal conflicts among block shareholders, which have led to a decline in their 
productivity. The majority of these blocks have wet coffee mills4, and a small 
number possess dry mills5.  
 
Plantations 
Plantations are also a high input-high output system of production. European planters 
initially developed the majority of the plantations and were sold to landowner 
business groups and nationally-owned corporations through the PRS in the 1970s. 
Some citizens also developed several coffee plantations through the THDS or by 
obtaining loans from commercial banks in the early 1980s. Previously, most 
plantations had an onsite management team and coffee mills. Sometimes permanent 
labourers and their family members were accommodated on plantation land. Most 
plantations were established on state agricultural leasehold land, with 99-year leases. 
After independence in 1975, many of the plantations failed and were abandoned or 






Coffee buyers with large sums of cash used to travel into rural villages to buy coffee 
for coffee processors. This service has ceased largely because of armed holdups. 
Coffee farmers must now transport their coffee into urban centres to sell to coffee 
buyers. The coffee buyers provide a vital link between growers and the processors 
and the exporters. However, this group of ‘stakeholders’ are unregulated. Sometimes, 
coffee buyers purchase stolen coffee to meet contractual requirements, and this 
encourages coffee theft in rural communities. Coffee buyers also often fail to comply 
with coffee quality standards when making payments to farmers and are careless in 
handling purchased coffee (Mitio, 2014). These unacceptable practices of coffee 
buyers undermine PNG’s reputation for quality coffee. 
 
Processors 
In 2016, there were 61 registered coffee processing factories, more than 65% process 
smallholder coffee while the remaining mills were plantation-based (Table 1.2). 
These factories purchase cherry or parchment from coffee growers which they 
process to exportable green bean. Some processors, especially those with wet coffee 
mills, sell their coffee to dry mill owners, or the dry mill owners hull the parchment 
at a cost. Some processors have both wet and dry coffee mills. A typical coffee 
processing mill can process 25,000 to 100,000 bags of green bean annually. Most 
coffee factories are operating below full capacity.  
 
Table 1.2: Total number of coffee processors, exporters and manufacturers from 





2011 38 56 17 8 
2012 39 56 16 6 
2013 30 44 17 6 
2014 27 49 19 7 
2015 29 55 22 10 
2016 38 61 23 11 






Twenty-three exporters were exporting coffee in 2016. The number of exporters 
since 2013 has risen. Among this group, there are four categories of exporters: 
specialist exporters; partly-integrated exporters; plantation-based exporters; and, 
roast and ground exporters (CIC, 2008a). The bulk of exports are in green bean, but a 
small proportion comprises of roast and ground coffee. 
 Specialist exporters engage as ‘middlemen’ by purchasing green bean coffee 
from local processors and export to overseas buyers. Many exporters are 
multinational companies, while several are nationally owned. They ensure that 
the green bean product meets PNG coffee quality standards before the 
consignments are exported. Importantly, specialist exporters have local 
processing facilities that are capable of regrading green bean so as to add value. 
Some exporters are agents of multinational companies, hence regrading can 
occur offshore.  
 Partly-integrated exporters are partially involved in coffee production and 
marketing by producing their own coffee, processing to green bean and 
exporting to international markets. Moreover, these exporters also partner with 
surrounding smallholders, blocks and some plantations to source cherry or 
parchment coffee that is then processed at their mills to the green bean stage 
and then exported to overseas destinations.  
 Plantation-based exporters have vertically integrated operations. These 
exporters have their own coffee plantations, processing facilities and export to 
international markets. However, some of them also purchase coffee from 
surrounding smallholders, blocks and other plantations to meet their market 
quota. Some of these exporters sell their coffee directly to differentiated coffee 
markets. 
 Roast and ground exporters are primarily engaged in the exports of roast 
coffee. In 2011, there were eight roast and ground exporters which have 
increased to 11 in 2016. The roast and ground exporters form a small 
component of the total PNG coffee exports, and the number of manufacturers 





Peripheral chain actors 
Other peripheral value chain actors include transport companies, banks, and customs 
agents. Trucks cart coffee from sellers to coffee mills and after processing to green 
bean transported to Lae seaport for shipment to international markets. Banks provide 
financial services to the industry. During periods of high coffee prices, commercial 
banks in urban centres like Mt Hagen and Goroka sometimes run out of cash because 
coffee transactions are mainly cash transactions (“Coffee buyers out of cash”, 2016). 
 
Research Objectives and Significance 
The study aims to establish why some parts of the PNG coffee industry are resilient 
and remain successful under present conditions while the rest of the industry declines 
in production and importance. Thus, the main objectives of this thesis are to: 
1. Assess the reasons for the decline of the coffee industry; 
2. Establish why some smallholders, plantation and block owners are resilient and 
successful; and 
3. Identify and recommend strategies to revitalise and advance the PNG coffee 
industry. 
 
These objectives underpin some of the key research questions of the thesis which are 
discussed below: 
 My main aim is to uncover what went wrong and identify pathways to revive 
the ailing coffee industry. Along this road of long-term decline, there are 
pockets of success and small islands of hope of successful farmers who are 
thriving under the current circumstances. What is it about this group of coffee 
farmers that has allowed them to be resilient? This thesis will examine why 
these farmers are productive and prosperous. We can learn lessons from their 
successes as innovative coffee farmers and identify the strategies they are using 
to mitigate the constraints and challenges so that they remain viable and even 
thrive. Also, we can learn from the experiences of those farmers who are 
struggling or have failed and find solutions for them. By identifying what these 
factors are, this thesis will develop potential strategies to revive the industry. 
 A new model for the coffee industry is necessary to arrest the decline and 
revitalise the industry. The proposed model combines elements like the 
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European planter-landowner partnerships of the old industry structure from the 
days of thriving plantations of the 1960s and the 1970s with present successful 
factors such as collective action in cooperatives, to develop new strategies to 
avert the slump of the local coffee industry.  
 
The thesis provides four main arguments relating to the decline of the coffee 
industry, and they are: 
 Firstly, the decline of the plantation sector is linked directly to the current low 
productivity and production in the smallholder sector. In the past, the 
plantations provided planting materials (Sinclair, 1995), organised partnerships 
with customary landowners (Down, 1986; Sinclair, 1995), facilitated market 
access (Stewart, 1992) and assisted village ‘big men’6 to plant larger coffee 
gardens (Sinclair, 1995). The European-owned plantations operated factories as 
central mills and facilitated extension advice including enforcing quality 
standards. This assisted in maintaining good coffee quality and a consistent 
supply to overseas markets from the 1960s to the 1970s. As a result, there was 
a rapid rise in smallholder coffee production. These services collapsed with the 
decline of plantations and the subsequent relocation of rural coffee mills near 
to urban centres. 
 Secondly, despite smallholders now dominating coffee production, 
partnerships between farmers and chain leaders remain poor. This constrains 
increases in smallholder coffee production. Smallholders’ productivity and 
production levels are low and much lower than those achieved from the 1960s 
to the 1970s. The chain actors include chain leaders (i.e. processors, exporters 
and successful plantations) (see Batt et al. 2009) and lead partners (i.e. state 
actors and CSOs) who collaborate to raise production; upgrade productivity 
and consistently supply coffee quality. Murray-Prior et al. (2008) argue that 
future studies should investigate factors constraining partnerships between 
coffee farmers and chain leaders so that the relationships can be improved and 






 Thirdly, the increasing costs of production render plantation and block 
operations unviable. This problem is exacerbated by lawlessness, lack of 
community engagement, poor knowledge of the influence of the indigenous 
economy upon modern market enterprises, rising costs of farm inputs, poor 
rural infrastructure and land disputes which have all constrained production 
and undermined the profitability of coffee plantations and blocks. Additionally, 
the limited knowledge of business managers and/or owners to prudently 
manage farm, finances and assets of plantations and blocks has led to abuse 
and misuse, further undermining their operations. Business managers or 
owners often lack the necessary business skills to manage plantations and 
blocks efficiently. In group-owned entities, internal conflicts resulted in 
shareholders reclaiming their land in coffee blocks while plantations have been 
subdivided. The National Agriculture Development Plan (NADP) proposed to 
conduct a national survey of plantations to establish the present status of the 
managed subsector and devise appropriate strategies to revive the subsector 
(DAL, 2007). This has not been undertaken. Although, previous research has 
focused on other aspects of the coffee industry such as coffee husbandry, very 
little is known about the problems associated with the practicalities of 
plantation operations and management (Orlegge, 2010). 
 Fourthly, the problems faced by the industry have forced a few plantation 
business managers and owners to devise strategies to overcome these 
challenges. It is argued that these resilient plantation operators are applying 
innovative approaches, which has enabled them to mitigate the challenges 
arising from the communities surrounding their plantations and so improved 
their resilience to operate their businesses in rural areas.  
 
Significance of research 
This study is significant because it takes a holistic approach to investigate the PNG 
coffee industry including low productivity in various production systems, domestic 
value chains and extension services delivered by CIC and partners. The thesis 
contributes to the theoretical discourse on development theories by bringing to the 
fore the significance of social embeddedness where economic actions are socially 
embedded in transitional economies like PNG. However, as a result of the lack of 
knowledge of the effect of interactions of the indigenous and modern market systems 
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by the majority of smallholders, plantation and block owners, this has impeded their 
productivity and production. This study also provides insights into why some 
plantations and blocks are successful with their operations and management while 
others have failed or are struggling. Moreover, this study explains why some past and 
present partnerships among value chain actors improved productivity and coffee 
quality, and also highlights some of the key challenges. This research contributes to 
broadening our knowledge of the influences of traditional structures and practices on 
modern economic pursuits; such knowledge can inform policy decisions. The policy 
implications broadly cover institutional leadership, value chain partnerships and 
extension approaches in the coffee industry. 
 
Transition of coffee industry 
Coffee became an important industry when it made its journey into the hinterlands of 
the PNG mainland in the late 1920s. Coffee found a home in the densely settled 
fertile valleys that are surrounded by the majestic mountain ranges of the Highlands; 
a region where despotic ‘big men’ reigned over fragmented clans and tribes who 
engaged sporadically in tribal warfare (Sinclair, 1995).  
 
The local population was initially cynical about coffee when it was first introduced. 
The crop was rebuffed as villagers thought it would bring bad omens to their prized 
pigs, gardens and their livelihoods. However, a few ‘big men’ like Kofikai Sabumei 
of Bena and Hero Paito of Goroka (EHP), convinced other villagers to plant coffee 
(Sinclair, 1995). As for Paito, he acquired a Land Rover from his coffee income, 
which illustrated that coffee had the potential to generate a new type of wealth 
(Finney, 1968; Donaldson and Good, 1981). Also, Bimai Noibano of Watabung in 
Daulo (EHP), with the experience and knowledge earned from working on a coconut 
plantation on Manus island and later at Aiyura experimental coffee plantation, 
developed an understanding of the monetary worth of coffee, and, thus cultivated 
coffee in his village (Finney, 1993). Later, Noibano solicited the support of his 






The keen villagers observing and envying the lifestyles of European planters began 
to witness their kinsmen like Paito, Sabumei, and Noibano amassing wealth through 
coffee cultivation. The once sceptical villagers enthusiastically embraced coffee and 
thus the cultivation of coffee became widespread. It dawned on the villagers that 
coffee was valuable and not just any average crop. Villagers obtained seeds or 
seedlings and began planting coffee. The adoption and nurturing of this mysterious 
yet manageable crop was accomplished without much fuss as villagers incorporated 
the coffee tree into their agrarian farming practices. It is now the mainstay of the 
Highlands economy. 
 
From the 1950s to the 1960s, the growth of the early stages of the coffee industry 
was spectacular. The major growth was concentrated in the smallholder sector. The 
rapid expansion of coffee growing is a testimony to the entrepreneurial attitude of the 
people of the Highlands region during those formative years. This dark greened-leaf 
shrub laid the foundations for Highlanders who practised swidden cultivation to 
make the switch to monoculture and incorporate a mono-crop into their agricultural 
system7. Concurrently, Arabica coffee plantations were developed in the Central 
Highlands region. Europeans converged to the region to participate in an industry 
that was flourishing. Some European planters and a few Asians who had commercial 
interests in the Coastal regions of PNG also made their way into the new frontier of 
promise. Optimistic entrepreneurs came aplenty to participate in the industry that 
promised so much hope for prosperity. 
 
In the 1970s as independence approached, coffee plantations were sold to landowner 
business groups and local corporations through the PRS. The excitement heightened 
among the local population with the introduction of the THDS in the early 1980s. 
There was an air of exuberance as villagers began to enter the capitalist world of 
commercial business (Sinclair, 1995).  
 
When locals made the entry into the modern market economy, it came with its 
challenges that began to subdue advances of some local entrepreneurs while resilient 
entrepreneurs succeeded in commercial activities. In the late 1980s, the excitement in 
the coffee industry from the 1960s to the early 1980s began to recede. From the 
1990s to 2010s, it was evident that the once-thriving coffee industry was stagnant 
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and was in slow decline. However, along this slow road of long term decline, there is 
a small group of successful coffee farmers who are thriving in the midst of the 
broader decline of the industry.  
 
Study Outline 
This section provides the outline of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
framework of the study by examining development theories that encompass 
Modernisation to Dependency/Neo-Marxist discourses, social embeddedness and 
hybridization. The literature review also investigates entrepreneurship in a 
transitional economy and the influence of leadership on business enterprises. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the various ontological and epistemological research 
methodological approaches relevant to the thesis. It discusses the methods and 
establishes the approaches that were adopted and applied during the fieldwork and in 
the processes of data analyses. The mixed methods approach was deemed most 
appropriate for this study.  
 
The background information on the rapid expansion of the PNG coffee industry is 
presented in Chapter 4. The chapter outlines how the early plantation development in 
the Highlands paved the way for villagers to adopt coffee cultivation. It further 
discusses the governance systems and policies that were introduced to develop and 
safeguard the rapidly rising coffee industry. As the industry grew, it came with its 
own sets of problems, which are outlined in Chapter 5. This chapter discusses factors 
that have contributed to the decline of the coffee industry in PNG.  
 
Chapter 6 outlines constraints in producing coffee among smallholders who 
participate in grower groups. The chapter presents in detail the constraints faced by 
smallholders and outline some of the strategies farmers deploy such as labour 
exchanges to counter labour shortages. Chapter 7 presents detailed case studies of 
selected plantations. The case studies reveal the obstacles, successes and 
opportunities that prevail in the managed subsector. The case studies are supported 




Chapter 8 presents the opportunities and challenges in collective action of 
smallholders and value chain partnerships. The chapter discusses opportunities in 
group work to improve productivity and coffee quality. Similarly, it further outlines 
benefits of past and present partnerships which have raised productivity and 
improved the consistency of the supply of quality coffee. It also discusses some of 
the challenges of partnerships and collective action in coffee cooperatives.  
 
Chapters 9 and 10 synthesises the constraints, challenges, and opportunities that have 
been discussed in Chapters 5 to 8. From the synthesis, Chapter 9 outlines the 
challenges that were undermining coffee production in PNG. Chapter 10 outlines the 
strategies to revive the PNG coffee industry. The final chapter provides the 
conclusions, recommendations and proposes areas for future research.  
 
The next chapter provides the theoretical framework for the thesis. It discusses 
relevant development theories and the socially embedded economic actions in 






1. The overlapping years (e.g. 1972/73) indicates a coffee calendar year. In PNG, the 
coffee year begins in October and ends in September of the following year. This 
follows the flowering and harvesting cycle of coffee. 
 
2. Differentiated markets provide alternatives to marketing based on the 
differentiation of coffee, and it is usually by quality or the method of coffee 
cultivation (Lewin et al. 2004).  
 
3. Blocks are ‘mini plantations’ and they were mostly established in the early 1980s 
on customary land. 
 
4. In the wet coffee mills, wet processing is carried out where harvested ripe cherries 
are pulped, beans are fermented and after 48 hours of fermentation, beans are 
washed to remove the mucilage. 
 
5. In the dry coffee mills, washed fermented beans are dried. After drying to a 
standard of 10-11% moisture content, the dried parchment beans are hulled by 
removing the parchment and silver skin to obtain the green bean for exports. 
 
6. ‘Big men’ refers to persons of high status in a community. In the past, ‘big men’ 
amassed wealth, which they redistributed through traditional exchange systems. 
Today’s ‘big men’ also amass wealth but many do not redistribute their wealth. 
For a more detailed discussion on ‘big men’ in the Highlands societies, see 
Chapter 2. 
 
7. Certain parts of the Central Highlands region were known for agricultural farming 
about 10,000 years ago when a few societies in other parts of the world were also 













This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the thesis. It begins by outlining 
the key ideas on development from early modernisation to post-development 
approaches through to recent ideas on the social embeddedness of economies. The 
chapter also discusses the positive and negative attributes of indigenous economies 
and their influences on modern market systems. It argues that recent theories 
covering hybridisation, and entrepreneurship, which stress the social embeddedness 
of economic action, offer a suitable framework to analyse the present situation of 
coffee growers and the PNG coffee industry. The second half of the chapter 
discusses the influences of social action on entrepreneurship. The hybridity arising 
from the merging of indigenous and modern market economies provides a melange 
of economic opportunities. The chapter further discusses the transition from 
traditional to modern leadership in PNG and leaders’ roles in development and 
entrepreneurial activities in transitional economies like PNG. 
 
Development Since the 1950s 
The economies of many developing countries grew uninterrupted after attaining 
political independence between the 1950s and 1970s (Porter et al. 1991; Rondinelli, 
1993). However, in PNG, as occurred in many developing countries, growth faulted 
and began to decline in the 1990s, the second decade after independence. 
Consequently, many developing countries needed development funds and obtained 
loans from international financial institutions from western countries (Rondinelli, 
1993; Saul and Leys, 2006). With this monetary assistance, these financiers 
promoted structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which in the late 1980s and 1990s 
focused on reforming macroeconomics. There were many incidences of SAPs 
undermining policies that were relevant to local institutions in recipient countries 
22 
 
(Stein, 2006; Simon, 2008). With limited acknowledgement of the social, economic 
and political context of recipient countries, these SAPs called for the privatisation of 
state enterprises, land registration and titling, market liberalisation and fiscal controls 
(Ellis, 2006; Hare, 2006; Simon, 2008). For instance, in PNG, the World Bank in the 
1990s encouraged land reform, which was widely opposed, resulting in protests in 
which some university students were shot and killed (Koczberski et al. 2012). 
 
The international and state institutions were often inflexible in their approach to 
development and did not accommodate local values in planning (Porter et al. 1991; 
Rondinelli, 1993). Gardner and Lewis (1996, p. 94-95) argue projects that are 
implemented using “pre-existing social structures” are more likely to succeed than 
those imposing top-down approaches, which gives minimal consideration of local 
structures. Participatory research and rural appraisal planning approaches that allow 
beneficiaries to be involved in planning and implementation are also considered 
more likely to succeed (Rondinelli, 1993; Gardner and Lewis, 1996; Takahashi et al. 
2015). This process is often referred to as ‘bottom-up’ planning, and its 
implementation includes the involvement of project beneficiaries. 
 
Development Theories 
A range of theories has been put forward to explain the development process or the 
lack of development in the developing world. Poverty, inequality and human rights 
have long been significant to development studies (Hettne, 2008). Discourses and 
theories on how to address these challenges have evolved through time (Schuurman, 
2008). Development theories became prominent from the 1950s to the 1970s when 
colonies were attaining political independence. The term economic development 
became a priority as former colonies sought to emulate the development of the west. 
It was thought initially that this would be a simple process of replicating western 
industrialisation. However, the development sequels in many developing countries 
did not meet targets as desired. 
 
Modernisation theory 
Post-war development thinking was heavily Eurocentric with development theories 
and models being based on western economic history and western experiences. 
Modernisation theory (1950s-1960s) encompassed contestations in dual economy 
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concepts and a top-down approach to development (see Kiely, 2006). Modernisation, 
according to many, involves a social change from a less developed society to one that 
characterises a developed society (Thompson, 1987; Curry, 1992; Sahlins, 1992; 
Gardner and Lewis, 1996; McWilliam, 2013; Nhema and Zinyama, 2016). Thus, 
development theorists argued that many developing countries should adopt western 
development models while local agencies and pre-capitalist economies were deemed 
inappropriate, backwards and a barrier to development (Kiely, 2006; Binns, 2008). 
Theorists argued that the experiences of European reconstruction would also work in 
developing countries, but in many cases, they failed to work (Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Concepts of development. 
 
Modernisation discourses applauded the expansion of capitalism and the merits of 
markets, science and technological advances, and argued that these should be 
promoted in developing countries (see Escobar, 2006; Kiely, 2006; Saul and Leys, 
2006). It was assumed that development paths in developing countries should follow 
closely the experiences of the western nations that have high productivity with solid 
industrial bases (Curry, 2003). For instance, modern entrepreneurship was promoted 
to facilitate economic expansion, but this was advocated with little consideration of 
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Industrialisation would increase productivity 
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local agency in transitional economies. Development initiatives like large capital 
investments were concentrated in selected metropolises, and it was presumed that 
these investment benefits would eventually trickle out to rural areas. However, 
theorists like Gunnar Myrdal (1957) and Albert Hirschman (1958) recognised that 
forces were acting against the diffusion of development to the countryside. They 
believed that traditional structures and pre-capitalist economies were undermining 
the advances of western-style capitalism in developing countries (Binns, 2008; 
MacRae, 2016). Also, the large loans, capital and support from western countries did 
not translate into tangible improvements in developing countries. In many countries, 
this led to massive outstanding debts, inequalities, violence and failures in 
administration and civic life (Kiely, 2006). With the failure of modernisation, the 
advocates of the approach blamed development problems upon internal structures 
and barriers within developing countries. 
 
Dependency/Neo-Marxist theories 
Dependency theory or neo-Marxist theories (1960s-1970s) broadly cover discourses 
on world systems theory, political economy and the articulation of modes of 
production (see Saul and Leys, 2006; Conway and Heynen, 2008; Nhema and 
Zinyama, 2016). Like the ardent proponents of modernisation, neo-Marxist theorists 
also believe that the developed state would resemble western-style development 
(Binns, 2008). According to dependency theorists, the assumption that 
industrialisation would increase productivity considerably through technology and 
innovation transfers did not work because of structural barriers, like unequal terms of 
trade between developed and developing countries. Therefore, some development 
critics insist that the influences of western capitalists should be reduced in 
developing countries to allow development to occur and to assist these countries to 
choose their own destiny (Saul and Leys, 2006). This involves breaking economic 
and trading ties with the west. Furthermore, dependency theorists thought that 
western economic models applied in the Third World worked against development 
and caused underdevelopment (see Escobar, 2006; Kiely, 2006; Saul and Leys, 
2006). For instance, in the early growth period of the coffee industry in PNG, the 
high input-high output system of production was promoted among smallholders, but 
it has failed to prosper. The low input-low output production system of smallholders 
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would be explained by Dependency/Neo-Marxists as an outcome of a lack of capital 
and technical skills caused by structural barriers.  
 
In political economy arguments, two distinct world economic systems exist where 
the ‘core’ is the developed nations and the ‘periphery’ is developing countries 
(Hoogvelt, 2001). In terms of flows, capital, financial and technical assistance move 
from the core to the periphery. Furthermore, core countries are assumed to not only 
be the centre for development but are also perceived as exploiting the peripheries for 
resources, and thus explains the underdevelopment of the latter (Stewart, 1986). 
Moreover, this perspective fails to consider political instability or governance and 
corruption issues involving the misappropriation of public funds, which continue to 
hinder development in emerging economies. 
 
Articulation theory (P P Rey, C Meillassoux and H Wolpe) argues that the pre-
capitalist economy prevails in rural areas to subsidise the capitalist economy. There 
is interdependency between the subsistence mode of production and the capitalist 
mode of production (Thompson, 1987; Seok, 1998). For example, when local 
workers are born, they are raised by the subsistence economy and then their labour 
becomes available for the plantations. The plantation sector pays for their keep while 
they are working but does not bear the cost of raising the next generation of workers. 
Through this mechanism, cash crops destined for western markets are produced at a 
minimal cost in the peripheries. In many instances, capital from the core countries 
facilitated production of commodities such as coffee using available labour in the 
peripheries that was reproduced in the subsistence economy. 
 
Marxists also argue that politics could determine the successes of a select group of 
people, while the majority are marginalised thus promoting inequality. Educated 
elites in developing countries accumulate wealth at the expense of the bulk of the 
population; their successes stem from the support that they receive from external 
sources, thus relegating many people to remain poor and in poverty (Gardner and 
Lewis, 1996; Hoogvelt, 2001). Also, local elites can promote underdevelopment 
when they engage in embezzlement and corruption that thwarts development 
initiatives in many developing countries (Saul and Leys, 2006). For instance, the 
PNG government allocated K528 million over a seven-year period (2007-2012) to 
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agriculture including coffee: unfortunately most of this money was stolen by 
politicians and bureaucrats (“Probe NADP scam”, 2013; “K528mil for Agro 
Misused”, 2013; see Chapter 5). 
 
Post-development discourse 
In the 1990s, ‘post-development’ discourse rose to prominence (see Escobar, 2006; 
Sidaway, 2008). Post-development theory criticises current development approaches 
and argues that westernisation leads to the homogenisation of economies and 
societies (Curry, 2003; Sidaway, 2008). It further claims that development ideas and 
thinking have their own approaches, and it depends on one’s perception of what 
development is. Moreover, post-development theory takes a broad view of 
development although sometimes overlooks poverty and entrepreneurship at the local 
level. A further failing of post-development is the limited acknowledgement of local 
social, economic and political systems in traditional societies and the social 
embeddedness of economic action in many transitional societies. 
 
Social Embeddedness 
Studies have recognised that the economic and political systems in traditional 
societies are strongly socially embedded. The social embeddedness of economic 
systems challenges some of the core assumptions of modern capitalist markets and 
Marxist discourses (Block and Polanyi, 2003; Curry, 2003; 2005; Peredo and 
McLean, 2010; Curry and Koczberski, 2012; 2013; MacRae, 2016). Orthodox 
economic theory cannot fully explain the intricacies of non-market economic 
systems that are found in transitional societies (Thompson, 1987). Thus, the 
influence of social embeddedness as a concept of enquiry is gaining prominence in 
the research field of sociology and related disciplines. Karl Polanyi (1944) pioneered 
the work on social embeddedness in the 1940s. However, the approach did not gain 
attention then. It was not until the 2000s that there was a resurgence of academic 
interest in Polanyi’s work, following the decline in structuralist approaches. Recently 
others (e.g. Block and Polanyi, 2003; Curry, 2003; Maucourant and Plociniczak, 
2013) have further expounded this discourse, which is of particular relevance to 





One of Polanyi’s primary premises that deviates from pure economics is his claim 
that land, labour and money are ‘fictitious commodities’ which are always embedded 
in the economy, and therefore, they are not true commodities (Polanyi, 1944; Curry, 
2003; Maucourant and Plociniczak, 2013). He says that real commodities are goods 
that are destined for markets. Polanyi further explains that fictitious commodities 
remain embedded in society. However, when they are subjected to the impulse of 
capitalist markets, they could undermine the market system and thus be detrimental 
to people’s livelihood (Curry, 2003).  
 
Institutional perspectives enshrined in Polanyian concepts also digress from New 
Institutionalist Economics (see Richter, 2015). Polanyi argues that state institutions 
regulate and redistribute fictitious commodities for economic purposes while keeping 
them sustainable. The embeddedness of land, labour and money in the regulatory and 
distributive actions of the state through law, politics and morality facilitates the 
functioning of the economy. In terms of land and labour, regulatory frameworks are 
instituted to keep people on the land, while in the case of money the state regulates 
the money supply and credit (Polanyi, 1944).  
 
Within non-market societies, as is the case in PNG, local communities have their 
own institutionalised systems of rules enshrined in kastom1 (custom), which 
encompass social, cultural, economic and political aspects that influence people’s 
livelihood activities. Polanyi (1944; 1977) argues that in tribal societies, no formal 
institutionalised economic system exists, although production and distribution of 
goods indicates some form of economic system. He claims that these economic 
systems are embedded in socio-cultural relations: in what is now referred to as the 
relational economy. Polanyi (p. 55) further stresses that it is impossible to impose an 
economic system upon a society that is composed of many tribal groups with 
numerous socio-economic and political structures, of which PNG is a case in point. 
Polanyi’s assertions have relevance in the PNG context, where the pursuit of 
modernity has been greatly influenced by the tenacity of indigenous socio-economic 
practices, values, norms and beliefs, which are forceful in rural communities 
(Polanyi, 1977). However, in urban centres, the influence of traditional values and 




Traditional structures, practices and values 
Traditional or indigenous exchange activities can consist of acts of reciprocity where 
the exchange of gifts, goods and labour occur. It can also involve participation in 
distribution which confers prestige or status symbolism on the giver, traditional 
ceremonies to meet obligations, and barter exchange. These activities and their 
associated indigenous structures, beliefs and values can influence livelihood 
decisions and practices such as coffee production in rural communities. In 
transitional societies, people’s involvement in these events is motivated by the need 
to maintain or construct social relationships and identities (Peredo and McLean, 
2010). These traditional structures and values which are expressions of local agency 
sometimes override and undermine modern market values (Curry, 2003; Peredo and 
McLean, 2010; MacRae, 2016). By understanding the transitional socio-economic 
and political contexts in which commodity production is entwined, better insights 
can be gained into the constraints on development (Porter et al. 1991; Gardner and 
Lewis, 1996; Curry, 1999).  
 
Many studies also argue that development policies and initiatives must be 
considerate of local agency (Curry, 1999; 2005; Lummani, 2006; Fukuyama, 2007; 
Curry and Koczberski, 2012; 2013). Sillitoe (2016) argues that grasping and 
appreciating indigenous values and forms of knowledge can shed light on different 
understandings of development and influence development outcomes at the local and 
national levels. For example, this is reflected in low production and productivity in 
commodity crops such as coffee in PNG (Allen, 2009; UniQuest, 2013) because 
farmers often have other priorities for labour and capital investment.  
 
Indigenous exchange and development 
The socio-cultural context influences the societal behaviour of a population. In 
commenting on national identity and governance problems, Fukuyama (2007) and 
Feeny et al. (2012) highlight that traditional socio-cultural practices and values 
impact highly on development initiatives because Papua New Guineans view 
ethnicity and customary obligations as critical agendas for their personhood. For 
example, in government machinery, politicians and senior bureaucrats practise 
nepotism in allocating public goods and services which can be detrimental to 
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national goals and aspirations and also undermine development (de Renzio, 2003; 
Reilly, 2008). 
 
The march of capitalism and modern markets can encroach on fundamental 
traditional socio-cultural values. Often people in transitional societies negotiate these 
influences to suit their needs and aspirations. Thompson (1991) argues that the 
arrival of capitalism led to changing socio-cultural values and norms. Martin (2006) 
illustrates an excellent example of non-capitalist values conflicting with modernity in 
his study on the Tolais2 of Gazelle Peninsula in East New Britain Province (ENBP), 
PNG. He describes the transformations in the lives of the Tolais where they attempt 
to manage the advances of capitalism and Christianity which are colliding with their 
long-held traditional kastoms and belief systems. Martin shows how through the 
process of modernisation, some members of the community thought that the ‘big 
men’ were using customary practices and ceremonies to gain more personal wealth 
and influence than ordinary villagers, thus marginalising the latter. As a result, some 
young men refused to contribute money to host traditional ceremonies because they 
believed that ‘big men’ receive more accolades than them for staging the event. Also, 
some of the young men believed that some forms of customary activities are a waste 
of money and resources, and thus, they refrained from participating in them (Martin, 
2006). These findings explain the growing complexity of how people value and 
perceive traditional socio-cultural activities in contemporary PNG.  
 
Several writers have shown how the socio-cultural embeddedness of economic 
actions influence the transition from subsistence to capitalist production (Polanyi, 
1977; Curry, 2005; Rigg, 2007). Porter et al. (1991) and Sahlins (1992) caution that 
western economic concepts including capitalism are initially often eagerly embraced 
but over time, interest diminishes as people find that capitalism and market-based 
production often conflicts with indigenous socio-economic practices and values. This 
can be seen in the coffee industry in PNG. For example, the PNG coffee industry 
grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s as villagers enthusiastically embraced 
capitalism and coffee production. However, coffee production began to stagnate in 
the late 1980s and has been on a decline since the late 1990s. This I argue is partly 
attributable to the conflict between indigenous economic values and modern market 
practices and values (see Chapter 5).  
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Positive aspects of indigenous exchanges 
Traditional socio-economic and political structures possess some useful values and 
virtues which can be utilised in the modern context of the market. Studies in PNG 
have shown that certain traditional forms of status symbolism and labour exchange 
have merits, which can be adopted in the cash economy (e.g. Finney, 1973; 
Lummani, 2006). In particular, Finney (1968; 1973; 1987 and 1993) in his studies on 
entrepreneurship in PNG argues that Gorokan’s applied pre-capitalist structures and 
values, which enabled them to engage successfully in capitalist enterprises. Thus, 
traditional practices and values that are beneficial for modern economic development 
can be harnessed and applied in development policies and strategies. 
 
Also, indigenous exchange has broadened to include cash as an exchange valuable, 
and this has driven people’s engagement in the modern market economy (Lederman 
2015). Polanyi (1977) confirms that social relationships in non-economic systems 
can bring forth economic activities. For instance, Sharp (2013) argues that the 
eagerness of Mt Hagen people to venture into betel nut (Areca catechu) trading is 
due to the wealth and prestige it brings to those who participated, which is an 
important facet of the indigenous economy. 
 
People’s obligation to meet traditional socio-cultural and economic undertakings in 
their communities can directly influence resource allocation. Studies in PNG have 
shown that income from commodity production can be invested in reciprocal and gift 
exchange systems, which can facilitate the sourcing of labour for commodity 
production (Strathern, 1982a; Grossman, 1984; Thompson, 1987; Curry et al. 
2007a). However, the advent of modernity is modifying socio-economic and political 
structures and values in transitional societies. Consequently, social differentiation at 
the micro-level and new forms of economic development at the macro-level have 
flourished. In many emerging economies, there is a tension between market 
incentives and practices on the one hand and indigenous economic values and 
practices on the other (Martin, 2006). However, when these market and non-market 
economies fuse, they generate new forms of identities and economic logics (Curry, 





In globalisation discourse, proponents argue that capitalism will subsume indigenous 
economies, politics and cultures in transitional societies, which will lead to the 
homogeneity of cultures and economies. This Eurocentric view originates from 
modernisation’s concepts of the hegemonic influences of capitalism and 
westernisation (see above), which acts to undermine and even obliterate other 
cultures and forms of economies. It is argued that globalisation, modernisation or 
westernisation processes would integrate all cultures and economies into a single 
global system: capitalism, polity, and culture (Pieterse, 1994; Curry, 2003; Sklair, 
2006; Potter, 2008). Rowe and Schilling see globalisation differently, they define it 
as “the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and 
recombined with new forms in new practices” (1991, p. 231 in Pieterse, 1994). In 
their view, rather than globalisation homogenising economies and cultures, local 
institutions seem to have mechanisms and structures that integrate influences of 
globalisation to manifest a melange of new forms of hybrid economies, new 
economic logics, diverse political networks and multiple identities (Curry, 2003; van 
der Grijp, 2004; Pieterse, 2004; 2013). Hybridisation is a global phenomenon and its 
manifestations are expressed at the local level, regionally, and internationally 
(Brown, 1972; Sahlins, 1992; 1993; Stewart and Strathern, 1998; Curry, 2003; van 
der Grijp, 2004; Pieterse, 2013; Sharp, 2013). Thus, globalisation encompasses 
multi-faceted hybridisation and dimensions. 
 
While ‘globalisation-from-above’ is associated with homogeneity and oneness, 
‘globalisation-from-below’ tends to be associated with plurality and heterogeneity 
(Falk, 1997). The most common form of globalisation taking effect in developing 
countries is ‘globalisation-from-below’ (van der Grijp, 2004). This approach 
empowers local people to find satisfying spaces in their own communities and 
sometimes resistance arises to counter the advance of globalisation. During the 
colonial period, national movement efforts were directed at colonisers. However, in 
the postcolonial era, people within the nation states are trying to establish their 





The hybridisation process is not new. The resiliency of humans to the vagaries of 
their changing cultural, socio-economic and environment contexts during the pre-
capitalist period has enabled them to survive for thousands of years (Pieterse, 2013). 
Thus, an historical view of globalisation offers insights by distinguishing various 
stages in which the globalisation process unfolds. Pieterse (p. 51) elaborates further 
that history provides insights into “how certain junctures witness downturn, 
upswings of hybridization, slowdowns or speedups.” Before contact with capitalism 
in PNG, the structures in traditional societies had also evolved through the processes 
of migration, tribal alliances, exchanges and redistributions. This gave rise to new 
relationships in exchange and redistribution, and the forming of alliances for political 
purposes like tribal conflicts and in more recent times, political elections.  
 
Hybridisation in PNG context 
PNG’s encounter with globalisation arose through colonisation, and in particular 
with capitalism and Christianity, which gave rise to new identities, interconnections, 
and networks. The intrusion of capitalism into PNG’s indigenous economies has led 
to a process of assimilation and efflorescence of hybrid forms of economies (Curry 
2003; Pieterse, 2004). Thus, there is a continuous process of interaction between pre-
capitalistic and modern economies (Curry, 1992). Thompson (1987) and Seok (1998) 
argue that both capitalist and indigenous economies rely on each other and, therefore, 
are interdependent. In a study on the socio-economic transformation of local 
agencies in the PNG Highlands, Stewart and Strathern (1998) argue that people are 
conscious of modernity affecting their cultural domains and that it also impacts on 
their relationships with other people where they have very little control over these 
influences. This explains the theoretical constructs in globalisation about capitalism 
being powerful as it influences local practices and values including the identities of 
people in transitional societies (Gardner and Lewis, 1996; Thompson, 1991). 
 
Hybridisation or a range of organisational options are also signs of boundary 
crossing in which state’s roles are reduced thereby creating opportunities for new 
players. Although the state has a strategic role to play in development, hybridity 
opens up diverse opportunities for public and private sector participation in the 
economy (Chapter 8). Pieterse (1994) argues that hybridisation leads to collaboration 
between the state, international agencies and civil society organisations (CSOs) to 
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provide a much wider impact globally. For example, in the PNG coffee industry, 
institutional arrangements such as value chain partnerships among private and public 
sector actors and CSOs have been renegotiated, and the blurring of functions appear 
in their operations thus creating new forms of hybridity. Some of the outcomes have 
led to innovative forms of cooperation such as the public-private partnerships (PPP). 
The PPP concept is the latest ‘catchcry’ that the state and international institutions, 
like the World Bank, have been promulgating with the involvement of CSOs (Loftus, 
2008). In PPP arrangements, the state dispenses its regulatory role while the private 
sector entity does most of the implementation (Chapter 8). Although PPP has its 
faults, it has the potential to open up communal resource ownership for development 
such as collective action in coffee cooperatives, which would have wider 
implications for sustainable community development (Loftus, 2008).  
 
In the above section, the broader theories on development such as modernisation, 
dependency and post-development were discussed. Many of the development 
initiatives based on western development models when they are implemented in 
developing countries have either failed or achieved little. The social and economic 
actions are inseparable in transitional economies like PNG. These non-market 
systems seem to stifle pursuits in modern market systems. However, within the 
indigenous economies, there are also positive attributes, which can be adopted when 
pursuing modern market enterprises. The themes and concepts discussed in this 
chapter will assist in contextualising discussions in subsequent chapters. 
 
Transitional Economy Entrepreneurship 
The coalescing of the indigenous economy and modern market economy can 
generate a diverse range of hybrid economies and create opportunities for economic 
action and entrepreneurial activities. This section outlines the challenges for 
smallholder coffee farmers, plantation and block owners as they manoeuvre between 
non-market and modern market systems to engage in business activities. The section 
then discusses the categories of leadership and deliberates on each class of leader’s 





Entrepreneurship is a modern market concept where innovative ideas are developed 
and organised to create a business in a marketplace (Peredo and McLean, 2010). The 
intensification of globalisation with expanded market opportunities is creating more 
spaces for business activities (Tanas and Audretsch, 2011; Pieterse, 2004; 2013). In 
transitional economies, entrepreneurial progress has not been as successful as in 
modern market societies. Modern forms of economics and business imperatives are 
sometimes not well understood or considered too challenging and unfamiliar for 
many indigenous business managers and entrepreneurs.  
 
As illustrated above, in many transitional economy countries, social and economic 
relations are conditioned by customs and traditional activities. Often economic 
actions are for the communal good and not based purely on individualistic motives 
(Polanyi, 1977). Hoogvelt (2001) concurs that in tribal societies, the economy is not 
formally regulated and households sustain their livelihoods through communal 
sharing of resources like capital, labour and land. However, modern market systems 
promote self-interest so that individuals accumulate wealth, which at times 
undermines local customary obligations (Hoogvelt, 2001; Cahn, 2008; Purcell, 
2013).  
 
The standard notion of entrepreneurship in transitional economies like PNG needs to 
be modified to accommodate communitarian enterprises that involves relatives and 
community members (Peredo and McLean, 2010). Similarly, Sautet (2013, p. 399) 
affirms that enterprises in transitional economies benefit more from “local productive 
entrepreneurship” than from “systematic entrepreneurship.” Sautet defines local 
productive entrepreneurship as businesses that exploit local opportunities and have 
simple operating structures with local orientation, while systematic entrepreneurship 
has wider networks and more complex structures with an outward orientation. 
Enterprises with a simple structure and with a local orientation are suitable for 
emerging economies as their structures often accommodates indigenous practices and 
values, thus ensuring sustainable enterprises. In this section, I outline constraining or 




Challenges of entrepreneurship 
In transitional economies like PNG, where traditional forms of social relations, status 
symbolism and gift exchange are still strong, their influences can sometimes erode 
entrepreneurial activities, which are based largely on modern market concepts. Non-
market forms of values and structures remain an enduring influence, and, as stated 
above, they can permeate modern business activities (Banks, 1999; Cahn, 2008; Gray 
et al. 2014; MacRae, 2016). Entrepreneurs must therefore be aware of this when they 
manage modern enterprises in rural PNG. Curry (2005) argues that a capitalist view 
of business success in a transitional economy omits indigenous socio-economic 
values which are embedded in everyday practice. When non-market systems like 
social obligations are not managed effectively, businesses are likely to be 
undermined and even collapse. For instance, Curry (1999) gives examples of trade 
stores in the Sepik region, PNG, being closed because stock and recurrent income 
from the enterprise was diverted to the traditional socio-economy affecting 
restocking. Similar poor business practices have been observed in other parts of the 
Pacific and elsewhere (e.g. van der Grijp, 2004; Peredo and McLean, 2010; Purcell, 
2013).  
 
Moreover, the success of an entrepreneur in a community in PNG can lead to 
reprisals because of jealousies from rivals (Sillitoe, 2000). In PNG, skirmishes in 
rural communities sometimes stem from the success of their tribal enemies and, thus, 
resemble conflicts of the pre-capitalist era (Strathern, 1982a). For instance, before 
colonisation, tribes had long-term enemies often spanning multiple generations 
especially in the Highlands. At the onset of colonisation, the rule of law came into 
effect but various tribal groups’ animosities lingered. Thus, when a minor scuffle 
among members of rival tribal groups now occurs, it can lead to full-scale tribal 
warfare. Strathern (1993) argues that in the competitive modern market economy 
where people are competing to accumulate wealth, envy and subsequent reprisal 
from rivals can occur. Donaldson and Good (1988) reveals that in Simbu, ‘big men’ 
deployed youths to destroy the property and business assets of enemy tribesmen 
through warfare. Sometimes, pure resentment of another’s business success can 
trigger tribal wars, with the intention merely to destroy the assets of a successful 




Wealth accumulation and distribution has long been part of PNG culture. Traditional 
leaders in the pre-capitalist era amassed wealth and redistributed the wealth through 
kin and social networks to maintain social and kinship relationships and to reinforce 
their status. Traditional leaders shared the wealth through gift exchange and assisted 
kin when they had traditional social obligations to meet or ceremonies to host. In this 
way, traditional leaders earned the respect of villagers who honoured their traditional 
leaders. In contrast, western capitalism promotes individualism where an 
entrepreneur can amass wealth for their own personal benefit and use. Wealthy 
villagers who choose not to be involved in traditional exchange systems may 
encounter reprisals or resistance from sections of their own community (Strathern, 
1993). There is an expectation from relatives and villagers that wealthy villagers 
should invest some of their wealth in indigenous exchange. For example, villagers 
acquiring wealth through coffee production and other business activities who do not 
act appropriately may sometimes be targeted by poorer members of the communities 
through cherry theft or the uprooting of newly planted coffee seedlings (Donaldson 
and Good, 1988; Chapter 7). Sometimes disgruntled kin and other villagers may 
initiate moves to reclaim clan land on which the entrepreneur has coffee gardens, 
blocks or plantations. This lack of community engagement through participation in 
community socio-cultural activities and obligations can undermine business success.  
 
Positive influences on entrepreneurship 
On the other hand, certain forms of non-market values and practices have the 
potential to facilitate modern entrepreneurship in rural areas. For instance, the 
demand for cash for use in indigenous exchange stimulated villagers to earn cash 
from coffee (Sexton, 1988), thereby increasing coffee production. Moreover, some 
coffee farmers mobilise reciprocal labour exchange to recruit labour for developing 
new coffee gardens, harvesting cherry and weeding (Collett, 1992; Stewart, 1992). 
Sourcing of labour through indigenous exchange to address household labour 
shortages has also been reported in the cocoa and oil palm industries (e.g. 
Koczberski, 2007; Curry and Koczberski, 2012). Thus, non-market systems can 





Rural socio-cultural structures and values have also facilitated local people’s 
engagement as entrepreneurs in commodity production. The socio-cultural behaviour 
of locals played a major role in influencing the early adoption of coffee in PNG. For 
example, Finney (1973; 1987) observes that traditional concepts of status and 
prestige made villagers enthusiastic to plant coffee and prompted others to venture 
into businesses. The colonial administrators noted that when neighbouring clansmen 
started planting coffee, rival clansmen from nearby villages also wanted to cultivate 
coffee so they could be seen to be of equal status (Finney, 1968; 1973). The colonial 
administration in recognising this phenomenon established more nurseries and 
distributed seedlings to villagers to plant. Thus, locally defined concepts of prestige 
have influenced entrepreneurial activities like coffee farming, raising poultry, 
managing trade stores, citrus farming, and running transport businesses (Grossman, 
1984; Finney, 1973; 1987).  
 
Entrepreneurs in rural areas who maintain good relationships with villagers in socio-
economic and political undertakings can facilitate the sustainability of their 
enterprises. In PNG, some European planters and local entrepreneurs are successful 
because they are able to mix indigenous and capitalist values of managing their 
businesses by pursuing a balanced approach that maintained both traditional and 
modern market systems (Finney, 1973; Donaldson and Good, 1988). Early European 
planters who had better relationships with villagers by fostering effective community 
engagement found that it facilitated the smooth running of their coffee plantations: 
often the plantation would have fewer disputes, minimal coffee theft and farm 
labourers were not harassed. In another example, Zimmer-Tamakoshi (1997) argues 
that a female entrepreneur from Bundi in Madang Province, PNG, had a successful 
business because of her generous relationship to her kinsfolk. By gaining the support 
of her clan, it means that she could operate her business without fear of becoming a 
target for robbery. Cahn (2008) in a study of Samoan entrepreneurs shows how their 
participation in local socio-cultural practices raised the number of regular business 
clients, and also assisted them in maintaining their motivation. Thus, successful 
entrepreneurs often know how to manage their operations profitably and to 




In another study in Samoa, Purcell (2013) affirms that when the external mentor’s 
advice to the entrepreneur conflicts with local cultural values, the entrepreneur would 
either disregard or alter the advice to meet his or her own requirements. For instance, 
Samoan entrepreneurs go to great lengths to fund social obligations such as weddings 
and mortuary ceremonies. They can even close their businesses to attend the event or 
allow their employees to attend which may take several days. Purcell notes that while 
some local cultural practices are harmful and could undermine the efficient 
management of businesses, other aspects relating to traditional social relations 
facilitates the resiliency of the enterprise by way of social function.  
 
The opportunities originating from socio-economic and political dimensions 
necessitate entrepreneurs to adapt and to take advantage of opportunities to advance 
their businesses (van der Grijp, 2003; Gray et al. 2014). According to van der Grijp 
(2003), Penisio Tialetagi, a successful entrepreneur from Wallis Futuna gained 
access to land through traditional kin networks to expand his business interest. 
Penisio was allowed to build his stores on his extended family’s land and in return, 
the children of his kin after completing their education would work in his businesses. 
Penisio was fulfilling family obligations, which in turn facilitated his access to land 
to grow his business. These examples provide insights into how engaging in non-
market activities can positively influence modern businesses to be successful. 
 
Business success depends on suitable managerial skills of business leaders. Business 
leaders make pertinent decisions and possess knowledge and expertise to mobilise 
and deploy personnel, social networks, and capital resources (Poon et al. 2009; 
Thorpe et al. 2009). Business leaders must also have the ability to inspire and 
connect with others to enhance social capital and group cohesion within a business 
group (Thorpe et al. 2009). Gray et al. (2014) argue that leadership is especially 
critical in community businesses in which the enterprise caters for the collective 
interests of the wider community. Community-based enterprises embody a 
cooperative approach that encapsulates the social, political, economic and cultural 
dynamics of a community (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006). Thus, either in community 
or individual-owned business pursuits, success hinges on the savvy of business 
leaders to harness both non-market and modern market economies. In sum, 
successful entrepreneurs’ have blended market ideals with non-market values to 
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forge hybrid forms of enterprises (Curry, 1999; 2005; Schaper, 2002; Morrison, 
2008). The next section discusses the evolving leadership in PNG. 
 
Leadership in development 
Leaders perform important roles in non-market and modern market systems in PNG. 
The types of leadership in PNG that are evolving with the shift from non-market to 
market societies can be placed into three categories. Leaders or ‘big men’ are, in 
essence, ‘traditional’, ‘transitional’ and ‘modern’ leaders (Figure 2.2). The onset of 
capitalism in PNG brought major changes in socio-cultural identities and leadership 
(Thompson, 1987; Gardner and Lewis, 1996); leaders’ successes depend on how 
effective they are able to manage socio-economic and political relationships to their 
advantage and that of their communities. As discussed below, certain traditional 
forms of prestige, social relationships and indigenous exchange have been adapted to 
modern capitalist activities (Finney, 1973; 1987; Zimmer-Tamakoshi, 1997; Sillitoe, 
2000; Joseph, 2015; Lederman, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Transition of leadership in politics and business activities. 
 
Traditional leader 
Prior to European contact, pre-capitalist traditional ‘big men’, sometimes referred to 
as ‘great men’, were traditional leaders of their clans or tribes (Table 2.1). In 
Melanesian society, leadership is achieved, unlike most other places where it is 
inherited (Silllitoe, 2000). The traditional leaders were at the forefront of the 
ModernPre-modern
Traditional leadership
e.g. Luluias, tutuls, tribal or 
clan leaders and great men
Transitional leadership
e.g. First and second 
generation business leaders, 
LLG councillors,  village 
court officials and present 
village leaders
Modern leadership
e.g. Third generation 
business leaders, senior 
public and private sector 




transition to the modern market economy in their areas (Lindstrom and White, 1997; 
Lederman, 2015). Typically, they had superb oratory skills, were reputable fighters, 
forceful, and wealthy with several wives to manage their pig herds and had many 
food gardens (see Sahlins, 1963; Brown, 1995; Finney, 1993; Lederman, 2015). 
Today’s traditional leaders are village court officials and village chiefs in rural areas. 
Traditional leaders make speeches at rituals and lead in intertribal relations and 
ceremonial distributions and exchanges.  
 
Table 2.1: Types of leadership and their characteristics. 
Types of 
leaders 
Leadership period Characteristics of leaders 
Traditional  Pre-1930s to the 
late 1950s 
• Renowned warriors and splendid orators 
• Wealthy with several wives 
• Illiterate 
Transitional  From the late 1950s 
to the mid-1970s 
• Limited education 
• Have engaged in modern cash economy as farm 
workers, proletarians or entrepreneurs 
• Some were either first or second generation 
business leaders 
Modern  From the 1980s to 
present 
• Possess basic to higher level of education 
• Have extensive social networks and contacts 
• Some are third generation business leaders 
(Sources: Finney, 1968; 1973; 1987; 1993; Martin, 2006) 
 
In the colonial era, traditional ‘big men’ became intermediaries between the colonial 
administration and their people (Brown, 1972; 1995; Howard and Rensel, 1997). 
Their engagement was critical in the newly colonised territories when colonial 
administrators sought to apply the rule of law. Traditional leaders were respected and 
had control over their people so they became the obvious choice for official 
government duties as ‘luluais and tutuls’3 to represent their people in the 1940s and 
1950s. They assisted in administering their own people (Brown, 1972; 1995).  
 
When innovations like coffee were introduced, traditional leaders became the 
mediums for technology transfer, and were also the early adopters. Traditional 
leaders have sometimes been alluded to in the literature as ‘big men’ farmers 
(Finney, 1968; Donaldson and Good, 1981; Thompson, 1991), business leaders 
(Finney, 1968), large holders (Finch, 1991), big peasants (Collett, 1992) or petit 
bourgiese (Stewart, 1992). Thompson (1991) characterises the multiple identities of 
the ‘big men’ as entrepreneurs, accumulators, appropriators of surpluses and power 
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brokers. European planters and colonial administration officers supported traditional 
leaders to engage in commercial activities such as coffee cultivation (Finney, 1970; 
1993; Finch, 1991; Brown, 1995; Chapter 8). Therefore, traditional leaders were 
instrumental in the early growth and expansion of the coffee industry.  
 
A few traditional leaders later used their socio-cultural networks for their own 
political and economic gain. Some traditional leaders in PNG and Oceania used their 
authority as leaders to embezzle public funds, request gifts or services from the 
people for whom they were responsible (Sahlins, 1963; Finney, 1968; Brown, 1995; 
Howard and Rensel, 1997; Adams, 1997). For example, these traditional leaders 
were appointed to oversee some of the first central coffee nurseries, where most of 
the coffee seedlings intended for distribution were planted in their own gardens 
(Donaldson and Good, 1981). 
 
Transitional leader 
The second group of leaders can be categorised as ‘transitional’ leaders: they are 
either political or business leaders, who originate from pre-capitalist settings. Some 
have been exposed to modern market systems, and thus have their sights on 
entrepreneurial activities. Transitional leaders are ‘hybrid’ leaders that possess 
leadership values that personify indigenous and modern market values. In the past, 
some transitional leaders pursued political aspirations and eventually replaced the 
pioneer luluais and tutuls. According to Brown (1995), the traditional leaders were 
ageing so the colonial administration sought to replace them with younger leaders 
who had been former village police or court officials. They were fluent in 
Melanesian Pidgin (lingua franca) and had attended formal schools. These 
transitional leaders were to become councillors in the Local Level Governments 
(LLGs) in the early 1950s. The councillors took most of the powers away from the 
luluais and tutuls (Donaldson and Good, 1988).  
 
Some transitional leaders are entrepreneurs; Finney (1987; 1993) classifies them as 
first and second generation business leaders. These business leaders are some of the 
pioneer Papua New Guineans to engage in capitalist entrepreneurship. The first 
generation business leaders are sometimes involved in both politics and business 
activities, although only a few concentrate solely on business activities. The second 
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generation business leaders mostly focus on business and a few pursue individualistic 
approaches to business. Many of the first and second generation business leaders 
appropriate traditional social networks to solicit cash contributions from relatives to 
acquire capital assets or to engage in commercial enterprises (Finney, 1973; 1987; 
Curry, 1999; Sillitoe, 2000). Finney (1968; 1973) explains that the act of cash 
contributions resembles ‘wealth-pooling’ which is a traditional means of communal 
activity. A few of them progressed to represent their people in national politics while 
some became successful businesspeople.  
 
Sillitoe (2000) discounts the perception that ‘big men’ easily transit into business 
activities because they are leaders. He argues that many business leaders are not 
necessarily ‘big men’, but rather their success in business enterprises was facilitated 
because of their prior interaction with the capitalist market economy, early education 
or work experience. Zimmer-Tamakoshi (1997) also concurs that being a traditional 




The present ‘modern’ leaders or younger generation leaders are sometimes referred 
to negatively as ‘big shots’4 (Martin, 2009) or third generation business person for 
those involved in businesses (Finney, 1993). Modern leaders are educated and have 
responsible positions in the public or private sector, politics and business and are 
very individualistic in their business pursuits. Many of the attributes and approaches 
modern leaders employ are similar to the concepts and values promulgated in 
‘personal viability training.’ Personal viability training has been gaining prominence 
in the wider community (Haro, 2010). Multinational companies, CSOs and state 
institutions from Oceania have engaged the Entrepreneurial Development Training 
Centre, part of Grassroots University for Life, to provide personal viability training 
(Teare, 2013). Bainton (2010) argues that the personal viability concept envisions 
that rural people should break free from the grips of traditional customs and values 
inherent in PNG traditional societies to prosper through modern individual 
entrepreneurial engagement. While personal viability training considers customary 
activities, in reality, personal viability training places little emphasis on traditional 
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activities and values. This notion of ‘breaking free’ of customs evades the realities of 
the indigenous economy.  
 
Many villagers in PNG perceive modern leaders as being selfish opportunists who 
use traditional structures to advance their own business opportunities and personal 
wealth over their traditional social obligations (Sykes, 2007; Martin, 2009). In group 
businesses, Sillitoe (2000) argues that modern leaders also use traditional social 
structures like the transitional leaders to mobilise their people to contribute cash to 
acquire business assets as mentioned above. However, over time modern leaders pay 
out shareholders and so end up individually owning the enterprises. Shareholders in 
this instance are villagers who have contributed cash, sweat equity and land to either 
purchase plantations or develop blocks. Furthermore, some of the modern leaders 
have intentionally excluded shareholders who are either clan members or traditional 
rivals in group-owned businesses and pursue their own interests unhindered in the 
hope that they would take over the business (Quinn, 1981; Grossman, 1984; Finch, 
1997; Bainton and Macintyre, 2013). 
 
Some senior civil servants or modern leaders have harnessed indigenous exchange 
networks to advance their own private ambitions in the modern market economy. 
The recruitment of relatives and friends is part of the wantok system5, a traditional 
cultural phenomenon widespread in Melanesian societies (Nanau, 2011; McGavin, 
2016). The wantok system facilitates reciprocity and exchange and forms part of the 
relational economy, but can also be used to misappropriate assets and public/private 
sector funds. For instance, based on kinship relations, some PNG bureaucrats appoint 
wantoks6 to positions within the government and use them as conduits to defraud 
public funds, thus undermining economic progress (Reilly, 2008). 
 
To sum, traditional leadership styles continue to persist and influence transitional and 
modern leaderships. The advent of modern economic and political systems has 
provided new forms of engagement in business and politics. For instance, when 
relatives or wantoks are recruited, it is deemed nepotism in western societies. 
Conversely, Papua New Guineans view recruiting relatives as strengthening 
traditional relational networks. The transitional leadership style incorporates 
attributes from traditional and modern leadership, which is a hybrid form of 
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leadership. Transitional leaders effectively apply indigenous and modern market 
values to their advantage. Therefore, transitional leaders are likely to be effective in 
business and political activities in PNG. 
 
Indigenous enterprise management 
Indigenous entrepreneurs employ business-friendly indigenous practices and values 
which have assisted them to be resilient in operating modern businesses. Purcell 
(2013) argues that indigenous entrepreneurship is different, which means that locals 
operate these types of ventures, and their values, goals and style of business 
management would be very different from non-indigenous entrepreneurs. Non-
indigenous entrepreneurs operate their businesses according to modern market 
imperatives. A few coffee plantations and blocks in PNG that operate as indigenous 
enterprises do so with some success. This section discusses the challenges of PNG 
entrepreneurs’ participation in modern market enterprises. 
 
Many local business managers and entrepreneurs in PNG lack a proper 
understanding of the fundamentals of managing commercial businesses, although, it 
can be noted, that some have succeeded in these endeavours. Many entrepreneurs 
including coffee growers fail to see their coffee farms as enterprises, which require 
investments to generate profits that would subsequently increase the wealth of their 
households or shareholders. In the managed subsector, poor management is evident 
when coffee income is diverted in the relational economy such as social obligation 
and gift exchange rather than in farm inputs (Afflick, 1981; Paliau, 1981; Finney, 
1987; Taru, 1995; Hunt and Eko, 2001). Moreover, Turner (1986) and Donaldson 
and Good (1988) argue that coffee plantations are a business, but local business 
managers and owners manage them as vehicles to attain prestige.  
 
In the market economy, time means productivity and eventual profits so successful 
entrepreneurs are conscious of how they use their time. Crocombe et al. (1967) 
contends that successful entrepreneurs in PNG devote minimal time to social 
obligations and more time to their businesses. Successful entrepreneurs are aware 
that their businesses contribute to wealth accumulation and help them gain prestige 
so they spend more time on managing their businesses rather than on activities that 
draws on valuable business time. However, these entrepreneurs do not ignore their 
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social obligations and continue to participate in activities that maintain their social 
networks. 
 
The harmonisation of market-enhancing traditional values and modern market values 
and practices can be useful to ensure business success. Sharp (2012) argues that 
when close relatives of a betel nut seller request financial assistance, the seller is 
unlikely to ignore the request because the betel nut seller knows that his relatives 
render social security for his business activities. Also, coffee entrepreneurs have 
appropriated communal labour assistance from kinsfolk to develop their plantations 
and blocks (Stewart, 1992). These entrepreneurs at times are in return obliged to 
assist in socio-cultural demands of kinsmen (Finch, 1991; Merlan and Rumsey, 
1991). Further, Weiner (2013) argues that entrepreneurs have deployed traditional 
relations to mobilise labour to engage in commercial activities.  
 
Conclusion 
During the colonial era, development theorists espoused the view that capitalism and 
westernisation would modernise indigenous societies and bring about economic 
development in transitional economies. However, successes are very minimal. The 
most recent critique of development theory, post development discourse also argues 
that there are numerous perspectives to development thinking. Post-development 
theory takes a broader view than earlier development theories but overlooks poverty 
and social embeddedness. Much of the failings in development arise from theorists 
giving little attention to indigenous social, economic and political processes in 
traditional societies. These non-market systems are socially embedded, which means 
that social, economic and political processes are interwoven. It is for this reason that 
traditional structures, practices and values have an enduring influence on the 
transaction of economic resources like capital, land and labour, which continue to 
influence modern market systems.  
 
Entrepreneurial activities are based on capitalist market systems and in developing 
countries one must be conscious of traditional socio-economic logics. Moreover, the 
influence of the market economy is forceful and may lead the indigenous economy to 
weaken over time. However, the hybridity emerging from the merging of indigenous 
economy and modern market systems is generating a diversity of economic 
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opportunities for people to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Hence, 
entrepreneurial engagement in rural areas requires business leaders to be conscious 
of conflicting economic and social values and to find a balance between them. 
 
Leadership is critical to the success of entrepreneurial pursuits. Traditional leadership 
is fading, and transitional and modern leadership are at the forefront of transition. 
Some leaders concentrate on business activities while others manage both business 
and leadership. However, modern leaders are associated with increasing levels of 
abuse and corruption. Therefore, hybrid transitional leaders are likely to be 
successful candidates for business and politics in the transitional economy. 
 
In the next chapter, I will present the research methodology that was used in this 







1. Kastom is a Melanesian Pidgin term that refers to a set of traditional rules, values, 
norms, ceremonies and behaviours that regulate a particular society in a particular 
space in time. It is not static as relationships can bring forth new forms of kastom. 
It may differ from one society to another in PNG (Martin, 2013). 
 
2. Tolais are an ethnic group from the Gazelle Peninsula, ENBP, PNG. 
 
3. Luluias and tutuls were traditional leaders who represented tribal and clan groups 
respectively. They were appointed by Australian colonial administrators to assist 
in the governance activities of the state. 
 
4.  ‘Big shots’ are negatively perceived as individualistic in their pursuit of wealth 
and prestige at the expense of their kin and community members (Martin, 2013). 
 
5. Wantok system is a complex network of indigenous exchange, which is based on 
kinship and ethnic relationships (Nanau, 2011; McGavin, 2016; Walton, 2016). 
 
6. Wantok is Melanesian Pidgin word and means one who speaks the same language 
or a person from the same area, region or even a country depending on where the 
subject is located. It has connotations of bias or favouritism towards one’s own 












The preceding chapter reviewed the literature on development theories with 
particular emphasis on social embeddedness and its influence on entrepreneurial 
development in the context of transitional economies like PNG. This chapter 
described the field sites and the research and methodological framework applied in 
this study. Data collection focused on gathering information to assess the reasons for 
the decline in coffee productivity, production and quality, and to establish why some 
smallholder coffee farmers and plantation owners were resilient and efficient in 
farming coffee while most others had collapsed or were in long-term decline. This 
chapter also examines the legal, ethical and moral considerations of the research, and 




Fieldwork was undertaken in the coffee-growing provinces of Morobe, Eastern 
Highlands (EHP), Western Highlands (WHP) and Jiwaka. The four provinces were 
selected because they are the main coffee producing provinces in PNG and host 
many smallholdings, blocks and plantations. Two study sites were chosen to 
undertake data collection among smallholder coffee farmers. These smallholder 
study sites were the Wain area in the Wain/Erap local level government (LLG), 
Morobe Province (Figure 3.1) and the Korofeigu area in the Lower Bena LLG, EHP 
(Figure 3.2). Coffee plantation related data were collected at four plantations in EHP 
and Jiwaka Province (Figure 3.3). Chain leaders, coffee industry experts (CIEs) and 
other informants were interviewed across all four provinces, and two respondents 
were surveyed in Port Moresby, National Capital District (NCD) and one in 













Figure 3.3: The map of coffee plantation study sites (Source: Kingsten Okka). 
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Three phases of fieldwork in PNG were undertaken. The main data collection phase 
was from December 2013 to April 2014, with additional short field trips made in 
March 2015 and January 2016. The latter two field trips were conducted to fill 
information gaps identified while analysing the data and writing up of the thesis. 
When I returned to Perth, Australia, I occasionally communicated with PNG 
informants by phone and email to obtain recent production data, and insights into 
certain trends on analyses and to gather further historical information. 
 
Smallholder farmer interviewees 
Smallholders in the study sites in Morobe Province and EHP were coffee farmers. 
Farmer holdings of coffee ranged from several hundred coffee trees to just less than 
5 ha. In the recommended triangular spacing, a standard density would be 2,667 
coffee trees/ha. Smallholders cultivate coffee as one of several livelihood strategies. 
For some farmers, coffee remains the principal source of household income that 
finances their livelihood needs such as school fees, medical costs, household 
expenses and socio-cultural commitments, the latter being particularly common in 
their communities. The average household size for the Neknasi and Korofeigu 
groups was 4.5 members, less than the national average household size of five.  
 
Other respondents 
Another group of respondents were current coffee business owners, shareholders of 
coffee blocks and plantations, representatives from civil society organisations 
(CSOs), and former employees in the coffee industry such as plantation business 
managers, bank employees, extension advisors and CIC employees. For the chain 
leader interviews, they were current coffee processors or exporters. 
 
Research Approaches/Framework 
The changing social world poses a complex dilemma for researchers as to how to 
identify suitable data collection techniques (Letherby, 2013). Two common broad 
approaches underlie research in the social sciences: quantitative and qualitative 
methods. The quantitative approach is informed by objectivism and the positivist 
paradigm which entails deductive reasoning, while the qualitative method is more 
informed by subjectivism and encompasses inductive reasoning and focuses on 
processes and meanings (Dunne et al. 2005; Table 3.1). Many have argued that 
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quantitative and qualitative are from different schools of thought (see Letherby, 2013 
for a discussion). However, this argument no longer holds; there is a process of 
assimilation where two or more research approaches can be integrated and applied 
simultaneously (Letherby, 2013), in what is often referred to as a mixed method 
approach (see below).  
 
Table 3.1: Quantitative and qualitative approaches to research in social science. 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Realism: independent of reality Nominalism: dependent on researcher’s 
perspectives 
Positivism: seeking the truth Anti-positivism (constructivism): there are 
multiple ways of arriving at a truth 
Determinism: already regulated with values 
and beliefs 
Voluntarism: acting according to free will 
Nomothetic: using given laws to explain 
events, scenes and others 
Idiographic: seeking to understand 
individual cases 
(Source: Adapted from Dunne et al. 2005) 
 
Quantitative and qualitative methods have their own paradigms, which at times used 
on their own fail to show the complete picture of a particular phenomenon (O’Leary, 
2014). Quantitative and qualitative research approaches are further explained below. 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research 
Quantitative approaches attempt to seek the ‘truth’ by using defined hypotheses, 
variables and statistics (O’Leary, 2014). They tend to apply deductive logic to verify 
or falsify a hypothesis or theory. The quantitative research approach entails numbers, 
measurements and assesses the distribution and extent of a phenomenon (Berg and 
Lune, 2012). In quantitative methods, structured questionnaires can be used to 
interview respondents to generate numeric data; statistical tools are then used to 
analyse the collected data (Creswell, 2014). The statistically analysed data can then 
be used to reveal frequencies and/or occurrences from which interpretations can be 
made (Creswell, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, qualitative research endeavours to answer the questions of how, 
when, what and why of a phenomenon. Qualitative approaches seek to investigate 
and understand the meanings and values of people and accept there are multiple 
realities. Inductive logic is applied in which theories are derived from the data 
collected (O’Leary, 2014). Qualitative data also offers in-depth information and 
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helps better explain quantitative data. For example, trends and changes regarding 
coffee production measured using quantitative methods can be more 
comprehensively explained by drawing on the experience/knowledge of the 
respondents through interviews. Qualitative methods can also generate sufficient data 
from which trends can be established, but the approach is typically specific and 
cannot usually be generalised and applied to other situations (Winchester and Rofe, 
2010; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). In essence, the qualitative research approach 
focuses on studying the personal experiences or structures within a particular society 
(Winchester and Rofe, 2010; Creswell, 2014). These structures and experiences may 
include aspects of an interviewee’s identity and viewpoints. Qualitative approaches 
not only identify attitudes and opinions but also assist in classifying logics among 
various responses and how they relate to everyday life (Hay, 2010). 
 
Mixed methods 
Historically, cultural anthropologists, applied psychologists and sociologists were 
said to have used mixed research approaches in their work before the term mixed 
methods was created (Warner and Lunt, 1941; Gans, 1962). Many research 
methodologists credit Campbell and Fiske (1959) for conceptualising the use of 
several methods of measurement, and further introducing the idea of triangulation in 
which quantitative and qualitative methods were used as part of validating research 
findings. Later, others drew on Campbell and Fiske’s work to popularise 
triangulation (e.g. Webb et al. 1966; Denzin, 1978). In the 1970s, there were long-
standing theoretical debates about the boundaries of quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives in research. However, the thesis of Howe (1988) introduced a new level 
of thinking in which the two research paradigms were seen to complement each other 
when used simultaneously. From the 1990s to the present, many social scientists 
have accepted the ‘third research paradigm’ - the mixed methods approach 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Hesse-Biber (2015) posits that the mixed methods 
approach generates synergy and strength in which one research approach lends 
credence to the other and vice versa. The mixed methods approach also recognises 





Triangulation of data is an integral component of mixed methods as it can illuminate 
complex problems (see Elwood, 2010; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). 
Triangulation aims to validate data or a phenomenon using a number of research 
theories, methods and data sources and, thus reduces uncertainty in data 
interpretation. For instance, triangulating can be applied on quantitative and 
qualitative data to cross-check and validate certain data and thus generate new 
insights (Elwood, 2010; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). The complementary 
application of quantitative and qualitative research approaches can lead to making 
intelligent and practical synthesis (Johnson et al. 2007; Creswell, 2014).  
 
Mixed method approaches are widely used in the social sciences. Some examples of 
studies in PNG that have used mixed methods to investigate problems confronting 
smallholder farming communities include Koczberski et al. (2001), Lummani 
(2006), Curry et al. (2007a) and Inu (2015). The mixed methods used in these 
smallholder studies have proven to be suitable because they provide flexibility and 
permit the use of multiple research approaches to solicit data and validate data 
through triangulation. For instance, Inu (2015) deployed a number of research 
methods such as focus group discussions, questionnaire surveys, and semi-structured 
interviews to elicit information from smallholder coffee farmers in Bena, EHP. 
Similarly, Lummani (2006) employed weekly monitoring surveys in which six cocoa 
farming households in the Buin area in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
were initially interviewed. Over a three-month period, Lummani collected data on 
the amount of cocoa sold by the households and also made observations on socio-
cultural activities during the monitoring period. Thus, mixed methods have proven to 
be a relevant research method for conducting socio-economic studies among 
smallholder farmers in PNG. 
 
The mixed methods approach was employed in my study and included interviews, 
focus groups, case studies, observations and secondary data. The multiple research 
approaches enabled respondents from various sectors of the coffee industry to 
contribute and provide insights into opportunities and problems in the PNG coffee 
industry. Other data sources included proposals developed by plantations and 
cooperatives, company profiles, website pages, government reports, and relevant 
literature about the industry. When applying the mixed methods approach in my data 
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collection, I was conscious of the advantages and disadvantages of mixed methods 
outlined in Table 3.2 (see also Johnson et al. 2007; Driscoll et al. 2007). 
 
Table 3.2: Advantages and disadvantages of mixed methods. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 Offers multiple ways of investigating a 
situation. 
 Multiple methods in which observations, 
secondary data, and questionnaire surveys 
and pictures can be used. 
 Preliminary and in-depth data analyses can 
generate new theories or hypotheses, which 
can lead to new areas for further studies. 
 The combined approach allows the 
researcher to be aware of practical 
limitations that can be faced in the course of 
conducting the survey and thus changes can 
be incorporated. 
 The use of several research methods permits 
the researcher to comb a wider area of 
research interest than would have been 
possible using a single approach. 
 Conducting research can be costly. 
 Researchers with poor statistical skills 
can be a limitation in analysing 
quantitative data. 
 After data collection, quantifying 
qualitative data can be time-consuming. 
 An enormous amount of data can be 
collected and in many cases, not all 
data will/can be used. 
 
The mixed methods approach was considered the most suitable method for my 
research for the following reasons.  
 The coffee industry comprises of various actors who do not operate 
harmoniously. Distrust and suspicion are pervasive among key value chain 
actors. For example, smallholders believe that processors and exporters do not 
pay the full value of their coffee when they sell to them (see Murray-Prior et al. 
2008; Batt et al. 2009). Thus, there was a need to compare responses among 
farmer groups and other chain actors. 
 The study assessed the whole performance of the industry, and therefore it was 
important to gather views from a wide cross-section of the industry using a 
range of data sources and methods.  
 The coffee industry is dynamic as the socio-economic and political 
environment continues to evolve. In this evolving environment, the use of a 
single research method to solicit data and subsequent extrapolation of data 
would not have captured the diverse array of problems that constrain coffee 
productivity or the strategies chain actors were using to counter problems and 
advance their coffee enterprises. Thus, a holistic approach that employed 




Figure 3.4: Schematic representation of research methodologies and methods that are 




The main respondent groups and data collection methods employed for each group 
are outlined in Table 3.3. Data sourced from interviews, focus group discussions and 
documents about the PNG coffee industry were verified through triangulation. For 
example, in the smallholder questionnaire survey, quantitative data collected on 
coffee production constraints were restated in qualitative interviews to elicit detailed 
information from the same respondents. The farmers who participated in the 
interviews and focus group discussions were members of cooperatives. The data 
sourced were recorded on the questionnaire sheets while many of the qualitative 




The smallholder farmers selected were members of coffee cooperatives of the 
Neknasi and Korofeigu groups. The Neknasi group has been in existence for seven 
years while the Korofeigu group has operated for five years. This was unusual 
because most cooperatives fail in much shorter periods. Also, a Coastal group (Wain 

































Table 3.3: The categories of respondents, data collection methods, topics covered and purposes of the research methods used. 




Interviews Family labour, production constraints, land access, coffee 
production experiences, cherry theft, lawlessness, managing 
social obligations, low prices, market access and 
entrepreneurship. 
Identify constraints on smallholder coffee 




Household demographic data, farm size, income sources, 





Group profile, group cohesiveness, member farmers’ 
expectations of partners, leadership problems, accountability, 
relationship problems and coffee production. 
Identify factors influencing relationships with chain 




Multiple case study approach. Information gathered from 
focus group discussions was used to develop case studies. 
Two case studies were developed on grower groups 









Estate history, ownership, plantation size, annual yields, 
management strategies, labour needs, time allocated to farm 
activities and processing facilities. 
Establish factors why certain plantations are resilient 
and successful. Establish factors why certain 
plantations have failed or poorly managed. 
Qualitative 
interviews 
Land tenure, lawlessness, production and processing 
problems, cherry theft, labour constraints, managing social 
obligations and credit access. 
Case studies Multiple case study approach. Data gathered from qualitative 
interviews and questionnaire surveys. 
Four case studies were developed for various 






Views of CIEs on the managed subsector: land ownership, 
prospects of reviving the coffee industry and socio-economic 
expectations. 
Perspectives of CIEs on the future of the coffee 
industry particularly on the status of the managed 
subsector. 
Chain leaders 






Extension services, the quantity of coffee transacted, grower 
payments, prices offered, and period of relationships. 
Identify factors in the relationship with farmers and 
groups which were assisting in farm productivity 
and improved incomes. Qualitative 
interviews 
Relationship problems with growers, coffee quality, cash 
advances offered, chain leaders’ expectations of growers and 




In the first phase of fieldwork in 2014, group leaders provided a list of farmers of 
their respective groups, from which farmers were selected for interviewing using the 
cluster sampling technique (see O’Leary, 2014). However, during fieldwork, some 
farmers were unavailable for interviews, so other farmers who were present were 
interviewed. Ninety-one households were selected from the two study groups: 47 
coffee farmers from the Neknasi group and 44 from the Korofeigu group. 
 
The unavailability of farmers for interviews can be a challenge while conducting 
fieldwork in PNG. Some farmers who were selected from the group list had travelled 
out of the village for several reasons including visiting relatives in towns or other 
villages, or attending socio-cultural events or attending to household needs away 
from the home. To avoid this problem, I took the following steps to ensure there 
were adequate number of farmers for interviewing: 
• Several villages at each study site were selected to ensure there were many 
farmers available from which farmers could be identified and interviewed. The 
farmers interviewed were members of cooperatives.  
• A broad range of different age groups (18 years and above) of coffee farmers 
participated in the interviews.  
• Varying household sizes did not limit me when choosing farmers for the 
interview. 
 
The above considerations enabled me to ensure there were sufficient numbers of 
farmers present in each village for interviews.  
 
In total, four weeks were spent on conducting the surveys and questionnaire 
interviews with the 91 selected smallholder households. The members of the Neknasi 
group who were interviewed came from Sogam, Muniengan, Sikilan, Babong and 
Bosagen villages (Plate 3.1). My assistant and I resided at Sikilan Village for two 
weeks with a night spent at Bosagen Village. Since Badong and Bosagen villages 
were inaccessible by road in April 2014, my assistant and I walked 4 km to conduct 
the surveys with farmers from the two villages. As for the Korofeigu group, the 
respondents came from Bush Bata, Beneveto, Sozugu, Namaro, Nagamito and 
Nupasafa villages (Plate 3.2). In the Korofeigu area, my assistant and I resided in 














My research assistant carried out the majority of the 91 questionnaire surveys. He 
was an experienced interviewer and had conducted surveys for other researchers 
from the CIC. Before his recruitment, I explained the purpose of the study to him and 
how the survey instrument was to be completed. I also ensured my assistant trialled 
some questionnaire surveys to gain hands-on experience before collecting the data 
for the study. I conducted the informal interviews so that I could also ask additional 
questions when interesting themes or topics were raised from the semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
The household questionnaires sought household demographic data, and data on 
coffee garden size, income sources, coffee yields, other livelihood activities apart 
from coffee, and labour allocated to coffee production. Further information was 
solicited through semi-structured interviews on problems ranging from labour 
shortages, other production constraints such as poor land access, knowledge of coffee 
farming, cherry theft, lawlessness, social problems, volatile prices, market access 
problems, and entrepreneurial activities. Constraints on coffee production that were 
covered in questionnaire surveys were again probed in qualitative interviews to 
understand the issues in more detail. When I left the field, occasional telephone calls 
were made to clarify information on particular issues I gathered from respondents.  
 
Sometimes it was difficult finding a suitable time to interview farmers. In the Wain 
area, fieldwork was made easier by the Neknasi group leaders who announced our 
arrival to those who were selected to be interviewed. Farmers waited patiently 
through the day to be interviewed. In the Korofeigu area, interviews with Korofeigu 
farmers were conducted in the early mornings and evenings. The evening interviews 
were held at the house where I resided. 
 
Some farmers in the Korofeigu area enquired what benefits they would gain from the 
surveys and questionnaire interviews that I conducted. A few were confident that 
some tangible benefits had to come to them for participating in the interviews, 
although, they did not specifically indicate monetary benefits the intent was obvious. 
The query about the benefits came from young village leaders who were either 
village court officials or aspiring councillors. I made it clear that there would be no 




when I encountered problems in executing my surveys in the field, I was able to 
consult my supervisors for guidance. 
 
Focus groups 
I conducted two focus group discussions with smallholder farmers: one at Sikilan 
Village for the Neknasi group and the other at Beneveto Village for the Korofeigu 
group. Both male and female coffee farmers participated in the focus groups. 
Thirteen farmers belonging to the Neknasi group were chosen randomly to 
participate in the discussions at Sikilan Village while ten farmers at Beneveto Village 
participated. The discussion environment was informal, which enabled group 
members to contribute ideas and their points of views. Focus group discussions were 
used to triangulate and explain in more detail certain constraints farmers encountered 
in coffee production. This included the strategies farmers applied to alleviate their 
production problems that had been elicited from the smallholder surveys and 
questionnaire interviews. This type of triangulation is commonly termed as 
‘between-methods’ triangulation, which involves both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches (Johnson et al. 2007). The focus group discussions also explored: reasons 
why farmers formed groups to farm coffee and engage in collective marketing; and, 
the efforts of chain leaders and lead partners to develop the production capacities of 
farmers and leadership in farmer groups. Information was also gathered on group 
profiles, group cohesiveness, leadership problems, members’ expectations of 
partners, accountability of leaders in farmer groups and relationship problems with 
partners. The focus group discussions also assisted in establishing the commonalities 
in the expectations of farmers for their partners. Case studies on the cooperatives 
were developed from information gathered from the focus group discussions 
(Chapter 6). 
 
Supplementary information was later also sought from participants in the focus group 
discussions. Also, informants from CIC, government or CSOs who have had contact 
with the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups also provided additional information.  
 
Focus group discussions can reveal the factors that motivate farmers and the types of 
decisions and priorities a certain group of people make in their lives (Berg and Lune, 




contributions causing a synergistic effect in the discussions. After a topic was 
introduced, participants discussed it among themselves and a few of them would then 
speak on behalf of the group. Since some were either shy or could not articulate their 
contribution clearly in Melanesian Pidgin, they allowed spokespersons to translate 
and air their contributions to me. The spokespersons summarised and translated what 
other members contributed and in the process they may have omitted pertinent points 
and possibly misrepresented others. Members of the focus group discussions 
revealed some of the failures of their group leaders’ performances. The leadership 
subject was deliberated in group discussions with farmers from the Neknasi group 
but in individual conversations, farmers hardly talked about the inadequacies of their 
leaders especially about abuse of group assets (Box 8.1). Korofeigu group farmers 
did not talk about leadership problems; nor did they single out their leaders’ 
problems. However, communication seems to be an issue among members of the 
Korofeigu group, and a farmer raised this problem in the focus group discussions, but 
others did not elaborate. 
 
Plantations  
Four plantations were selected from the Obura/Wonenara District in EHP and North 
Waghi District in Jiwaka Province. The plantations were Akai Plantation, Etawa 
Coffee, Beser Coffee and the OK Corporation. The selection of the plantations was 
defined by the characteristics of the institutions and in this instance the ownership 
type, size of holdings and plantation location. The plantations were investigated to 
establish the problems they had experienced, which had led to some of them being 
abandoned or struggling to survive. I was also interested in identifying the strategies 
successful plantations were employing to remain viable1. 
 
The four plantations selected were nationally owned and included (Figure 3.5): 
a) A group-owned plantation operating successfully with its management 
problems under control. 
b) A group-owned plantation and poorly managed, struggling and almost 
abandoned.  









Figure 3.5: Case studies of plantations representing four scenarios. 
 
For the plantations, three main data collection methods were used: informal 
interviews; questionnaire surveys; and, plantation records and documents. A 
structured questionnaire was conducted with business managers and owners to solicit 
information on estate history, ownership, farm size, annual yield, community 
engagement, labour requirements, business manager’s time spent on the farm, and 
the types of processing facilities. 
 
Some problems were confronted during the execution of the questionnaire survey. 
The Akai plantation had no records on coffee production. After the departure of the 
chain leader in 2001, records of the farm that were kept at the nearby central coffee 
mill were either destroyed or removed during frequent changes of coffee 
entrepreneurs who rented the factory (Box 7.1). Thus, information was sourced from 
shareholder group leaders, former business managers and informants. The OK 
Corporation, a group-owned company was reluctant to supply information that was 
related to production and finances of its plantations, but provided other information 
on the history and farm management (Box 7.3). In the case of Beser Coffee, the 
plantation was abandoned for more than 15 years, and records were lost (Box 7.4). 
The new owner was revitalising the farm and processing facilities and only had 



















Semi-structured interviews were used to solicit data on land tenure, lawlessness, 
production, processing, cherry theft, labour, management, community engagement, 
partnerships, waste management and credit difficulties. Informal discussions 
followed the questionnaire surveys to source additional information from business 
managers and owners. Further information was sought through casual conversations 
with informants who formerly had worked for the plantations or were the customary 
landowners, elites from the community or community leaders. Supplementary data 
were collected from relevant industry reports and company profiles of plantations. 
 
A CIC officer assisted me with gathering further information from three of the 
plantations located in EHP. In August 2014, the officer collected information on the 
following: fortnightly wages paid to farm workers, management fees and other 
details of plantation owners. In my second and third fieldwork phases, I revisited the 
four plantations and gathered more information from the owners, business managers 
and informants to fill gaps in my data. Following each field trip, I also made 
telephone calls to business managers and informants to solicit information on topics 
where gaps were evident in my analyses and write-up.  
 
From the information generated, four case studies were developed. The use of case 
studies for my examination of plantations was considered an appropriate method for 
my study for the following reasons: 
a) The approach provided historical information on a plantation, especially on 
factors contributing to their successes in the early growth of the industry. 
b) Provided detailed insights into the reasons for the current successes of some 
plantations and what factors were undermining operations of some plantations 
that have led to failures.  
c) Provided information, which could be applied to developing suitable 
recommendations to rectify problems that were undermining plantation 
operations. 
 
Case study research is an approach, which involves the detailed study of a specific 
case. It can be described as an intense examination of a single unit or several 
instances of a particular occurrence or experience to investigate in-depth a 




phenomenon so as to understand similar or larger phenomena at the broader level 
(Hancock and Algozzine, 2006; Berg and Lune, 2012). The case study research 
design adopted in this study was historical, intrinsic, pragmatic and purposeful in 
nature (Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4: Case study designs, characteristics and methods of soliciting data. 
Designs Characteristics Methods 
Historical  Historical case studies describe programs, events, 
or organisations that have changed over time (e.g. 
after acquisition or development of plantations and 




Intrinsic Cases that are unique, misunderstood or 
misrepresented thus require confirmation of the 
facts. Intrinsic case studies attempt to understand 
more about a group, individual, event, or 
organisation and extrapolate the findings to 
broader populations (e.g. focus the study on each 
situation of a plantation so that its case is 
extrapolated to the larger conditions of the 
managed subsector. Also, case studies on grower 
groups can be inferred to other grower groups). 
Interviews, 
observations 
Pragmatic It entails being practical and being able to 
investigate a phenomenon, which is of interest at a 
point in time. Cases that involve current events 
such as why some plantations were successful 
under the present socio-economic context (e.g. 




Purposiveness Researcher’s focus on a particular event that will 
help to affirm an argument, disprove or generate a 





(Sources: Hancock and Algozzine, 2006; O’Leary, 2014) 
 
The type of approach to my case studies was descriptive and furnished detailed 
narratives of the phenomenon within their contexts. According to O’Leary (2014) 
case studies can offer a unique perspective, debunk a theory where an example 
shows that a commonly held view is disputed. Case studies can reveal new trends, 
contribute supportive evidence for a theory, and accord new insights into a 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the worth of a case study approach is that it can be used 
to discover solutions to real-life difficulties. My plantation case studies aim to 
provide detailed insights into the varying socio-cultural factors influencing the 
operations of plantations and to identify possible solutions to address some of the 




Coffee industry experts 
The CIE interviews were conducted among former plantation business managers, 
factory managers, CIC officers, management agency advisors; and present plantation 
owners, exporters, and processors. Because of the wealth of experiences they have of 
the coffee industry, I refer to them as CIEs. In total, 32 interviews were recorded. 
The purpose of the CIEs’ interviews was to expand further on data gathered in the in-
depth plantation case studies and to obtain a broader perspective of the performance 
of the managed subsector and the overall coffee industry. It provided an avenue to 
triangulate the data, which also enriched the data collected for the plantation case 
studies. Interviews focused on gathering information on the future of the managed 
subsector and the associated influences of socio-economic and political factors. 
Although semi-structured interviews were used to solicit data, CIEs were also 
encouraged to supply supporting information that was essential to this study. 
Moreover, informal conversations including telephone calls and emails were 
exchanged with some respondents to seek further clarification on information gained 
in interviews.  
 
Interviews with CIEs were conducted in several places that included plantations, 
coffee factories, residential areas, offices, vehicle repair shops, smallholder coffee 
gardens, restaurants, town parks, CIC offices, in vehicles and even on roadsides. The 
interview sites for CIEs included Mt Hagen, Waghi Valley (Banz, Minj, Kigabah 
Estate), Goroka, Kainantu, Lae and Port Moresby. Respondents from Mt Hagen and 
Jiwaka were interviewed in locations where the interviewees felt either comfortable 
or it was convenient for them. Most of the respondents in EHP came from rural 
districts like Lufa, Bena, and Daulo and were interviewed in Goroka town. The 
majority of the respondents from Kainantu and Obura/Wonenara districts were 
interviewed in urban Kainantu. Two CIEs with plantations in the Central Highlands 
were interviewed in Port Moresby: they were residents of Port Moresby during the 
period of the first phase of fieldwork in 2014. A retired CIE was interviewed at his 
home in Brisbane, Australia. Some of the CIEs were still involved in the coffee 
industry while some had moved on to other vocations, retired, or retired to their 





The initial selection of CIEs was based on my knowledge of who were the prominent 
industry players in PNG. Those who were interviewed in the early stages of 
fieldwork passed me contacts of their former colleagues to interview. Follow-up 
contacts were made, and subsequent appointments were made for interviews. This 
way of recruiting respondents is called snowball sampling (Handcock and Gile, 
2011). It is a process where existing respondents assist in recruiting additional 
interviewees. CIC officers also helped in identifying several CIEs. The mobile phone 
was crucial in making contact with this group of respondents.  
 
A few problems were encountered during the survey of CIEs. Some of the CIEs were 
busy and wanted the interviews to be completed quickly, and this affected the 
amount of information I was able to gather.  
 
Chain leaders and lead partners 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from chain leaders and lead 
partners. This group of respondents were chain actors or lead partners who were 
currently engaged in the coffee industry. Some CIEs, who were initially interviewed 
and involved in the coffee industry as chain leaders, were interviewed a second time. 
Interviews and questionnaire surveys were used to collect information on the 
extension services offered to farmers, the quantity and quality of coffee transacted, 
payments on coffee delivered, prices offered to growers, and partnerships with 
farmer groups, plantations or blocks. Semi-structured interviews were employed to 
collect information on relationship problems between partners and growers, coffee 
quality, cash or farm input advances offered to farmers, their expectations of 
growers, and the types of agreements chain leaders have with farmers. The chain 
leaders’ interviews also helped to identify commonalities and divergences between 
the focus group discussions with farmers, particularly on the relationship difficulties 
and expectations. 
 
Most of the chain leaders were located in urban centres while a few were located in 
rural areas. Letters were sent to known processors, exporters and CSOs explaining 
the purpose of my study. Thereafter, phone calls or personal visits were made to 
make appointments for interviews. Some chain leaders declined to be interviewed. A 




representative were interviewed. The chain leaders who were approached were 
known companies in the local coffee industry that had links with certain farmer 
groups or farmers who sold their coffee directly to their mills. In other cases, farmers 
were receiving interest-free cash loans or farm inputs as advances from chain leaders. 
Lead partners are those who had training or extension programs on coffee 
development and were working with farmer groups.  
 
Some problems were encountered when collecting data from chain leaders and lead 
partners. One employee of an exporting company declined to participate. Also, many 
of the chain leaders interviewed were reluctant to provide quantitative data such as 
the coffee prices offered and the quantity of coffee they purchased from partner 
farmers. A few respondents did supply this information. Those who offered 
information gave guesstimates as it was evident they were not keen to reveal 
commercial information relating to their company. The data sought included the 
coffee prices chain leaders offered and the quantities of coffee they purchased from 
farmers, especially those from farmer groups.  
 
Secondary data 
Prior to and following fieldwork, relevant literature was reviewed to gain 
information on the early growth of the coffee industry in PNG and the factors that 
were contributing to its decline in recent decades (Chapters 4 and 5). The literature 
review provided insights into the industry and brought to the fore challenges that 
were curtailing the growth of the coffee industry. The synthesis of past information 
served as the basis for which new knowledge could be generated from my research 




Upon returning to Curtin University from my first period of fieldwork, audio 
recorded interviews and notes were revised and transcribed thoroughly. After my 
second phase of fieldwork, I was able to fill in the missing data identified from the 
first phase of fieldwork. In the third field trip, I obtained smallholder production data 





Qualitative data were coded and checked, cleaned and entered into the computer. 
Qualitative interviews recorded on audio were replayed, and hand-written notes 
taken during formal and informal interviews were typed and edited. 
 
The hand-written responses in qualitative interviews were diligently reconciled with 
records on the audio to confirm the accuracy of note taking. The reconciling of notes 
added to the written feedback of interviews and formed part of my quality checks on 
the data. Most of the interviews were conducted in Melanesian Pidgin. 
 
Qualitative data analyses included the content analysis of the interview transcripts to 
identify important commonalities and divergences. The data were analysed by 
reviewing, synthesising, interpreting and categorising the information obtained from 
the interviews, focus groups and informal conversations. The rigorous analysis 
generated a variety of themes under which the responses were categorised and coded. 
In some cases, cross-case analyses were conducted to check on a phenomenon, 
which could be similar to other cases, in particular for the plantations. Important 
subjects that arose from the qualitative data were explored further in subsequent 
interviews and monitoring surveys. Some unexpected trends from analyses were also 
pursued from follow-up interviews. This approach formed an essential component of 
the study.  
 
The quantitative data were entered into MS Excel spreadsheets and were summarised 
using Pivot Tables and Pivot Chart Reports.  
 
During data analyses, the productivity calculations seemed very high for smallholder 
farmers in the Wain and Korofeigu areas. The high productivity did not align with 
recent findings (e.g. UniQuest, 2013). One explanation for the problem was that the 
area of coffee was calculated using the tree population in the coffee garden. The 
actual area of coffee was probably larger because of wider spacing and the non-
replacement of dead coffee trees when I used the standard triangular plantation 
density of 2,667 trees/ha. A CIC officer travelling to Wain and Goroka areas in July 
2015 measured a defined area (30 m x 30 m) and counted the number of coffee trees 
in it. He measured four gardens for each site, so an average was calculated for the 




Goroka area (Asaro, Kabuifa and Nagamiza), which is adjacent to Korofeigu area 
was 2,537 trees/ha. Thus, the average tree population for the smallholder garden for 
the two study sites was 2,569 trees/ha, which was applied in recalculating coffee 
productivities for the two study sites.  
 
Ethical Consideration 
The legal, moral and ethical dimensions of my research were considered so that there 
was ethical integrity in the findings of this study (see O’Leary, 2014 for details). I 
ensured for example: 
 Respect for the societal norms and values of the communities I worked in by 
ensuring that the purpose of the study was initially explained to group leaders 
(village leaders), CIEs, chain leaders and lead partners and they approved the 
conduct of the interviews. Before conducting the interviews with respondents, 
the purpose of the study was also explained to them. 
 Respondents provided their consent for interviews and confidentiality of 
respondents was a must. Before the interviews, respondents signed a consent 
form. I ensured that respondents did not feel obligated to participate in the 
interview because I am an employee of CIC. This study ensured that ethical 
considerations were paramount and appropriate approvals were sought from 
approving agents at Curtin University in Australia and the CIC in PNG.  
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Research 
One of the advantages I had in conducting this study is that I have a good knowledge 
of the coffee industry. This enabled me to make contact with relevant companies, 
organisations and individuals to make arrangements for the interviews, case studies 
and focus group discussions. Moreover, I understood the socio-cultural context of the 
respondents, which facilitated a smooth interview process and data analysis. 
However, I was also mindful at times of the knowledge that I have of the industry, 
and that the socio-cultural environment may overshadow or bias my interpretations 






The other advantage is that the bulk of the respondents were willing to participate in 
the interviews. Since I come from the CIC, interviewees generously offered 
information and also ventured into discussing other problems that affected them in 
the coffee industry.  
 
The disadvantage was that the interviews were conducted in Melanesian Pidgin and 
during the translation from Melanesian Pidgin into English, some of the meanings 
could have been misrepresented, or taken out of context or lost. Therefore, every 
time translations were made, I ensured that the translations were consistent with the 
intent of the questions that were used to solicit the data, so the questions guided me 
during the translation phase of my data. Also, being fluent in both Melanesian Pidgin 
and English helped ensure the accuracy of the translation. 
 
In summary, this chapter presented the research methodological framework, the 
origin of mixed methods and its merits for use in the social sciences. The chapter 
discussed in detail the survey methods and the types of data that were collected from 
respondents: coffee growers; CIEs, chain leaders; and lead partners in the PNG 
coffee industry. It further outlined the sources of secondary data and how the data 
were analysed. The chapter provides the legal, moral and ethical dimensions that 
underpin this study. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages in conducting this 
research were also discussed. 
 
The next chapter outlines the period when the coffee industry in PNG rapidly grew to 
become a major cash crop for growers and the state. As a result, public institutions 








1. Abandoned or struggling blocks were plentiful; however, in the selection of 
successful businesses, some plantations met this criterion while I could not 
identify a single block that was performing well. I therefore selected only the 













Chapter 3 presented the research and methodological approaches employed in this 
study to investigate the development of the coffee industry in PNG. This chapter 
begins by describing the growth of the PNG coffee industry. It provides insights into 
coffee cultivation in pre- and post-independence PNG. The discussion in this chapter 
is in three sections corresponding to the main phases of development of the industry: 
the first phase of coffee development from the 1930s to 1960; the second phase of 
expansion was from the early 1960s to 1990; and the third phase of decline from the 
1990s to the present. 
 
Coffee in the Territories 
Coffee from the provenance of Ethiopia was first cultivated in New Guinea in the 
19th century. In 1884, Britain annexed eastern New Guinea as British New Guinea 
while Germany administered the northern coastline as German New Guinea 
(Sinclair, 1995). In 1907, British New Guinea was transferred to Australian 
administrative control with a subsequent renaming to Papua. Australia assumed 
control of German New Guinea in 1919, after World War 1. The Highlands region of 
mainland New Guinea remained unexplored by Europeans until the late 1920s. Both 
territories were administered by Australia until PNG became an independent state on 
the 16th of September 1975. 
 
The introduction of coffee in PNG is sketchy as the coastlines of mainland New 
Guinea, and its islands had contact with many European explorers, seafarers, traders, 
missionaries, entrepreneurs and colonial government officials. They may have been 
conduits for ushering in coffee seeds or seedlings into mainland New Guinea or to 
some of its many islands. However, it is believed that because of the commercial 




introduced coffee (Sinclair, 1995). Commercial production of coffee in the then 
British New Guinea and German New Guinea protectorates began in the lowlands in 
the late 1880s (Elworthy, 1967). Some of these plantations were in the Finschhafen 
area of Morobe Province, and later in the New Guinea Islands. A few years later, 
coffee plantations of Robusta were flourishing in New Britain and Bougainville in 
the first wave of coffee plantation development.  
 
In British New Guinea, several Robusta plantations were established as well as an 
Arabica plantation in the Sogeri Plateau, in the Central Province (Cartledge, 1978; 
Sinclair, 1995). Severe fungal disease, namely coffee leaf rust (CLR), first appeared 
in 1903, but officials did not confirm it was CLR as limited knowledge was available 
about the disease. Villagers involvement in Robusta and Arabica coffee production 
in the territory was minimal during this period. A few village community groups, 
cooperatives, individuals, companies and business partnerships owned coffee 
plantations (Crocombe, 1965). Moreover, the first reported case of villagers earning 
cash income from coffee was in 1928 in Oro Province when farmers received 229 
pounds (Sinclair, 1995). Thus, in the lowlands, Papua New Guineans had owned and 
operated coffee plantations with a small number of villagers planting coffee in their 
gardens during the formative years of coffee introduction. During World War I and II 
many of the agricultural plantations including Robusta coffee plantations were 
destroyed (Dwyer, 1954).  
 
In 1928, the colonial Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries developed the 
first experimental Arabica coffee plantation at Wau, Morobe Province (Sinclair, 
1995; West, 2012). The Wau coffee plantation had only one coffee variety named 
Typica; its seeds were sourced from Jamaica in the Caribbean (Cartledge, 1978). A 
German planter who previously had a coconut plantation on Emirau Island, New 
Ireland Province later bought the experimental plantation (Sinclair, 1995). Other 
Arabica coffee seeds of ‘commercial varieties’ like Arusha, Bourbon, Mundo Novo, 
Caturra, and Catimor were then introduced. Lutheran missionaries were believed to 






The date of entry of coffee into the Central Highlands is unknown. The first 
Europeans to make contact with the people of the eastern parts of the Central 
Highlands were Christian missionaries in the late 1920s ahead of gold prospectors 
and colonial patrol officers (Brown, 1995). Therefore, coffee is likely to have been 
introduced by missionaries into the region (Finney, 1970) where it was to become a 
valuable commodity in the ‘last frontier’ - the Central Highlands. Coffee plantings on 
mission stations were established as early as 1935 at Raipinka and Asaroka mission 
stations in EHP, and Ogelbeng and Korn Farm in WHP. Several more mission 
stations in the region had coffee trees which were planted for personal consumption 
only, although missionaries were cognizant of its commercial value. They focused 
instead on spreading God’s Word and converting Papua New Guineans to 
Christianity.  
 
First Phase of Coffee Expansion, 1930s to 1960 
As mentioned earlier, the first phase of coffee expansion began during the 1930s to 
1960. The development of the coffee industry essentially occurred once coffee made 
entry into the populous Central Highlands where it spread very rapidly. Coffee 
quickly became associated with the region’s social, economic and political 
development. 
 
An experimental coffee plantation was established at the Highlands Agricultural 
Experimental Station in Aiyura, EHP, in 1937. In the 1940s, colonial government 
officials began to encourage villagers to plant coffee (McWilliam, 2013). Plantation 
workers, early European settlers and government officials were responsible for 
disseminating coffee among villagers. Villagers living near mission stations would 
have known about the value of coffee from the missionaries or local church layman, 
and this made it easier in subsequent years for the distribution of seeds and eventual 
adoption of coffee among villagers. In the 1950s and 1960s, coffee plantations were 
established and rapidly expanded, largely in EHP. 
 
Early coffee diffusion among villagers 
The colonial officials under the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit 
earnestly promoted coffee as a cash crop between 1944 and 1945 in the region east of 




coffee exchange for cash and store goods occurred indicating the beginnings of the 
‘infant’ industry. Finney’s (1973) earlier assertion that the coffee industry began in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s is misleading. In correcting this claim, Bourke (1986) 
argues that an early start had commenced in the mid-1940s that laid the groundwork 
for villagers to engage in the cash economy.  
 
Regional expansion 
The colonial administrative centre for the entire Highlands region was Goroka. It was 
also the site of the commencement of the coffee industry and to this day, Goroka 
remains the coffee hub of PNG. Coffee production started in Goroka and quickly 
spread to Kainantu to the east and the provinces to the west including Simbu, WHP, 
Enga and Southern Highlands Province (SHP).  
 
The colonial administration believed that coffee would facilitate economic 
development in the Highlands of PNG as coffee was already thriving on 
experimental and observational plots. Diana Howlett (1962), in her work conducted 
in the Goroka area, confirms that coffee appealed to colonial administrators and early 
settlers as a cash crop because it could generate high returns per unit area of planted 
coffee. 
 
Highlands plantation development 
The coffee plantations laid the early infrastructure in the 1950s and 1960s for the 
smallholder sector to grow in the Highlands. Finch (1991) claims that plantation 
development boosted marketing opportunities, hence, enthusiasm for coffee 
cultivation among villagers gained in momentum. He gives further examples of 
villagers in the Tairora area, EHP, having small coffee plots in the 1950s. During the 
plantation development phase, many rural areas were opened up with access roads, 
making government services in urban centres accessible to villagers. Also, the bulk 
of the plantations acted as mini-economic hubs in rural areas. For example, during 
pay-days, villagers and women would sell garden produce and trade store goods to 
plantation workers. Some plantations also developed wet and dry coffee mills that 







Plate 4.1: A coffee factory complex at Nomba Coffee Plantation, Upper Asaro, EHP 
in 1979 (Source: John Fowke). 
 
Leahy’s Erinvale 
The establishment of Erinvale Coffee Estate near Goroka in 1948 was the start of the 
second wave of coffee plantation development in PNG, and this was the first for the 
Central Highlands. Jim Leahy1, in a logistics role for his brothers’ business interests 
and adventures, developed Erinvale plantation (Donaldson and Good, 1988; Sinclair, 
1995). Jim Leahy also opened the first commercial store in Goroka and the region to 
serve the European community and the local people (Finney, 1973). The exchange of 
cash for goods began in earnest for villagers who had been receiving wages as casual 
workers or cash payments for road construction or proceeds from land sales to 
Europeans for coffee or livestock production. Interestingly, the first exchange of 
village coffee in the Central Highlands in the late 1940s was not paid in cash but 
with store goods which took place at government stations (Bourke, 1986). 
 
The Highlands Farmers and Settlers Association (HFSA) was a political association 
which was instrumental in shaping the early development of the coffee industry. The 
HFSA’s main objective was to protect the interest of members in relation to coffee 
industry development in PNG. It was established in 1953, and Jim Leahy became the 




office in Wau, Morobe Province. The organisation’s membership comprised of 
European planters and prominent local coffee entrepreneurs like Sir Sinake Giregire, 
Sir Dupre Dumun, Bono Azanifa and Kofikai Sabumei. Some of these ‘big men’ 
used their association with HFSA to launch political careers at the national level by 
entering the then House of Assembly, now the National Parliament. 
 
In the early 1950s, Dan Leahy Senior, Jim Leahy’s sibling, developed a coffee block 
at Kuta, WHP. However, Dan Senior discovered that coffee struggled to grow at 
Kuta where it was cooler, and thus he identified a location at a lower altitude in the 
Nebilya Valley where it was warm and more conducive to growing coffee. There he 
established the Korgua Coffee Plantation (Sinclair, 1995). At around this time, 
Bobby Gibbes, an aviator, had begun developing Kimel (Box 7.3) and Tremearne 
plantations in the Waghi Valley. These were some of the pioneer European planters 
who established commercial coffee plantations. The arrival of many more European 
planters in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in plantation development in EHP and WHP 
expanding rapidly. The early European planters were from diverse backgrounds: 
drivers, clerks, alluvial miners, patrol officers and pilots among them. The EHP and 
WHP continue to host the bulk of the plantations in PNG today. A small number of 
plantations are also found in Wau, and SHP.  
 
‘Green Gold’ excitement 
In 1952, Jim Leahy received an excellent return on his investments in coffee, and his 
coffee sale was heralded as Green Gold in the mass media in Australia (Sinclair, 
1995). The excitement began with a shipment of coffee from Erinvale Estate to 
Sydney where Jim Leahy received a high price that was beyond his expectations. A 
reporter from Melbourne picked up this intriguing story, and it received extensive 
media coverage in Australia (Sinclair, 1995). The story prompted an influx of new 
European investors to PNG, who were keen to cultivate coffee (McWilliam, 2013). 
The newspaper reporter soon made a fact-finding trip to the Central Highlands to 
confirm these developments and more publicity ensued. Some European planters 
were gold prospectors who turned to coffee production, so the Green Gold 
connotation resonated. Prior to coffee’s emergence as a high return investment, New 
Guinea had earlier been famous for the 1920-1930 Gold Rush in Wau and other parts 




Land acquisition for plantations 
Many Europeans came to the Central Highlands and purchased land to develop 
coffee plantations. The European settlers acquired customary land through the 
colonial administration from local villagers. In some cases, villagers invited 
Europeans to come to their area and establish plantations on their land (Finney, 
1970). The reason for the invitation was to show rival tribes that the plantation, a 
wealth generating enterprise, existed on their land, thus having prestige significance. 
 
From 1952 to 1955, a vast area of fertile customary land for agricultural development 
was alienated for coffee plantation development in the EHP (Finney, 1973). Much of 
the alienated land was of significance in the communities where these plantations 
were established. Some portions of land were former battlefields, unused land, 
disputed land, or swampy marshland. The colonial administration’s intentions were 
for enemy tribesmen to work together on these plantations so that peace efforts were 
achieved through these interventions (Sinclair, 1995; McWilliam, 2013). The 
warring warriors mutually benefited from the commercial development by receiving 
income from the land which was once a battlefield or disputed land and also by 
working on the plantations and earning wages. 
 
The very first land alienated for agricultural development in the Central Highlands 
was in 1947 (Howlett, 1962). The early European settlers paid in cash and other 
items to the landowners for the land. The luluais, tutuls and ‘big men’ facilitated 
negotiations between colonial administrators, European settlers and customary 
landowners to acquire the land (Brown and Ploeg, 1997). These traditional leaders 
were also responsible for distributing the land payments to customary landowners 
(Donaldson and Good, 1981; Brown and Ploeg, 1997; see also Chapter 5). Before the 
First World War, tobacco, axes, knives, and salt were used to purchase land use 
rights (Crocombe, 1964). The majority of coffee plantations established at the time 
were on alienated state land that had 99-year state agricultural leases. 
 
The influx of European settlers became a concern for the colonial administration. 
Thus, a moratorium was issued to restrain further land alienation so that sufficient 
land would be available for villagers and future generations to plant coffee and food 




1973; McWilliam, 2013). Stringent criteria were introduced to ensure proper 
procedures were employed in alienating customary land from the landowners. This 
policy, at least, reduced the rate of land alienation which had become rapid. 
 
Smallholder development 
In the early phase of coffee development, the eagerness of villagers to cultivate 
coffee was evident. Seedlings and seeds were transacted by unlikely means, such as 
stealing from plantations or obtaining them through networks of contacts who knew 
the potential of the crop. For instance, Bimai Noibano from Watabung area, EHP, 
carried seeds from Aiyura, EHP, to his village, approximately 160 km, in the hope of 
establishing a nursery. However, his first attempt failed (Finney, 1987). Later with 
the assistance of the administration, Noibano established a nursery and a coffee 
garden in his village and helped other villagers to cultivate coffee. The keenness of 
villagers to plant coffee was then gaining momentum. Finney (1973; 1987) reveals 
that some European planters also assisted villagers to plant their coffee gardens. For 
example, Jim Taylor, a former district commissioner for the Central Highlands 
supported Hero Paito, a villager from Gahuku area near Goroka to plant his coffee 
garden. 
 
The colonial administration’s efforts to promote coffee among villagers sometimes 
lacked proper planning. One of the many colonial agricultural officers, Robert Cottle, 
who had earlier worked at the Highlands Agricultural Experimental Station in Aiyura 
was appointed in 1952 and had a significant influence on coffee development. He 
sometimes acted contrary to his superiors’ instructions. He was charged with 
promoting passionfruit (Passiflora edulis) but instead was instrumental in kindling 
the interests of villagers to plant coffee (Finney, 1973; McWilliam, 2013). Cottle saw 
that the villagers would benefit from coffee cultivation and, thus, decided to focus on 
promoting coffee which had a better economic return than passionfruit (Finney, 
1973). Although Howlett (1962) and McWilliam (1996; 2013) assert that colonial 
administrators promoted coffee, their efforts were sporadic. Many more examples of 
the colonial administration's poorly planned initiatives were part and parcel of the 
early growth of the coffee industry (Cartledge, 1978). For example, the colonial 
administration established several demonstration coffee gardens and nurseries 




exceeded the expectations of the colonial administration. Finney (1973) argues that 
status symbolism, an indigenous value, was apparent in the rapid spread of coffee 
planting. The competition among villagers to outpace each other in growing coffee 
accelerated its diffusion and establishment. Thus, it was the sheer enthusiasm of 
villagers to plant coffee, rather than well developed and coordinated planning by the 
colonial administration that better explains the swift uptake of coffee by villagers. 
Land area devoted to coffee planting jumped from 957 ha in 1954/55 to almost 
30,000 ha by 1972/73 (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Area of coffee planted for selected years from 1954/55 to 1972/73. 
Year 
Area (ha) 
Smallholder Plantation Total 
1954/55 227 7,30 957 
1959/60 4,364 2,769 7,133 
1964/65 14,179 4,949 19,128 
1969/70 23,937 6,082 30,019 
1972/73 22,901 7,050 29,951 
(Source: Adapted from Cartledge, 1987:316) 
 
The enormous demand for seedlings was of concern to early European planters in 
two ways (Stewart, 1992). First, European planters feared that if more coffee were 
planted, there would be over-production, which would be above the coffee quota and 
thus affect exports. From the 1950s to 1960s, Australian, and PNG coffee was sold 
together under Australia’s quota (Cartledge, 1978). Second, European planters were 
worried that labour for their plantations could dwindle if villagers had their own 
coffee trees to look after. 
 
By the end of the 1960s, efforts to promote and expand coffee planting were 
curtailed, and the colonial administration’s focus shifted to encouraging villagers to 
diversify into raising livestock and producing alternative cash crops such as chilli 
(Capsicum frutescens L.) and cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum). The European 
planters influenced the decisions of the colonial administration to limit coffee 
extension among the villagers (Stewart, 1992). The reduction in efforts to promote 
coffee resulted in a decrease in coffee production from the smallholder sector in 
1967/68 (Munnul and Densley, 1977). However, the smallholders were determined, 
and coffee production picked up again the following year. Thus, the early 




coffee industry not wanting the involvement of villagers in coffee production. 
Despite these obstacles, the coffee industry went from strength-to-strength and grew 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Second Phase Expansion, 1960s to 1990 
Village coffee production intensified through the 1960s (Figure 4.1). The massive 
surge in smallholder production led to rural coffee mills purchasing coffee from 
villagers. During this second phase of expansion, European plantations on leasehold 
land were sold to landowner business groups in the 1970s; coffee blocks were 
developed on customary land in a lease-lease back arrangement. Relevant state 
institutions were also established to support the overall growth of the industry. 
However, in the late 1980s, the growth of the coffee industry began to slow.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Coffee production by smallholders, blocks and plantations from 1960/61 
to 1970/71 (Source: CIC data). 
 
Expansion in smallholdings 
By 1964, the production from smallholders surpassed plantation production. In 1965, 
the Highlands Highway was opened, and this accelerated expansion of the coffee 
industry. The highway opening illustrated the importance of road access to transport 

































increasing coffee production. Alongside improved infrastructure, coffee mills 
situated in rural areas provided the market access for villagers in the communities to 
sell their coffee. 
 
Indigenous plantation ownership and management 
In the 1970s, two important agricultural policies were executed to encourage Papua 
New Guineans to engage in large-scale commercial agriculture which was until then 
dominated by European planters especially for plantation production, coffee 
processing and exporting (Brown and Ploeg, 1997). These policies were the 
Plantation Redistribution Scheme (PRS), which operated from 1974 to 1980, and the 
Twenty Hectare Development Scheme (THDS), which ran from 1979 to 1985. In the 
booming industry, the PRS and THDS policies facilitated citizens’ acquisitions of 
European-owned plantations and the development of new coffee blocks respectively. 
These policies were intended to involve landowner groups and local corporations, 
although some individuals also benefited from the schemes. As a result, the schemes 
boosted coffee production (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Coffee production by smallholders, blocks and plantations from 1960/61 































Locals acquiring of plantations 
The PRS implemented under the Land Acquisition Act was conceived primarily to 
dispel uprisings in certain Coastal regions particularly on the Gazelle Peninsula, 
ENBP where locals were short of land because vast areas of agricultural land had 
been alienated for plantations during the colonial period (Sinclair, 1995). Moreover, 
secessionist movements were gaining momentum in the Gazelle Peninsula and 
Bougainville, and thus, the new government had to allay some of these fears by 
responding to their demands (Turner, 1986). Sinclair (1995) confirms that the PRS 
initiative was largely in response to political demands rather than economic factors. 
According to an Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research [ACIAR] 
(1987a, b) report, the PRS policy had two main goals: to return the customary land to 
traditional landowners and to engage Papua New Guineans in commercial 
enterprises. Consequently, priority was given to traditional landowners to acquire the 
plantations through their business groups (Ketan, 2004). Ketan further claims that 
expatriate owners were paid reasonably good prices for the plantations through the 
scheme. The government met the selling price and guaranteed the equity share of 
purchasing by landowner groups. The landowner groups were required to provide a 
minimum equity (10-15%) to buy the plantations. Munnul (1981) reports that 
landowners were unable to meet the equity requirements, although the executing 
agencies still accepted whatever amount they contributed. By 1979, 61 coffee 
plantations were acquired through PRS while some coffee plantations were 
transacted outside of the Land Acquisition Act. In total 68 plantations were sold to 
landowner groups and local corporations (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Total number of coffee plantations which were sold under the PRS from 
1971 to 1979. 
Province No. of plantations Sold under PRS Period of sales 
EHP 70 30 1971-1979 
WHP 40 24 1974-1979 
Morobe 14 7 1974-1979 
SHP* 16 - - 
Total 140 61  
*In SHP, 14 coffee plantations were owned and operated by the provincial 






The purchased plantations had expatriate managers employed through the 
management agencies as part of the acquisition arrangements under the PRS 
(Gimbol, 1988). In some cases, former expatriate plantation business managers and 
planters were engaged to manage the recent acquisitions for landowner groups. The 
acquired plantations operated successfully for a few years, and then many began to 
encounter management problems (see Chapters 5 and 7). These problems became 
overwhelming when management agencies pulled out from providing advisory 
services. However, in the first couple of years of ownership, some plantations had 
begun to repay their loans. The repayment of loans was against a backdrop of 
exceptionally high coffee prices in the late 1970s. 
 
Development of mini-plantations 
The THDS policy came into operation about the time when the PRS was ending. 
Villagers who had not participated in the PRS because there were no nearby 
plantations wanted comparable developments in their areas (Gimbol, 1988). The 
government, with optimism in the air for economic development, wanted to involve 
as many villagers as it could in the market economy, and therefore embraced the 
THDS concept and funded the project. From 1979 to mid-1985, 3,500 ha of coffee 
blocks were developed with loans totalling about K11 million (Gimbol, 1988).  
 
The beneficiaries of the THDS used their customary land to develop mini coffee 
plantations. The name of the scheme is misleading as the development of the block 
depended on land availability and size of land. Blocks developed through the THDS 
ranged from 5-29 ha. Under the THDS, the customary land was converted to a 
leasehold title for a term of 15-25 years. By converting customary land to leasehold 
title, farmers could access bank loans (McWilliam, 1988). Large areas of contiguous 
land to develop coffee plantations were dwindling in EHP, although WHP and SHP 
still had land to expand coffee plantations and blocks. Smallholders were encouraged 
to form groups along family or clan lines and collectively make customary land 
available to register it as leasehold (Gimbol, 1988). Thus, family or clan customary 
land formerly of a communal nature was registered and leased to the state who in 





In the SHP, the approach for implementing the THDS was unique. The provincial 
government took control and developed blocks of 30-40 ha in each of the districts 
(Mitio, 1981). It had a management agency, the Southern Highlands Management 
Agency, which handled the management of the blocks. Local landowners became 
shareholders by making land available while the respective LLGs were the major 
shareholders. 
 
The THDS had an integrated approach in which land, finance, and management 
came together as a package. The agreements were tripartite in nature where it 
involved the bank, project owner, and the management agency. The Agriculture 
Bank (now the National Development Bank)2, provided 95% of the loans for the 
scheme, and other commercial banks provided the balance. Loans ranged from 
K20,000-200,000 depending on the size and physical status of the site (Gimbol, 
1988). The scheme stipulated that block shareholders should contribute sweat equity 
as part of their contribution to the development of the block (see Chapter 5). The 
government and the World Bank made funds available through the banks. 
 
Soon after the introduction of the PRS and the THDS, the government recognised the 
lack of competency among Papua New Guineans to manage plantations and blocks. 
To address this, the state created institutions to help build management skills and 
knowledge of novice managements. In the mid-1970s, the National Plantation 
Management Program (NPMP-1976) and the National Plantation Management 
Agency (NPMA-1977) were established (Turner, 1986). The NPMP was to provide 
training and equip novice business managers with the relevant knowledge and skills 
required to manage the plantations (Pondikou, 1981). The training courses were 
initially offered in Rabaul for New Guinea Islands, and later, in 1979, a unit opened 
in Mt Hagen for the Highlands region. In 1980, another unit opened in Port Moresby 
for the Southern region. Since the training conducted through NPMP would take time 
before trainees could work, NPMA filled the void by immediately providing 
practical advice, training and mentoring for local plantation managers (Paliau, 1981). 
New management agencies were established to participate in the lucrative business 
of advisory services to the managed subsector. Among the management agencies, the 
Smallholder Rural Project Management (SRPM) performed better than many 




operated out of Goroka, with offices in other centres in PNG. During its existence, 
many of the bank loans given for coffee development were repaid. 
 
Consolidating industry governance 
The rapid growth of the PNG coffee industry in the first phase and the second phase 
required proper governance systems. In the 1960s, the Department of Agriculture, 
Stock and Fisheries performed regulatory, research and extension functions for the 
coffee sector before the establishment of coffee institutions. However, with the 
expansion of the coffee industry, it became apparent that an agency to regulate and 
oversee the development of the coffee industry was required. Thus, the Coffee 
Marketing Board (CMB) was established. Several other service organisations also 
began during this phase (Table 4.3). 
 




1964 CMB  Established at the behest of HFSA 
 To regulate and promote marketing 
 Participated at International Coffee Organisation 
(ICO) and International Coffee Agreements (ICA) 
meetings 
1976 Coffee Industry 
Board (CIB) 
 It subsumed the responsibilities of CMB 
 Enforced parchment and cherry standards 
 ‘Objective criteria’ for quotas were enforced 
1986 Coffee Research 
Institute (CRI) 
 To carry out scientific research and develop 




 Established to counter the CLR epidemic 
 Later assumed extension functions to support the 
growth of the coffee industry 
1991 Coffee Industry 
Corporation 
 The CIB, CRI, and CDA merged to form the CIC. 
It assumed responsibilities for research, extension 
and regulation of the industry 
 
Coffee Marketing Board 
The CMB was mandated with statutory powers and functions in 1963 and became 
operational in 1964 to buy and sell coffee, including the promotion of PNG coffee 
(Fleming and Antony, 1993). The CMB regulated the coffee industry by registering 
exporters, coffee agents, processing facilities and inspecting mills for compliance 
(Cartledge, 1978). In 1971, with minor changes made to the 1963 ordinance, the 




areas of the coffee business. A remarkable achievement for the CMB was the role it 
played in ensuring the industry was localised. Importantly, from 1964 to 1976, the 
CMB adequately represented PNG in ICA discussions on coffee quotas for PNG. 
The quota system, which the ICA imposed, was to control exports from producing 
countries and to ensure reasonable coffee prices reached producers. The CMB 
managed quota requirements, and excesses were kept in stock for future exports. 
Funding to enable the execution of the CMB’s regulatory functions came from a levy 
of 0.5 cents/lb on coffee exports (Fleming and Antony, 1993). 
 
Coffee Industry Board 
In 1976, the CMB statutes were revised to establish the CIB Act (1976) with wider 
powers than its predecessor. The CIB took on more responsibilities, which included 
setting new standards for cherry and parchment buying so that the quality of the 
coffee was upgraded and high-value coffee was traded. The former coffee quality 
control mechanisms were initiated using the CIB Act (Fleming and Antony, 1993). 
Also, in 1978, guidelines for the use of the Coffee Industry Fund (CIF) were 
established. The CIB removed restrictions on Coffee Dealing (the Act of 1974) as it 
reduced competition in the sector. The CIB continued participating in ICA 
negotiations for quotas. Furthermore, the CIB with other coffee producing countries 
were able to convince the ICO to adopt the ‘objective criteria’ for quotas in which it 
allowed for producing countries to state their potential production as its quota for the 
following year (Fleming and Antony, 1993). The adoption of objective criteria was a 
significant achievement for the PNG coffee industry as it was already producing 
more coffee than its quota. 
 
Coffee Research Institute 
As the industry developed, prominent people in the industry and the government 
desired to establish a coffee research team, and, therefore, in 1986 appropriate 
legislation was passed in Parliament to establish the PNG CRI. Since the 
establishment of the CRI, and up to the early 1990s, the CRI was known for its 
quality research outputs and its international collaborations. The CRI also made 
direct representations to the government for its research and development funds, 
ensuring its programs were well-funded. In the early life of the institute, the bulk of 




over time, its research focus shifted to smallholders as it increasingly became 
apparent that smallholders dominated coffee production in the country. 
 
Coffee Development Agency 
In 1987, a year after the CRI was established the CDA was created in response to the 
outbreak of CLR. The primary intention for CDA creation was to contain the spread 
of CLR and ensure PNG continued to produce coffee without the disease reducing its 
exports. Thus, a massive coffee rehabilitation program took place with financial 
support from the government and donor agencies. These efforts included farmer 
training, field days and awareness on the radio. Many smallholders directly benefited 
from this assistance. The CDA’s regular presence and contact with farmers are a 
testimony that remains to this day and farmers revere the CDA’s interventions. 
Farmers’ appreciation of the CDA's effort was because of the ongoing contact CDA 
staff had with coffee growers. 
 
At the time, there was a void in extension services so when the CDA was formed it 
filled the vacuum (Fleming and Antony, 1993). An essential function lacking in the 
coffee industry was farmer training in extension programs, so the CDA began to roll 
out training activities. During that period, extension officers were present in all 
coffee growing districts in PNG. 
 
Coffee Industry Fund 
The CIF, or reserve fund, had its beginnings in 1966 as the Coffee Industry 
Stabilisation Fund during the reign of the pioneer CMB. The supply and demand in 
the world markets drove price fluctuations, which were beyond the control of the 
coffee farmers. Thus, the purpose of the fund was to minimise these effects (Kiele, 
1987). Also, oversupply in the market led the board to initiate the Price Stabilisation 
Scheme in 1968 to assist growers to stockpile their coffee. Stockholding assisted in 
moderating price fluctuations. During the life of the CIF, necessary policy changes 
were effected to accommodate changes of the times (see Munnul and Densely, 1977; 
Bodman and Jolly, 1987; Kagim Consultants Ltd, 2002). Levy collections on coffee 
from exporters financed the operations of coffee entities (McWilliam, 1996). In the 
late-1980s, different coffee institutions such as the CIB, CRI, and CDA, which 




fund their operations. In 1986, the CIF reached K120 million (Fleming and Antony, 
1993). The last bounties were paid out in 1997 (Ricky Mitio pers. comm., 19/05/15). 
 
Third Phase Expansion, 1990s to 2015 
In this final phase of expansion from 1990 onwards, coffee production increased and 
then plateaued. Coffee production in the 1990s and mid-2000s averaged 1 million 
bags (60 kg gb). Since then production seems to be on a downward trend (Table 4.4). 
The coffee production record from 2011 was a record high for the industry. 
 
Table 4.4: Exports and Kina value from 2010 to 2015. 
Year Exports (60 gb bags) Value (PGK) 
2010 883,567 520,932,672 
2011 1,488,752 926,462,961 
2012 808,456 478,494,162 
2013 911,598 336,680,345 
2014 755,702 450,289,461 
2015 711,483 393,545,950 
(Source: CIC records) 
 
The CIB, CRI, and CDA were merged in 1991 to form the CIC. The purpose of the 
merger of the separate coffee agencies was to bring forth efficiency and effectiveness 
to service delivery within the coffee industry. After the creation of the CIC, four 
divisions were established: the CIB became the Industry Affairs Division (IAD); the 
CDA was renamed the Extension Services Division (ESD); the CRI maintained its 
identity; and, the Corporate Services Division (CSD), a new division to support the 
technical divisions of the CIC. The ESD’s primary extension focus was on the 
smallholders, thus in 1994 the Technical Management Advisory Services (TMAS) 
was created to support the managed subsector. In a restructure of CIC in 2002, IAD 
and CSD were amalgamated to form Industry Operations Division while ESD and 
CRI were merged to create the Research & Grower Services Division (RGSD). 
Despite the expansion and consolidation of regulatory and governance systems, signs 
of a slowdown in coffee production began to appear in the late 1980s (Figure 4.3). 
Since then, the overall performance of the PNG coffee industry has been regression. 
To address these initial signs of decline many impact projects and institutional 
reforms were initiated in the 1990s and 2000s by the coffee industry and the 





Figure 4.3: Coffee production and ICO indicator prices from 1965 to 2015 (Sources: 
CIC and ICO data). 
 
National and institutional policies 
Since the 1990s, two sectoral policies have been conceived and implemented to 
consolidate the agriculture sector and the coffee industry. These include the NADP 
(2007-2016) and the PNG Coffee Industry Strategic Plan (2008-2018; 2013-2018). 
These plans are cognizant of higher national visions and goals enshrined in the 
National Development Strategic Plan 2030, and the Vision 20503.  
 
The coffee industry recognised the stagnation of the industry, especially the low 
productivity of the smallholder sector. Since the 1990s, several policies and 
programs were implemented to stimulate coffee production in PNG. Also, some of 
the past and ongoing coffee industry programs and projects aimed at improving 
production include: partnership arrangements with provincial governments, districts 
and resource companies; nursery projects; credit scheme; freight scheme; cherry ban; 
school coffee curriculum; grower group mobilisation; village coffee rehabilitation 
and Productive Partnership for Agriculture Project (PPAP) which are discussed in 



























































The agriculture plan 
The NADP attempted to coordinate agricultural development in which coffee was 
one of its main agendas. In 2007, the NADP was launched with much fanfare for the 
agriculture sector (Figure 4.4). This plan was to ensure a sector-wide approach to 
agricultural development, and it was initiated with good intentions (DAL, 2007). It 
required coordination, monitoring, and evaluation at the national level. Because of 
the resource boom in non-renewal resources, it was envisioned that some of the 
proceeds would be invested in the agriculture sector (Mbabu and Hall, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The different levels of development goals in which the coffee industry 
strategic plan is embedded. 
 
One of the NADP’s development objectives was to reduce production costs and 
enhance the quality of agricultural produce for domestic and overseas markets. The 
NADP funds were originally administered by the DAL and then handed over to the 
National Planning Department for management, allegedly because there were 
anomalies in the screening and disbursement of funds by the DAL. At the start, funds 
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were expended by the two departments when proposals submitted were approved. In 
later years, it was channelled directly to all districts for agricultural development. 
 
Coffee industry strategy 
The PNG Coffee Industry Strategic Plan (2008-2018) was created to promote further 
development of the coffee industry. The plan stipulates that the CIC become a 
facilitator rather than the leader of the industry so that value chain actors can develop 
the coffee industry through productive partnerships. The industry plan is partially 
being implemented. The approach used in framing this plan was participatory and 
involved the majority of stakeholders in the coffee industry in its conception and 
development. The plan was put together over a seven-year period (Mbabu and Hall, 
2012). The PNG Prime Minister launched the revised coffee plan (2013-2018) in 
March 2015. Other corporate plans were developed for the coffee industry for the 
periods 1993-1997 and 1998-2002, with little information about how they would 
support and further boost the expansion of the coffee industry. 
 
Collaborations for coffee development 
Many coffee-producing provinces in PNG had memorandum of agreements with the 
CIC to continue development of the coffee industry in their provinces. Likewise, 
provinces that did not produce coffee planned to engage its people in coffee 
production also became partners with the CIC, these included New Ireland, Milne 
Bay, East New Britain, and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. 
 
Since 2010, the state has shifted financial resources towards the districts (Walton 
2016); thus there was a need for the CIC to foster partnerships with districts. In 
response, the CIC has shifted to partnering with those districts that are willing to 
invest in coffee development. Since 2014, the CIC has publicly published an open 
tender for coffee growing districts to apply for funds and partner with the CIC in 
coffee development. To apply, a district must be able to contribute counter funding 
(K1 on K1 basis) for coffee rehabilitation in their districts. The issuance of export 
licences was also tied to the partnership with districts. The CIC also partnered with 







The nursery projects have always been part of many coffee industry interventions 
which began during the CDA era. After the formation of the CIC, nursery projects 
continued as part of its extension programs (Plate 4.2). In 2000, a CRAC meeting 
stated that there were 650 nurseries spread across 13 coffee-growing provinces, 
producing 364,050 seedlings.  
 
 
Plate 4.2: A CIC managed coffee nursery at Kimel, in Banz, Jiwaka Province. 
 
In the recent past, nursery activities were part of village coffee rehabilitation and 
coffee curriculum projects. Recently, two large nurseries were established in Jiwaka 
and Simbu provinces, and the CIC is managing them with landowner groups. Mitio 
(2014), in reviewing the coffee price support given by the state to the sector 
recommended that part of the funding should be used in developing nurseries. 
However, past nursery efforts by the CIC have been unsustainable and produced 
mixed results. Although significant amounts of seedlings have been raised in 






Smallholder credit facility 
The Coffee Credit Guarantee Scheme (CCGS) was initiated in 1996 by the state as 
part of the Smallholder Agricultural Credit Scheme in 1997 to support smallholder 
farmers with credit provision (CIC, 2005a; 2006). The implementation of the 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Scheme was a tripartite agreement between the 
DAL, the Rural Development Bank (RDB) and the CIC. The scheme was managed 
by the CIC while the RDB was the fund manager. In 1996, the government allocated 
K2.8 million to the coffee subsector and since then 1,285 coffee farmers received 
loans totalling K1.2 million. By 2000, the CCGS covered 11 coffee-growing 
provinces (CIC, 2000). The scheme was a noble initiative to assist smallholders who 
lacked the capital to invest in their coffee farms. Although loan disbursement and 
repayments ceased in 2002, the CCGS office remained until 2012. A group 
marketing project funded by AusAID was piloted with CCGS farmers in 2005. It was 
designed to ensure farmers collectively trade their coffee and bargain for better 
prices. Farmers who participated in the scheme as a group earned between K0.50-
1.00/kg of parchment sold collectively, which was about 20-30% more than if the 
coffee was sold at the roadside (CIC, 2008b). The CCGS farmers are now 
independent of CIC and are operating as a cooperative group. 
 
Freighting coffee from inaccessible areas 
The Freight Surety Scheme was another incentive program designed to assist 
smallholders in airlifting their coffee from remote locations to markets (CIC, 2008b). 
The scheme began as the Freight Subsidy Scheme in 1999 and ran until 2001, with 
an annual budget of K400,000. Under the subsidy scheme, 40% of the cost was borne 
by the scheme while 60% was met by participating farmers. In August 2003, its 
modus operandi changed to a Freight Surety Scheme. The state, through the Public 
Investment Program, has supported the scheme since 2004. From 1999 to 2015, the 
scheme freighted 3,709 tonnes of green bean worth K12.8 million. The total cost of 
transportation during that period was K5.4 million while remote farmers have earned 
K7.4 million since the scheme began. In 2005, the Green Revolution Policy engaged 
the PNG Defence Force to assist in the freight program. The Defence Force planes 
and third level airlines facilitated the freighting of coffee. However, the partnership 
with the Defence Force was short-lived because of high costs in mobilising its 




Cherry ban policy 
Smallholders and plantation and block owners were losing cherry through theft, and 
this became a disincentive to growers. Consequently, in 2008, to address rampant 
cherry theft and coffee quality problems that emerged during the sale of cherry, a 
Cherry Ban Policy was initiated. The policy restricts cherry buying and only allows 
buyers who have obtained cherry-buying permits from the CIC to engage in the 
cherry trade. The cherry trade ban is still active and operates as a self-regulated 
policy, which means that coffee industry stakeholders and village court officials act 
in concert to implement the policy. The CIC was to have facilitated the policy 
implementation by providing advisory and technical support to stakeholders. 
However, the stakeholder partners were not enforcing the policy and expected the 
CIC to implement it. Furthermore, there was inconsistency in regular budgetary 
support from the CIC, and this derailed the execution of the ban and thus its 
enforcement is weak.  
 
Coffee curriculum 
A primary and high school coffee curriculum was launched in 2009. The intention 
was to expose upper level primary and secondary students to knowledge and 
techniques on coffee farming through the education system. However, with the 
departure of senior officers overseeing the project, the CIC management has been 
unable to continue funding this innovative project. School children were to be 
targeted so when they left school early, they were equipped with skills and 
knowledge to return to the land and engage in coffee production. 
 
Grower group mobilisation 
The Coffee Growers Support Services adopted the farmer demand-driven extension 
(FDDE) model, and the approach required farmers to work in groups. The Growers 
Support Services was able to mobilise large numbers of coffee farmers around the 
country using the participatory rural appraisal planning (PRAP) methodology (see 
Api et al. 2009). PRAP is a participatory process in which farmers identify their own 
problems that constrain them in coffee production. CIC often organises targeted 
training based on farmers’ knowledge gaps pertaining to coffee husbandry practices, 
processing, marketing and book keeping. Many farmers benefited from the training 




13,211 farmers of which 2,318 were female farmers have been trained (Murray-Prior 
and Padarath, 2013). They reported that from 2005 to 2012, a total of 160 grower 
groups have undergone PRAP, of which about 51% of the groups received training. 
However, cost per head was high and a very small percentage of coffee farmers was 
reached. 
 
Village coffee rehabilitation 
The Village Coffee Rehabilitation program began in 2009 through NADP funding, 
which totalled K3.9 million (CIC, 2009). The project aimed at rejuvenating the 
coffee tree stock by pruning, replanting, shade control, and infilling of seedlings in 
smallholder gardens. The coffee rehabilitation project involved four districts in three 
provinces: Anglimp-South and Nondogul (Jiwaka); Kundiawa (Simbu); and 
Obura/Wonenara (EHP). A RGSD report for 2009 reported the following 
achievements. In the year ending 2009, a total of 6,329 smallholder gardens were 
rehabilitated with a tree population of more than 5 million (approx. 1,989 ha). Also, a 
total of 11 coffee blocks and seven plantations were rehabilitated where the total tree 
count was 200,000 (approx. 312 ha). A total of 60 nurseries were established 
throughout the four participating districts with each nursery having a capacity to 
produce 10,500 seedlings annually (CIC 2010).  
 
Partnership for Productive Agricultural Project 
In 2010, the Partnership for Productive Agriculture Project (PPAP) was launched 
with the intention for stakeholders in the industry to foster productive partnerships 
(CIC, 2010). The project aims to assist in building the capacity of chain leaders, lead 
partners and farmer groups and is consistent with the coffee industry strategic plan. 
Farmers are supplied farm inputs, training and in some cases where infrastructure 
was required, such as water supply or rehabilitating access roads, PPAP funded the 
project. The World Bank/IFAD project was originally worth K40 million. In 2015, 
the project was extended to 2019 and it is now valued at K306 million (“Update on 
Productive Partnership”, 2015). About 40% of this support is being spent on 
productive partnerships while the rest will be used in policy development and to 
create market access by improving rural infrastructure. At the project design stage, it 
was intended to cover EHP, Simbu, and WHP; however, it has been expanded to 




Table 4.5: Total number of partnerships and households participating in the project. 
Province No. of partnership* No. of households 
Eastern Highlands 10 8,161 
Simbu 2 2,106 
Jiwaka 4 2,176 
Western Highlands 3 2,475 
Madang 1 877 
Total 20 14,501 
*Note: The total number of partnerships and participating households is from 
approved partnerships in calls 1 and 2. Calls 3 and 4 have not been finalised, which 
will cover SHP and Enga Province (Source: PPAP records). 
 
The PPAP is impacting about 4% of the total households involved in coffee 
production. However, the PPAP intends to increase its coverage to 10% of coffee 
households by 2019. As part of its screening of applicants wishing to participate in 
PPAP, chain leaders or lead partners are expected to produce audited reports for the 
last two years before they are considered for PPAP projects. Thus, many nationally 
owned coffee businesses and CSOs failed to meet this criterion. The project drives a 
message that commercial activities including coffee plantations and blocks must 
demonstrate they are viable enterprises by producing audit reports. 
 
The Dream Cash Crop 
The early European planters laid the foundations for the coffee industry to grow. As 
the industry matured, the coffee industry was eventually taken over by villagers. The 
European planters built coffee factories which acted as central coffee processing 
mills in the rural areas. The majority of farmers could sell their cherries and 
parchment quickly at these depots. When these factories were in operation in the 
rural communities, PNG was known for its premium coffee which was sought after 
by international coffee connoisseurs. These mills had stringent quality control 
systems in place that ensured only top quality coffee was produced (Stewart, 1992). 
The European planters, with the assistance of the Australian administration, built 
access roads which were useful for rural communities in later years. The 
infrastructure provided the bedrock for services and goods to begin to flow into rural 
communities and, facilitated the growth of fresh food markets as coffee and garden 





Coffee was a ‘dream’ crop for villagers as it readily gave them the cash income that 
they could use to meet their household needs, customary obligations, as well as the 
capacity to acquire luxury items. As Finney (1973) points out, villagers’ eagerly 
embraced capitalism, as coffee paved the way for Papua New Guineans to advance 
into the modern cash economy in the early stages of coffee development. Sexton 
(1988) in her study in Daulo, EHP, in the mid-1980s also reports that capitalism had 
taken a firm foothold with the accessing of modern goods and services, including 
meeting socio-cultural obligations: coffee thus provided the medium for exchange. 
She was implying that cash earned from coffee contributed to meeting modern goods 
and services, as well as meeting indigenous socio-cultural obligations. 
 
Later, in acquiring plantations from European planters, PNG owners and 
shareholders envisioned that they would graduate to the grand lifestyle that European 
planters lived. Similarly, groups of smallholders who had collectively released their 
small parcels of land to develop mini-plantations had hoped to enjoy prosperity from 
the proceeds of the newly created blocks. The owners of blocks and plantations 
dreamed about owning luxury cars, stylish modern houses and sending their children 
to private schools. 
 
During this formative period, the people and the government assumed the growth of 
the coffee industry would continue uninterrupted. There was enormous optimism 
amongst coffee farmers, the industry and the government that the industry would 
continue to prosper. However, the hope of coffee farmers to live a better lifestyle 
from income earned from coffee has turned out to be a dream. Some farmers lost 
confidence as their dreams disappeared, which led to a lack of motivation to farm 
coffee as an enterprise.  
 
Conclusion 
In the first phase of development, the coffee industry grew with hope for prosperity 
among the coffee farming population. The growth of the industry was derived from 
structures within the indigenous and modern market economies. For instance, in the 
indigenous economy, the rivalry to compete with kinsmen provided the impetus for 
villagers to plant more coffee as a form of prestige for the coffee farmer, leading to 




and subsequent generation of wealth from coffee originating from the cash economy 
also enticed villagers to plant coffee. Although colonial administration extension 
services were sporadic, the industry grew rapidly to become a key economic driver 
for development in the Highlands region. 
 
In the second phase of development, some industry-based policies were developed 
and implemented to support industry growth. Policies like PRS and THDS allowed 
Papua New Guineans to engage in commercial businesses. These plans included the 
transfer of plantations to local control and the development of blocks. As the industry 
began to grow, other sectoral and industry plans were initiated to enhance and 
support further the development of the coffee industry.  
 
In the third phase of the growth, governance systems were created to support the 
rapid expansion of the PNG coffee industry. Over time governance systems were 
reformed, and new institutions were established to accommodate the changing 
circumstances. CIB and its predecessors performed regulatory and promotion 
functions of the ‘embryo’ industry. In the mid-1980s, coffee research and extension 
institutions were created to carry out research and development functions and service 
the needs of the coffee farming community. In the 1990s and 2000s, further reforms 
to the institutions were initiated like the formation of CIC to make operations 
efficient and focus on advancing the industry. 
 
Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail some of the problems that began to undermine 
the coffee farmers’ dreams of development as the industry entered into a period of 








1. Jim is one of the famous Leahy brothers, Mick and Dan who were part of a team 
of pioneer Europeans to explore the ‘Middle Kingdom:’ the Highlands of PNG in 
the late 1920s. Jim was mainly into business and later joined his brothers in the 
Highlands. 
 
2. The Agriculture Bank now called the National Development Bank was also 
formerly known as PNG Development Bank and Rural Development Bank. The 
name change occurred to reflect priorities of the government over the years. The 
aforementioned names will appear in various parts of the thesis. 
 
3. The NSDP is a medium term development plan with a lifespan of 20 years whilst 













This chapter departs from the story and optimism in Chapter 4 concerning the early 
and rapid growth of the coffee industry in PNG. The dream of local coffee farmers to 
enjoy an affluent lifestyle funded with income from coffee began to fade in the 1980s 
as will be discussed in this chapter. Chapter 5 outlines the faltering of the growth, 
then stagnation followed by the gradual decline of the coffee industry through the 
1990s to the present time. 
 
In line with the objectives of the thesis, this chapter discusses the managed subsector 
problems, low coffee production among smallholders who are not members of 
grower groups or are referred to in this thesis as independent farmers, and national 
and institutional constraints, which together contributed to the decline of the coffee 
industry. This chapter argues that when plantations were sold through government 
policies in the 1970s to local landowner groups and corporate companies, problems 
began to emerge that undermined their profitability and contributed to their 
subsequent decline. Experienced expatriate managers departed after the plantations 
were sold leaving plantation management to inexperienced local business managers. 
The support services that were once enjoyed by coffee smallholders living in the 
vicinity of efficiently run and managed plantations and their rural mills also ceased. 
Smallholders were left to their own devices to fend for themselves in producing 
coffee. It is argued that the decline of the plantations and their rural mills led to 
smallholders’ low productivity and production of inconsistent coffee quality. 
Moreover, sectoral policies and institutional programs and projects were also poorly 
designed and when executed, problems began to rise producing both positive and 






Annual coffee production in the 1990s to mid-2000s averaged 1 million bags (60 kg 
gb). From 1980/81 to 1998/99, there was growth in the smallholder sector while 
production in the managed subsector was stagnant (Figure 5.1). Since 1998, the 
growth of the coffee industry began to slow down (Figures 5.2). Coffee production 
started to plateau from 1998/99 and has remained stagnant except for a sharp rise in 
2011, when there was a record high production of 1,187,981 green bean bags, a 
response to very high prices (see Figure 4.2). Because of the high prices, coffee from 
remote areas made their way to the market. After 2011, coffee production fell again.  
 
Also, a critical factor in explaining the decline in production is the ageing stock of 
coffee holdings in PNG. Most of the current stock of coffee trees was planted in the 
boom years from the 1950s to the early 1970s, so are now old and need to be 
replanted to re-invigorate the tree stock (Mitio, 2014). The revised coffee industry 
plan (2013-2018) also identified land and labour shortages, deteriorating rural 
infrastructure, lawlessness, and competition from other cash crops as undermining 
coffee production (CIC, 2014). Therefore, a range of factors are contributing to the 
general decline of the industry and are discussed further below. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Coffee production by smallholders, blocks and plantations from 1980 to 































Figure 5.2: Coffee production by smallholders, blocks and plantations from 1999 to 
2015 (Source: CIC data). 
 
Managed Subsector: Plantations and Blocks 
The number of functioning coffee plantations and blocks has been declining over the 
years. In 1969, there were 237 plantations and by 2007, only 33 were still in 
operation. Estimates in the 1970s showed plantations were consistently producing 
about 2,500 kg gb/ha (Munnul and Densley, 1977) but by the early 1980s yields had 
dropped to 2,000 kg gb/ha (ACIAR, 1987b). By the late 1980s, plantations were no 
longer achieving productivity levels as expected from a high input-high output 
production system. In the early 1990s productivity remained low and thus doubts 
about the future existence of the managed subsector began to emerge (McWilliam, 
1996). Allen et al. (2009) reports that the average productivity of plantations from 
2000 to 2006 was 600 kg gb/ha, which was less than one quarter of the mean 
productivity of 2,500 kg gb/ha for plantations in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, the 
number of coffee blocks increased from 200 to 636, however, the majority are now 
non-operational (Allen et al. 2009). In 1992, block productivity was around 1,040 kg 
gb/ha (Irog, 1992). The last survey of the managed subsector was conducted in 1997 
so there is little information available on the number of plantations and blocks that 






























Many problems have affected the managed subsector, some of which are outlined in 
this chapter. They include land disputes, poor farming knowledge, deficiencies in the 
PRS, failures in THDS, the poor performance of management agencies, lack of 
advisory services, the banks’ reluctance to provide loan, increased input costs and the 
adverse impacts of politics. This chapter also includes interviews with coffee 
industry experts (CIEs, n=32). Chapter 7 discusses in more detail some of the 
problems and prospects of the subsector by presenting four case studies of 
plantations including interviews of CIEs.  
 
Land disputes 
Much of the land which the European planters alienated in the 1950s and 1960s to 
develop coffee plantations had some form of traditional significance in the 
communities (see Chapter 4). Plantations developed on battlefields and disputed land 
posed problems to potential investors as conflicts over ownership continued well 
after the acquisitions. Twenty-three percent of the CIEs I interviewed confirmed that 
land disputes were harming the managed subsector and have resulted in the demise 
of some plantations. A few land disputes were related to the initial land purchases, 
swamp land which is no man’s land but villagers are now laying claims of 
ownership, and a lack of proper understanding by customary landowners of land 
leases. 
 
In the initial land acquisition for plantation development, the customary landowners’ 
names were not recorded. Instead, the official documents recorded the names of 
luluais, tutuls and ‘big men’ who represented the customary landowners, and who 
facilitated discussions with the purchasers and patrol officers, and who also received 
and distributed payments (Donaldson and Good, 1981; Strong, 2004). Raisis Klink, a 
former coffee factory manager asserted that “customary landowners have therefore 
never been rightfully recognised” and their grievances continue to disrupt production 
(CIE #4, 14/03/14). Finch (1991) highlights a case at Ontenu in Tairora area, EHP, 
where traditional leaders who distributed money obtained from land sales failed to 
include some of the customary landowners and thus complaints were later made. 
Such cases have led to aggrieved landowner families and groups making land claims 




The location of many plantations in the Western Highlands Province (WHP), Jiwaka 
and the eastern region of Eastern Highlands Province (EHP) were once swamp lands 
which were drained by European planters and turned into fertile land for coffee. In 
some areas, villagers believed that swamps had ‘spirits’ living in them (Ketan, 2004), 
so they chose to reside on hilltops. Nobody made gardens or resided near them. With 
the advent of formal government administration, villagers laid claims on drained 
swampland. Bill Gardner of Kigabah Coffee reported that “… when villagers 
complained about the estate land I pointed to the trees and the drains and questioned 
them who cleared this place” (CIE #20, 06/04/14). Bill stated that after a few 
disputes with the villagers challenging the ownership of the estate land, there have 
been no more complaints. However, several land disputes continue on plantations 
developed on swamp land. 
 
Land disputes over plantation land have arisen because many landowners have 
inadequate knowledge and understanding of the concept of state or ‘private’ land. 
After selling land, original landowners perceive that they have residual rights over 
the land they have sold (Crocombe, 1964; Filer, 2012). For example, Strong quotes a 
landowner’s perception of coffee plantation land which was under dispute: the 
landowner stated that “the coffee tree and assets can be owned by others [referring to 
the European planter and shareholders] but for the land, I am the father” (2004:178-
179). This plantation land dispute resulted in a fierce tribal warfare in the late 1990s 
in which many lives were lost, properties destroyed and families were displaced. 
Also, in WHP, many plantations were abandoned as a result of tribal warfare (e.g. 
Anderson and Connolly, 1992; Ketan, 2013). The viewpoint of landowners that they 
still retain residual rights over their customary land that has been sold or converted to 
state or individual tenure was revealed in an interview with Thomas Mosen of WR 
Carpenters in Jiwaka Province. He reported that “villagers still have that mentality as 
papa graun [landowners], and they continue to steal coffee from our estates” (CIE # 
25, 08/04/14).  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the banks tendered nationally-owned plantations that had 
arrears on bank loans to recoup their losses (Hunt and Eko, 2001). Successful bidders 
moved onto the plantation. However, disputes with customary landowners soon 




cherry theft. Landowners deemed the purchasers as ‘outsiders’ without rights to the 
plantations. Afflick (1981) notes that legally because the customary landowners still 
hold the lease on the land, the banks cannot mortgage the property: financiers only 
have the right of entry to the land. Here Afflick is implying that the land continues to 
belong to the landowners as the land is leased and has not changed ownership or title.  
 
Disputes on plantation land are also more likely to occur when the new owners are 
from outside the local area. In an interview, Max Kumabong, a coffee entrepreneur 
from Mt Hagen, WHP gave the following account about why purchasing plantations 
away from their own locality can be a problem. Kumabong reported that: 
 
... seeing at what is happening around me [alluding to plantation land 
disputes], I will not move into another area. … On Warauwa [his 
plantation], I live in proximity, have traditional kinship ties with locals, and 
am also a landowner, so I feel at ease to invest here. (CIE # 23, 08/04/14) 
 
When locals purchase nearby plantations, they are likely to encounter fewer 
problems (Chapter 7). However, when investors from other areas of the province or 
regions purchase plantations, ownership disputes are more likely to emerge. For 
these reasons, many plantations were abandoned in the 1990s. 
 
Lack of farm management knowledge 
After acquiring land from villagers, the European planters began to plant coffee, but 
initially there was a general lack of knowledge about coffee farming. Many European 
planters were not from farming backgrounds. However, they had learnt coffee 
farming techniques by reading literature, from friends or learning through coffee 
cultivation. In the 1950s, the Highlands Farmers and Settlers Association saw the 
need for the knowledge gap to be filled and arranged for a coffee expert to visit the 
Central Highlands and provide advisory services to European planters. Hence, Baron 
Goto, a coffee specialist from Hawaii came to the PNG Highlands and conducted 
training for coffee farmers (Cartledge, 1978). Field days were organised, and the 
European planters learnt about proper coffee husbandry practices such as raising 





Moreover, in search of coffee knowledge, some European planters travelled to 
countries like Kenya to learn about coffee production techniques. Despite the search 
for information, in-depth knowledge of crop physiology and soil chemistry was 
lacking (CIE #1, 10/12/13). In the mid-1970s, more information became available on 
raising yields by removing shade and applying fertiliser, and plantation managers 
followed this advice (Sinclair, 1995). Managers learnt that exposing the coffee trees 
to the sun increases the photosynthesis. Thus, the trees would require more nutrition 
to facilitate the increased metabolism. Consequently, the demand for fertiliser 
escalated. John Fowke, a former coffee plantation manager reported that the new 
need for fertiliser caused two adverse effects on plantations (CIE #1, 10/12/13). 
Firstly, heavy dieback occurred where insufficient fertilisers were applied after the 
removal of shade trees. Secondly, on plantations where excessive fertiliser was 
applied, the soil became acidic and lime had to be applied to neutralise it.  
 
There have been suggestions that the plantations were ‘milked’ by the European 
planters in the years leading up to independence in 1975 (Sinclair, 1995). 
Coincidently, in 1975, frost devastated coffee in Brazil, so in the subsequent years, 
the drop in global supply pushed up prices (Figure 4.3). Some owners wanted to 
make fast money before selling their estates and thus removed shade trees. They 
received large returns from increased fertiliser application and eventually sold their 
plantations through the PRS. Besides this, the euphoria of approaching independence 
engulfing the local population in 1975 brought apprehension and insecurity to 
European planters, which may have discouraged on-going investments in their 
plantations. The non-reinvestment explains why many plantations were in poor 
conditions when locals bought them (Paliau, 1981). After local business groups 
acquired the plantations, they enjoyed income for a couple of years, but after a while 
local business managers did not re-invest in the plantation and dieback became a 
major problem. Local business managers were not aware that re-establishing shade 
would have lessened dieback and restored the plantations back to sustainable 
production levels without the need for fertiliser. 
 
After plantations were acquired by landowner business groups, farms were not 
managed as a high input-high output system of production. Rather local plantation 




resulting in falls in production. According to Jacob Taru, a coffee entrepreneur, local 
business managers at the time were using a ‘smallholder mentality’ to manage their 
plantations: alluding to the low input-low output farming system (CIE #31, 
10/04/14). The ‘new’ owners failed to comply with farm schedules and apply timely 
farm inputs such as fertiliser. The smallholder mentality continues to dominate 
plantation management methods. Thus, many plantations were abandoned while 
others continue to struggle.  
 
Deficiencies with the plantation redistribution scheme 
There were several problems associated with the PRS. The ‘Report of the Committee 
of Review into the PRS’ reported the poor conceptualisation of the Land Acquisition 
Act (the Act governing PRS), and the poor business practices underlying the scheme 
(Walter, 1981). The main problems included:  
 a lack of oversight on loan repayments; 
 landowners’ equity did not have a uniform standard for participating landowner 
business groups to comply with; 
 the selling prices of plantations were inflated; 
 many landowner business groups were not formally incorporated groups; and  
 loans were interest-free unlike those that have been offered through 
commercial banks where interests are charged. 
 
As there were no strict criteria for accessing PRS support, some landowner groups 
considered the loan to be a ‘gift’ from the government and did not bother to repay the 
loan. Sinclair (1995, p. 351) confirms that the PRS was “rushed into existence to 
satisfy political demands” and, therefore, was a very poorly conceived policy. 
Landowners believed that they were entitled to repossess the plantation land which 
was their customary land as discussed in Chapter 4. Munnul (1981) affirms that 
landowner business groups contributed a meagre amount while the state heavily 
subsidised the purchase of plantations. There was a laxity towards managing the 






From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, many locals had limited education, lacked 
business knowledge and skills, and had minimal understanding of plantation 
management, which was in short supply (Sinclair, 1995). As a result, unsuitable 
people who lacked business experience were appointed as business managers. In 
some cases, directors of business groups held dual positions and acted as managers 
and directors (Paliau, 1981). A few European planters who had sold their estates 
returned as advisors but withdrew because of lawlessness, which was surfacing in 
some areas as a result of deteriorating rural infrastructure and land disputes.  
 
Failures of mini plantations 
Under the THDS, it was intended that blocks would be self-sustaining enterprises 
concerning both funding and management (Fleming and Antony, 1993). In reviewing 
the THDS, Gimbol (1988) reports that shareholders failed to supply labour as sweat 
equity during the development phase. As a result, management agencies recruited 
labour from elsewhere which ultimately over-stretched the farm budget (Sinclair, 
1995). Thus, a significant component of farm budget was spent on an item that was 
originally planned to be available cash-free. The reluctance of customary landowners 
to work on their blocks reflected indigenous notions of prestige that possessing a 
business enterprise means they are above labourers. As owners, it would be 
degrading to provide their labour as sweat equity. Also, shareholders’ status as 
owners of the enterprise had to be visible to rival tribes, and this was best illustrated 
by them not working on their blocks as labourers but bringing in workers from 
elsewhere for this low-status menial work.  
 
Poor performance of management agencies 
In 1974, the National Plantation Management Agency (NPMA) was created as 
discussed in Chapter 4 to provide management services to plantations and blocks. 
The transfer of European-owned plantations to locals and the development of coffee 
blocks increased the demand for extension and advisory services, therefore, 
additional management agencies were formed to service the subsector (Table 5.1). 
By 1987, 60% of the managed subsector was serviced by numerous management 
agencies (ACIAR, 1987b). However, management agencies failed to apply 
sustainable practices and gave little thought to the indigenous values and norms that 




Also, management agencies were often looking after many plantations or blocks and 
this had an impact on their advisory services. Freyne (1991) confirms that where 
management agencies had many plantations to manage, services were reduced. 
Conversely, management agencies that had fewer plantations and blocks performed 
better (Turner, 1986). 
 
Table 5.1: Some of the management agencies that existed during the PRS and THDS 
era. 
Management agencies Owner Location Year of operation 
NPMA State Goroka 1978-1987 
ANGCO* Development ANGCO Goroka Receivership in 2001 




Receivership in the 
1990s 
Gouna Development Gouna Pty Ltd Goroka Receivership in the 
1990s 











PMA Ltd Mt 
Hagen 
Advisors left and did 
not return 
Natgrow Management Pipilka Mt 
Hagen 
Receivership in the 
1990s 
Komakama Investment Nokondi 
Investments 








Goroka From the 1990s or 
early 2000s 
*ANGCO - Australia New Guinea Coffee and Cocoa, **SRPM was originally 
known as Agriculture Bank Management Pty Ltd. 
 
In addition, management agencies’ fees were exorbitant (Turner, 1986; Gimbol, 
1988). The fees were charged before coffee came into production. Agencies had 
numerous expatriate advisors, and substantial costs were subsumed in administration. 
The agency fees began at K250/ha/yr in 1974 and then rose to K400/ha/yr in the 
1980s (Sinclair, 1995). In some cases, fees went as high as K680/ha/yr. Later, fees 
stabilised at K300/ha/yr in the late 1980s. The SRPM charged a low rate of 
K150/ha/yr for blocks thus forcing many opportunist agencies out of business. Other 





The extension and advisory services for the managed subsector have been 
inconsistent and poor (Orlegge, 2010). The demise of the management agencies in 
the late 1980s combined with the lack of advisory services from CIC has contributed 
to the dwindling of services to the subsector. Although, the CIC created the 
Technical Management Advisory Services (TMAS) to provide extension and 
advisory services, due to lack of budgetary support from CIC, TMAS was unable to 
adequately service the subsector. In 2003, the extension arm of the CIC subsumed 
TMAS and it has been virtually inactive since (CIC, 1996). The TMAS did conduct 
some training of business managers of plantations and blocks in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, but it was inconsistent.  
 
Banks reluctance to support the managed subsector 
A further problem that confronted the managed subsector was the massive 
outstanding debts on loans obtained from the banks in the 1970s and the 1980s 
associated with the PRS and the THDS. These debts included accrued interest, 
especially those that had been taken as commercial loans which were later written-
off (Hunt and Eko, 2001). In subsequent years, the banks were reluctant to provide 
further loans to the subsector because of loan arrears and the unfavourable socio-
political conditions that prevailed in rural areas in PNG (Afflick, 1981).  
 
Increased costs of farm inputs 
Since the 1990s, increases in costs of agricultural inputs, like fertiliser, labour and 
security have diminished productivity and the financial viability of many plantations 
and blocks. For example, costs of fertilisers such as Sulphate of Ammonia (SOA) 
and Muriate of Potash (MOP) have increased by 76% from 2007 to 2016 (Table 5.2). 
Also, Kufinale and Fleming (2002) reported that security costs arising from law and 
order problems were a major cost for the subsector.  
 
Table 5.2: Prices of different types of fertilisers for 2007, 2013 and 2016. 
Year 
Cost of fertiliser (PGK) 
Sulphate of Ammonia (50 
kg) 




2007 29.70 36.67 72.88 
2013 193.00 108.00 63.00 
2016 180.00 181.81 138.71 




Negative impacts of politics 
Political activities have had a deleterious effect on the running of plantations and 
blocks. In my interviews with CIEs, 67% believed that national, provincial and local 
level politics had negatively impacted their operations. The adverse effects of politics 
identified in interviews were twofold. First, business managers that align themselves 
with political candidates create problems on the plantation. Philip Kapal, the former 
premier of WHP and now a coffee entrepreneur revealed that “supporters of 
candidates have attacked us, so [we] disallowed workers from openly supporting 
candidates, and we stopped polling occurring on the plantation” (CIE #17, 03/04/14). 
The aftermath of election-related fights and problems can persist long after the 
election thus disrupting plantation operations. Second, during elections, many 
plantation labourers return to their home provinces to vote or move out from 
company premises to engage in election-related festivities in the community. Money 
and food are plentiful during election periods, and some labourers forgo working on 
the plantations so they can be involved in election-related activities. Consequently, 
labour shortages can become acute on plantations around elections. 
 
The productivity of the managed subsector is low because of the problems outlined 
above. Since the late 1980s, many plantations and blocks have been abandoned, 
while a few struggle to remain viable. From the outset, the transfer of plantations 
under the PRS did not adhere to proper business protocols and many were distributed 
as ‘gifts’ to landowner business groups. The scarcity of local experienced business 
managers to run the newly purchased plantations led to poor business practices. Also, 
many management agencies closed, leaving the CIC to deliver advisory services to 
the subsector but these services was erratic and ineffective. Moreover, the adverse 
impacts of politics have undermined production of the subsector. During the 
purchase of plantation land, proper social and genealogical mapping was not 
conducted, thus many legitimate landowners were not identified and did not benefit 
from land payments. Therefore, the children of the customary landowners continue to 
dispute the current ownership of plantation land. It is these complex and multiple 






As the managed subsector declined, the support services it used to provide to 
smallholder farmers in their neighbourhood also ceased. This contributed to low 
productivity and production of poor coffee quality. Smallholder production plateaued 
in the 1980s (Figure 4.3) and has been stagnant and declining since the 1990s (Figure 
5.2). Although, smallholders eagerly embraced coffee in the 1950s to the 1970s as 
outlined in Chapter 4, maintaining high production and the processing of good 
quality coffee has been, and remains a challenge.  
 
Since the 1990s, the productivity of smallholders who operate on their own and were 
not members of grower groups or independent farmers has varied. The average 
smallholder productivity in the 1970s was 830 kg gb/ha. In the 1980s, productivity 
increased to 968 kg gb/ha and in the 1990s, it was 1,090 kg gb/ha (Munnul and 
Densely, 1977; Hassall and Associates, 1982; Harding, 1988; Collett, 1992; 
Overfield, 1994; Allen et al. 2009). In a 2013 study, coffee productivity for the 
smallholders in the Central Highlands was 382 kg gb/ha (UniQuest, 2013). 
Productivity has decreased by 65% from the 1990s average. In studying independent 
farmers in Bena, EHP, Collett (1992) shows the average number of coffee gardens as 
2.5 for Bena households with a total average coffee holder’s farm size of 0.43 ha. 
UniQuest (2013) reports an average garden size of 1.4 ha for independent farmers in 
other parts of the Central Highlands (see Table 6.1).  
 
Several reports have highlighted problems that undermine productivity and quality of 
coffee amongst independent smallholder coffee farmers and these impediments 
include poor rural infrastructure, labour shortages, pig damage, lack of credit, coffee 
theft, volatile prices, lawlessness, gender constraints, tribal fights, and inadequate 
extension services (Collett, 1992; Mauro et al. 2010; Aba et al. 2012; UniQuest, 
2013; Inu, 2015). Some of the key factors this study considered important that 
explains the low productivity and coffee quality of independent smallholder farmers 
stem from the low input-low output system of production, limited land access, 
inadequate extension services, poor access to credit, household labour constraints, 
poor rural infrastructure, tribal conflicts, and the closure of rural coffee mills which 
are discussed below (As for cooperative member farmers, their constraints are 




Low input-low output production system 
Smallholder coffee farmers apply a low input-low output system to produce coffee so 
coffee yields are below potential levels. In this system, smallholders are unwilling to 
allocate sufficient labour to prune their coffee trees, maintain the drains and control 
shade. This low labour input reduces yields. According to Aba et al. (2012, p. 25-26) 
in a supply response study of coffee in PNG, “smallholders produce for specific 
reasons, and if those reasons are satisfied, they do not bother producing more.” Inu 
(2015) in her study in the Bena area, EHP, reports a number of factors that led to 
farmers not maximising coffee production. These factors were: competition for 
labour with other lucrative cash crops such as pineapples and vegetables; coffee 
maintained to ensure income security in case of natural disasters and so may not be 
regularly harvested (e.g. drought); and, farmers planting coffee to secure clan land 
for a household’s future use and not for immediate production. The two latter 
strategies together with competing labour demands result in households investing 
minimal labour or farm inputs in their coffee gardens which results in low 
productivity.  
 
Farm investments in smallholder coffee gardens is also low. Farmers invest coffee 
income in socio-cultural activities and indigenous exchange, and they rarely reinvest 
coffee income into their coffee farms (Strathern, 1982b; Sexton, 1988; Mauro, 2010). 
Indeed, it is typical for socio-cultural events and compensation payments to be timed 
to the coffee harvesting season when villagers have more cash after the sale of their 
coffee. The importance of socio-economic factors influencing coffee farmers’ 
investment practices also concurs with smallholder studies in the cocoa and oil palm 
industries in PNG (Koczberski et al. 2001; Curry and Koczberski, 2013).  
 
Farmers may sometimes perceive coffee farming as a waste of time and labour and 
instead cultivate other cash crops that generate better returns (Aba et al. 2012). Many 
smallholders with high market access have a diversity of income opportunities; they 
can choose to abandon coffee and switch to other more profitable crops like 
vegetables that have a short cultivation time-span and provide quicker returns than 
coffee (Inu, 2015). Thomas Kilip, a plantation manager with WR Carpenters in 
Jiwaka Province reported in an interview that in villages close to towns 




can generate income two to three times more” (CIE #24, 08/04/14). Studies in PNG, 
and elsewhere, have shown that farmers sometimes believe that coffee production 
draws farmers’ labour away from other priority areas that are essential to sustaining 
their livelihoods (Babin, 2012; Inu, 2015). 
 
Limited land access 
Declining land availability for coffee has contributed to low coffee production 
among smallholders. The increasing population in coffee growing areas is exerting 
pressure for land use. In certain areas, farmers can no longer expand the area under 
coffee. In other areas where land shortages are severe, households are reluctant to 
allocate more gardening land to coffee. This process is reaching a peak in some 
villages, where it is leading to a contraction in the area under coffee per household. 
For example, some households are subdividing their coffee garden among their 
children, which is resulting in coffee garden size per household shrinking in each 
generation (Aba et al. 2012). Other households facing land shortages for food 
gardening have uprooted coffee to plant food crops.  
 
Land disputes are surfacing which have resulted in family, clan and tribal conflicts 
(Collett, 1992). When cash crops like coffee were introduced, households began to 
plant coffee and this has locked land up for long periods (Kalinoe and Kiris, 2010). 
By farming short-term food crops, households were provided with the flexibility to 
share the portion of land; however with the cultivation of perennial crops like coffee, 
the land can no longer be shared (Babin, 2012; Inu, 2015). This has resulted in 
conflicts which have led to the original landowners reclaiming land planted to coffee 
(see Chapter 6).  
 
As discussed above, the flexibility of villagers to change farming sites freely as it 
used to happen in the past on communally-owned customary land has diminished. 
Inu (2015) affirms that the individualisation of land was occurring in the Bena area 
with 69% of land for food and coffee production now inherited by sons. Thus, at 
Bena, there is less flexibility in land use. In some areas in the Highlands, farmers are 
renting land to plant short-term crops like sweet potato (Ipomoea batatas) and 
vegetables (UniQuest, 2013) because of land shortages. Also, in areas of land 




clansmen or tribesmen to plant coffee. McWilliam (1988, p. 79) confirms that 
“considerable buying and selling of land between smallholders” in the Highlands was 
occurring as early as the 1980s. However, the security of land “purchases” is 
insecure as is the case in some areas in PNG (Numbasa and Koczberski, 2012).  
 
Inadequate extension services to smallholders 
In part, the poor farm practices of smallholders are also a result of their limited 
access to extension services which have declined over the years. In the 1980s, 
extension services were devolved to provincial governments which led to a general 
decline in extension services (Fleming and Antony, 1993). The provincial extension 
officers focused on other priority areas and the coffee sector did not feature 
prominently in their programs. In 1987, the Coffee Development Agency (CDA) was 
formed. It employed the training and visit method to provide extension services to 
smallholder farmers (Table 5.3). The CDA merged with CIC in 1991 which led to 
changes in the mode of providing extension services to smallholders. As a result, the 
Extension Services Division (formerly CDA) of CIC used Coffee Management 
Divisions and Central Training Points and mainly focused on conducting training in 
coffee husbandry practices and postharvest techniques. The Coffee Management 
Divisions were larger extension units than Central Training Points. Coffee 
Management Divisions were established depending on accessibility, incidences of 
CLR and the population of coffee farmers in an area. The establishment of the 
Central Training Points depended on: a pro-active response from willing coffee 
growers; requests from farmers to grow coffee; nominal cash flow within the 
community; and sufficient arable land for coffee cultivation. In 2003, CIC adopted 
the farmer demand-driven extension (FDDE) approach which focused on grower 
groups (Api et al. 2009). Most of the extension efforts have failed to adequately 
address the decline in smallholder productivity.  
 
Table 5.3: Extension approaches deployed in the coffee industry since 1987. 
Period Entity Extension approach Target farmer size 
1987-1990 CDA Training and visit Individual farmers 
1991-1997 ESD, CIC Coffee Management Division 3,000  
1998-2001 ESD, CIC Central Training Point 1,000 
2003-now RGSD, CIC Farmer demand-driven extension 20-100 





The merging of CDA with CIC and subsequent restructures of the CIC drastically 
reduced the number of extension officers based in coffee growing districts and 
provinces (CIC, 1997; CIC, 2008b). At times, the number of extension staff after a 
retrenchment round, has increased in subsequent years as the organisation has 
realised staffing levels are insufficient to provide adequate extension services to 
coffee farmers (Table 5.4). These incidences show the lack of proper planning which 
has undermined extension services to smallholders.  
 
Table 5.4: CIC extension staff numbers since 1987. 
Year Extension staff Source 
1987 800* Biosi Gunure (pers. comm., 16/06/15) 
1998 53 CIC, 2000 
2000 144 CIC, 2000 
2003 36 CIC, 2005b 
2005 53 CIC, 2005c 
2015 36 CIC records 
*CDA also had 1,000 casual extension assistants. Gunure was the pioneer general 
manager for CDA. 
 
The restructures in CIC have led to only one or two extension officers being placed 
in each coffee-growing province with a disproportionate ratio of coffee farmers to 
extension officers (CIC, 2008b; Murray-Prior and Padarath, 2013). The low levels of 
extension officers have contributed to the decline in farmer contacts which has 
impeded productivity of smallholders. Also, extension funding mostly caters for 
salaries of extension officers and little remains to facilitate the execution of extension 
services (Sitapai, 2012). For instance, because of lack of funding, province-based 
CIC extension officers are sometimes under-resourced and not able to effectively 
carry out extension services. 
 
Furthermore, the reduction in extension services to growers has meant that extension 
information and new technologies intended for smallholders are not reaching them 
(Mauro et al. 2010). Moreover, some of the advice and new technologies promoted 
among farmers were not always appropriate and so smallholders were reluctant to 
adopt them (Fleming and Antony, 1993; Poulton et al. 2010). Therefore, the 






Poor credit access 
Poor access to credit has been reported in PNG as limiting coffee production (Mauro 
et al. 2010; Aba et al. 2012). Credit could be used to purchase farm inputs like 
secateurs to prune coffee and knapsacks for spraying weedicide. Additionally, credit 
could be invested in technologies like hand pulpers that could improve coffee quality 
and the efficiency of labour, which would lead to farmers earning better incomes. 
Because of poor credit access, smallholder coffee production is undermined. 
Although smallholders have had access to credit facilities in the past, many do not 
have a good track record of repaying loans. A preliminary cost-benefit analysis of the 
coffee credit scheme, which was implemented by CIC in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
showed that 56% of farmers that obtained loans did not repay (Inu, 2009). 
Additionally, Curry et al. (2007b) contend that oil palm smallholder farmers in West 
New Britain Province, PNG have too many household expenses, which limit their 
ability to purchase farm inputs. Curry et al. further argue that after obtaining loans, 
some farmers had difficulties in repaying them because of a myriad of other 
expenses. Instead of providing cash, it is possible to facilitate credit access in the 
form of farm inputs like pruning saws, secateurs and pulpers through value chain 
partnerships (see Chapter 8) or agro-nucleus setups (Curry et al. 2007b).  
 
Lack of household labour 
Labour shortages can constrain smallholders from improving coffee production. The 
smallholder system of production practised in PNG allows for labour to be deployed 
across a range of livelihood activities such as subsistence farming and raising pig 
herds. Coffee farming is just one of many livelihood strategies smallholders juggle to 
sustain their lives. Because smallholders are engaged in multiple livelihood 
activities, it impacts on labour availability for coffee farming. Two studies in Bena, 
EHP, on independent farmers established that food production was a principal 
activity of farmers followed by coffee production (Collett, 1992; Overfield, 1998). 
Other studies have shown that in household labour allocations, women spend more 
time in food gardens than coffee (Overfield, 1998; Curry et al. 2016; Chapter 6). For 
coffee harvesting and weeding, smallholders in many instances may have insufficient 
household labour to carry out these labour intensive tasks (Curry et al. 2016). A 
couple of factors can constrain labour availability for a household. First, internal 




income. This can lead to women reducing their labour in coffee farming activities 
and diverting it to other cash earning activities where they have more control over 
income (Overfield, 1998). Second, the increasing size of the coffee garden also 
increases the demand for labour to farm coffee and for processing tasks (Finch, 1991; 
Collett, 1992). Thus, labour problems also undermine smallholder coffee production. 
 
Low and unsteady coffee prices have eroded the motivation of smallholders to 
produce coffee (Aba et al. 2009). Coffee farmers are price sensitive so when prices 
are low, they are less motivated to produce coffee. During periods of high prices, 
farmers spend more time maintaining their coffee gardens, but when prices are low, 
they neglect their coffee gardens and even abandon them to be taken over by bush 
(Allen et al. 2009; Batt and Murray-Prior, 2011). In my interviews with farmers at 
Korofeigu, they reported that they sometimes store parchment in their houses waiting 
for coffee prices to rise. However, parchment quality can deteriorate if it is stored for 
more than three months. Farmers tend to store parchment when the price falls below 
K3.00/kg. 
 
Poor rural infrastructure 
An important factor that has been identified in several reports as contributing to the 
decline and stagnation of coffee production is poor infrastructure in the rural areas. 
Coffee is grown in rural and remote areas where feeder roads are sometimes 
impassable or no longer in use (Murray-Prior and Batt, 2007; Aba et al. 2012). In 
some cases, bridges have been destroyed by floods thus smallholders walk long 
distances to access transport. Farmers living in remote areas descend into deep 
gorges, cross fast flowing rivers and climb steep mountains carrying their parchment 
to the nearest roads or airstrips (Plate 5.1). It is not unusual for coffee growers in 
remote areas such as Baira in EHP and Jimi in Jiwaka to walk for days carrying 
coffee to access points that will get them to market. Transporting coffee over long 
distances is not only costly through hiring carriers, but creates the economic 











Smallholder coffee production has been negatively impacted by tribal conflicts 
(Sinclair, 1995). There have been instances of a tribe driving its enemy off its land 
and then cutting down coffee trees and uprooting newly planted seedlings. 
Donaldson and Good (1988) reveals tribal conflicts in Simbu, PNG, where the 
primary intention was to destroy the properties of rival clansmen, including felling of 
coffee trees. During tribal conflicts, abandoned coffee gardens can remain 
unproductive as the bush takes over. It would be risky for displaced farmers to return 
to their coffee gardens to work them unless peace has been brokered through 
mediation by law enforcement agencies, which can sometimes take years.  
 
Closure of mills and poor quality coffee 
Apart from the low production of smallholder coffee holdings, coffee quality is also 
a major problem. In part this is due to the closure of the mills outlined in the first half 
of the chapter. From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, the majority of the plantations had 




Smallholders could sell cherries and parchment coffee to these factories. Coffee 
buyers working for processors typically purchased coffee cherries from smallholders 
and supplied the rural central coffee mills (Stewart, 1992). Also in the 1980s, the 
blocks supplied ripe cherries to mills instead of parchment because they received 
better income. These mills had quality assurance mechanisms which ensured the 
processing of excellent quality coffee. The mills demanded and bought only quality 
cherry and parchment from coffee farmers. This resulted in farmers producing and 
delivering coffee according to the mills’ quality standards. However, with the demise 
of plantations and the abandonment of factories checks on the quality of coffee sold 
by smallholders ceased (Plate 5.2). Without these quality assurance mechanisms, 
coffee quality declined (Hunt and Eko, 2001; West, 2012). 
 
 
Plate 5.2: Abandoned coffee factory at Roka Coffee Plantation, in Daulo, EHP. 
 
The closure of coffee mills in rural areas created a vacuum for a new and unregulated 
group of coffee buyers to enter the cherry and parchment trade. These buyers are 
‘middlemen’ who buy for large coffee buyers or chain leaders (West, 2012). Private 
entrepreneurs also engage in coffee trading. Many of the buyers do not adhere to 




before pulping. Thus, the quality of the coffee deteriorates. Also, parchment buyers 
fail to comply with parchment standards and pay a standard price for all grades 
(Murray-Prior and Batt, 2007). Thus, the present system does not offer incentives for 
farmers to consistently produce quality parchment. Buyers are also careless about 
storing parchment after purchase, so when it rains, the beans become soaked. The 
pressure on buyers to meet contractual obligations leads them to purchase dubious 
quality coffee (Hunt and Eko, 2001). The inconsistent supply of quality coffee has 
led to international buyers labelling PNG coffee as ‘inconsistent’. Because of poor 
quality coffee, farmers are not receiving as high a price as they could if they were to 
produce quality plantation parchment. This creates a further disincentive for 
households to invest labour into coffee.  
 
The challenge to reduce the exports of low-quality Y-grade coffee continues. In the 
past, the majority of coffee exported was of high quality. In the 1980s, Harvey-Jones 
(1988) reports that plantations produced more than 60% of AA or A grade green 
beans. It is argued that in the past, PNG’s excellent reputation for quality was based 
on well-managed plantations and their efficient and well-maintained mills, which 
processed both plantation and smallholder coffee to produce the renowned premium 
coffee. Now only a small percentage of PNG coffee exports are of high quality 
graded as AA or A which have not varied in the last five years (Figure 5.3). In 1995, 
to differentiate smallholder coffee from plantation coffee, the premium smallholder 
coffee (PSC) grade was introduced for the smallholders. Although, the PSC earned 
better prices compared to Y-grade it is deemed of lower quality to plantation coffee.  
 
In 2016, the CIC in consultation with stakeholders revised the present green bean 
standards, which will reduce the number of coffee grades from 12 to 5 (Appendix 1). 
The revision has done away with the differentiation of smallholder and plantation 
coffee as two separate categories. The new standards assess coffee on the basis of 
quality only rather than by sector (plantation and smallholder). The new premium 
grades are A and B. The lower quality grades consist of Y, Y2 and Y3, in order of 






While a few smallholders have the technical expertise and resources to process high-
quality coffee, most use a variety of inferior methods. These inferior methods result 
in poor quality coffee. For instance, instead of using raised beds to dry washed 
coffee, many farmers have adopted the use of polythene canvas to spread over the 
ground to dry coffee and then fold it over the parchment in the evening. This 
technique collects moisture which sometimes results in ‘tainted flavour’ coffee. Also, 
farmers in many remote locations lack hand pulpers and use stones and other 
methods to pulp coffee which leads to processing delays. A lack of clean water, over-
fermentation, delayed pulping of harvested cherry, and incomplete drying are 
common practices among smallholders and lead to poor coffee quality (Murray-Prior 
and Batt, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Percentage of various coffee green bean grades exported from 2010 to 
2015 (Source: CIC data). 
 
As argued above, smallholders who are independent farmers face numerous socio-
economic challenges that undermine their productivity. The smallholders’ approach 
to low input-low output production seems to arise from the numerous livelihood 
strategies farmers engage in to sustain their lives. Also, some household heads are 
subdividing coffee gardens as a result of population growth while others uproot 
coffee trees to plant more profitable crops and food crops. Moreover, smallholders 
were not accessing credit because many have failed to repay past loans. The 

































































































smallholders are not accessing extension information, new innovations and 
technologies which would have helped in building their capacity to improve 
productivity. The persistent labour constraints and low prices are also disincentives 
for farmers to improve productivity.  
 
National and Institutional Constraints  
At a more macro-level, national and institutional problems also constrain coffee 
production both for the managed subsector and the smallholder sectors. The main 
problems include the inappropriate use of industry funds, poor implementation of 
sectoral and industry strategies, and institutional governance systems. Each is 
discussed below.  
 
Industry fund 
Since the inception of the Coffee Industry Fund (CIF) in 1968, periodic reviews of 
the fund were made, and rules and priorities regarding the fund were revised to keep 
the fund relevant. Levies were collected during periods of high prices, particularly to 
pay bounties during periods of very low prices. When there was a prolonged period 
of low prices and CIF funds were depleted in the 1990s, the government gave grants 
as price support. In the past, exporters were the primary beneficiaries of the fund and 
they became mediums for transmitting the levies to coffee farmers (McWilliam, 
1996; Smith, 1992; Stewart, 1992). The levies were paid to farmers in addition to the 
prevailing market price of coffee. 
 
In 2014, the government allocated K11 million for coffee price support. Mitio (2014) 
in reviewing mechanisms to spend the K11 million recommended that current coffee 
prices were above the threshold levels so price support should be deferred. Instead, 
he recommended the establishment of large nurseries to replace the aging coffee 
trees. He also recommended that coffee farmer groups must be registered so that they 
could participate in differentiated markets.  
 
Problems with national and institutional policies and strategies 
The National Development Strategic Plan 2030 is a medium-term plan anchored on 
Vision 2050 and forms the basis for allocating financial resources to different sectors 




(NADP) is a sectoral plan but its projections were unrealistic. The projections in the 
plan were dependent on accessible rural infrastructure, efficient markets, unhindered 
land access and good governance thus the plan is unworkable.  
 
Problems related to sectoral and industry strategies that have affected coffee 
production include the abuse of the NADP funds and the partial implementation of 
the coffee strategic plan. Some institutional projects were moderately successful 
while others failed. They include the credit scheme, freight scheme, grower support 
services, village coffee rehabilitation and collaborations with partners.  
 
Abuse of NADP funds 
The NADP was allocated a total of K528 million from 2007 through to 2012. This 
proved to be a disaster because genuine, hard-working farmers were unable to access 
the fund. Politicians, bureaucrats and ‘paper farmers’ who did not own coffee 
gardens or were not engaged in agricultural activities swindled the funds (Nalu, 
2009). The state carried out an inquiry which revealed massive abuse and 
misappropriation of funds (“Probe NADP scam”, 2013; “K528mil for Agro 
Misused”, 2013). Commodity agencies, including the CIC were supposed to take a 
leading role in implementing the NADP (DAL, 2007). However, because of political 
manipulation, commodity agencies rarely participated in project formulation, 
implementation or the allocation of funds. Benjamin Poponawa, a politician from 
WHP reported that NADP funds were serving ‘paper farmers’ and not genuine 
farmers (“Planning Dept should explain”, 2009). In response, the former DAL 
minister John Hickey stated that: 
 
They’ve (Planning [Department]) been very tricky. NADP is special 
intervention. But, somehow bureaucrats have changed it to PIP [Public 
Investment Program]. It was deliberate, so they can dip their hands into it. 
(“No NADP Funds”, 2009) 
 
Some ‘coffee farmers’ who benefited from the funds were associates of those who 
managed the fund or had political connections (“Probe NADP scam”, 2013; 
“K528mil for Agro Misused”, 2013). Others submitted coffee proposals, but after 
obtaining the funds invested the money in other businesses. This funding is an 




for coffee farmers and did little to invigorate the coffee industry and arrest the 
decline in production. 
 
Partial implementation of coffee plan 
Some of the strategies enshrined in the Coffee Industry Strategic Plan (2008-2018; 
2013-2018 (revised)) that are related to raising productivity are increased production 
of high-quality coffee, rehabilitation of plantations and blocks, facilitating supply 
chain linkages, training, credit facilities and other services (CIC, 2008a). Some are 
discussed below while others are reported elsewhere in this and subsequent chapters. 
The coffee plan is partially being implemented, but programs that have not received 
stakeholder input are at times being elevated at the expense of programs that have 
been conceived through consultative processes. Some activities currently been 
undertaken by CIC that were not part of the strategic plan include the issuing of 
export licences to the districts and the opening of a CIC office in Sydney, Australia. 
Such impromptu projects may soak up much of CIC’s resources, thus undermining 
the execution of the strategic plan.  
 
Problems with coffee credit scheme 
To assist coffee farmers with credit access to purchase farm inputs, the government 
in 1996 introduced a credit scheme for smallholders (Chapter 4). In the late 2000s, 
the scheme encountered problems, as the fund manager, the Rural Development 
Bank (RDB) could not make the funds available for lending. The RDB still had a 
balance of K1.6 million; when the loans to the coffee credit guarantee scheme 
(CCGS) were suspended in 2003 they claimed that the bank was being restructured 
(CIC, 2005b). In 2005, a report revealed some problems with the implementation of 
CCGS (CIC, 2005a). These problems included the RDB’s lack of oversight of the 
facility and the unavailability of operational funds to support the logistics of the 
program. Because of poor institutional record keeping, only a preliminary cost-
benefit analysis was carried out for CCGS.  
 
Problems associated with the freight scheme 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the Freight Subsidy Scheme initially began in 1999 to 
freight coffee from remote locations to market but the financial sustainability of the 




over time. Moreover, as government support declined, an alternative approach had to 
be sought. In 2003, the scheme was redesigned to the Freight Surety Scheme to make 
it more sustainable by allowing the scheme to pay freight costs up-front, with costs 
recovered at the point of sale. Thus, it guaranteed a pool of funds to be used as a 
revolving fund. A cost-benefit analysis conducted in 2006 reported that recorded 
freight costs did not reconcile with the amounts collected at the point of sale. This 
anomaly may mean record keeping was poor or records may have been manipulated. 
The scheme encountered misappropriation of funds with a few CIC officers being 
reprimanded. The scheme is currently operational.  
 
Inconsistent grower support services 
In 2003, in another attempt to assist smallholders, the CIC began promoting grower 
groups. This was part of a reformed approach to provide extension services based on 
farmers’ demand (FDDE). It was believed that by developing collective action in 
grower groups, coffee production, and quality would be improved. The CIC used the 
PRAP process to organise farmers into grower groups. Api et al. (2009) highlighted 
many of the problems associated with the PRAP methodology including the high 
costs to execute the program. PRAP costs exerted pressure on the recurrent CIC 
budget; the PRAP method was cumbersome and farmers were not asked to 
participate in suggesting the types of training they required from the production 
constraints they had identified but which were left to CIC to decide. Murray-Prior 
and Padarath (2013) reveal that on average K40,000 per year was spent on 
conducting a single PRAP involving 800 coffee farmers in a year. They further 
report that in the seven years (2005-2012) of executing FDDE, less than 1% of coffee 
farmers were involved. Recommendations were made that the PRAP process be 
streamlined to make it more cost-effective (Api et al. 2009; Murray-Prior and 
Padarath, 2013). Also, because of inconsistencies in the available ‘hard data’, 
detailed evaluation of FDDE was not possible (Murray-Prior and Padarath, 2013). 
 
Other problems that affected FDDE were related to payments of service providers 
and cash flow. From 2007 onwards, payments for training and service providers were 
not released because of internal cash flow problems in CIC (Batt et al. 2009; Murray-
Prior and Padarath, 2013) and CIC did not have a dedicated pool of funds to support 




informal; the intention was that eventually grower groups would be registered with 
the cooperative office as they began to develop social capital and strengthen group 
leadership. However, ‘new’ priorities, like village coffee rehabilitation program, 
district partnerships and nursery projects diverted the focus away from strengthening 
grower groups and leadership. 
 
Poor implementation of village coffee rehabilitation 
The CDA extensively rehabilitated smallholder coffee gardens in the late 1980s, but 
failed to make follow-up visits to carry out de-suckering and sucker selection 
(Fleming and Antony, 1993). The huge effort in pruning coffee trees in many places 
may have reduced the available number of CDA officers to conduct follow-up visits. 
By 1991, the CDA merger with CIC led to priorities once again being changed.  
 
In 2009, the CIC carried out the village coffee rehabilitation program to rejuvenate 
ageing coffee trees with financial support from the NADP (Chapter 4). The project 
attempted to mimic the CDA coffee rehabilitation of the late-1980s. However, the 
project spent vast sums of money on items that had no relevance to improving coffee 
production, such as the purchase of blankets, and bush knives. An institutional 
investigation revealed huge discrepancies in record keeping and poor quality tools 
were acquired at inflated costs. Low smallholder productivity and poor quality coffee 
continued to remain significant problems. Thus, the execution of the program lacked 
proper planning and efficient monitoring.  
 
The lack of regular monitoring and scheduled reviews of many of the memorandum 
of agreements (MOAs) with provincial governments, districts, civil society 
organisations and resource companies have rendered many MOAs not fully capable 
of achieving their intents to promote coffee production. Many of the MOAs were 
based on partners contributing finances while CIC offered expertise and training. 
However, the approach to partner with districts has an element of political leveraging 
rather than achieving improved coffee production. For example, the MOA finances 
were in most cases expedited by partners with minimal input from the CIC on where 






Poor institutional governance systems 
Industry institutions were created with the aim of regulating, facilitating and 
providing leadership through research and development activities to assist the growth 
of the industry. However, Itika (2005) cautions that, sometimes, reforms in 
institutional frameworks could constrain the growth of the coffee industry. Some of 
the problems associated with reforms in implementation are outlined below.  
 
The CMB was created to regulate the PNG coffee industry. The localisation policies 
that were derived from the 1974 legislation of the CMB to allow local entrepreneurs 
to participate as processors and exporters led to some problems (Fleming and 
Antony, 1993). For example, between 1974 and 1979, non-citizen ownership of 
coffee processing facilities declined considerably and shifted to local ownership. 
About this period, overseas buyers of PNG coffee complained of the poor quality 
(Fleming and Antony, 1993).  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, political interests also became apparent with attempts to 
manipulate the issuance of licences to political cronies in the industry. For example, 
in the late-1980s, the late Sir Iambakey Okuk, the then Agriculture Minister 
influenced the CIB to issue an export licence to Panga Coffee. The company 
obtained a loan of K11.1 million from the CIF to purchase and stockpile coffee but 
was unable to repay it. The CIB and thereafter CIC as fund manager sued Panga 
Coffee, which led to a protracted legal battle in the 1990s (Sinclair, 1995) and 2000s 
to recover the loan. The CIC eventually won the case in the 2000s and was awarded a 
K14 million but was unable to recover the monies as the owner of Panga Coffee died 
(Ricky Mitio pers. comm., 11/06/16). 
 
Also, the CIB encountered illegal activities of processors and exporters that 
challenged its regulatory functions (Fleming and Antony, 1993). For instance, the 
CIB placed on notice a coffee mill owned by a local company from Lufa, EHP, 
because it did not meet licensing requirements and ordered it to cease processing 
coffee. When coffee inspectors made a visit to the site, they were harassed by the 






From 1986 to the mid-1990s, the CRI was active in research as finances were readily 
available. However, following the merger of the CRI with the CIC in 1991, research 
outputs such as innovation and publications of peer-reviewed articles and stakeholder 
engagement have diminished significantly. This is because the CRI has suffered from 
protracted periods of limited funding support from the CIC in its regular budget to 
facilitate new research activities and, thus, there are gaps in innovation generation. It 
is paradoxical that the CIC researchers are paid salaries but the organisation fails to 
fund research projects. This problem, as argued by Fleming and Antony (1993) 
occurs when political expediency takes precedence over research priorities and 
funding. Moreover, the merging of the CRI with the ESD in 2003 was to facilitate 
effective information exchange between scientists and extension officers so that new 
technologies could reach farmers through regular interactions. Unfortunately, 
inadequate funding has drastically curtailed effective research and extension 
collaborations (Murray-Prior and Padarath, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
The coffee industry is beset with numerous complex problems which are 
undermining coffee productivity, production and quality. The seeds of the problems 
in the managed subsector began as early as when plantation land was bought and the 
original landowner names did not feature in the land sale agreements. Lack of proper 
coffee farming knowledge was also a problem. These problems had an enduring 
influence upon plantation productivity, which worsened after plantations were 
transferred to local entrepreneurs, landowner business groups and corporations. 
Local business managers and owners did not manage the plantations and the blocks 
as commercial businesses, which led to failures. As for the blocks, lack of sweat 
equity investments from shareholders, differences between management agencies 
and business managers, and internal conflicts among shareholders have contributed 
to their decline. 
 
After the departure of European planters in the 1970s, the support services that used 
to be available for smallholders also collapsed. There was no entity to fill the gap, 
particularly the availability of quality processing facilities nearby for rural farmers to 
access and sell their coffee. Incompetent local business managers could not replicate 




surrounding the plantations (see Chapter 8). Smallholders had to produce coffee on 
their own and encountered numerous challenges to increase their productivity and 
produce good quality coffee.  
 
The failure of sectoral and industry strategies have contributed to the decline in 
productivity and production in the coffee industry. The strategies failed as a result of 
poor governance and weak institutional leadership. The inconsistent support from the 
CIC and the demise of management agencies led to diminishing services for 
plantations and blocks. Also, institutional projects produced mixed results where 
records were not kept thus making evaluation impossible. The CDA coffee 
rehabilitation program assisted in revitalising the coffee tree stock, which led to the 
industry achieving 1 million green bean bags in the late 1980s. However, recent 
approaches applied in coffee rehabilitation have been unsustainable. Furthermore, 
poor governance systems emanating from poorly designed institutional reforms in 
CIC has also undermined service delivery. Inadequate funding to institutional 
programs and projects has resulted in poor services to stakeholders in the industry. 
Lack of credit facilities, inadequate extension and advisory services, close of rural 
coffee mills and tribal conflicts have in all contributed to the decline of the coffee 
industry.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8, examine the constraints on coffee production in more detail and 
outline some strategies resilient farmers are employing to be successful. Chapter 6 













Chapters 4 and 5 examined the historical growth of the coffee industry and the main 
factors contributing to its decline. Chapter 5 in part discussed some of the coffee 
production problems of smallholder farmers who are not members of farmer groups 
or independent farmers. Because of the decline of the plantations, the support 
services that plantations used to provide to smallholders in the 1960s and 1970s also 
disappeared. To address the lack of support services some farmers formed 
cooperatives to source services from partners. However, independent farmers and 
cooperative farmers continue to encounter problems in coffee production which have 
contributed to the fall in productivity and the inconsistent supply of quality coffee.  
 
This chapter focuses on smallholders who are members of cooperatives. It argues 
that coffee production problems that smallholders in groups encounter are not as 
severe as for independent farmers. Smallholders participating in cooperatives have 
benefited from receiving support from chain leaders and lead partners in partnerships 
which have improved farmers’ coffee production capacities (see Chapter 8). Through 
group participation, farmers have been able to improve their productivity and quality 
of coffee (Chapter 8). The smallholder grower groups are replicating the role of early 
European-owned plantations as focal points for support services for coffee farmers. 
However, at the household level, even farmers in grower groups still face a number 
of constraints that undermine their production.  
 
In this chapter, I present my survey results derived from two farmer groups (see 
Chapter 3). In group one there were 47 coffee farmers who were members of the 
Neknasi Coffee Growers Cooperative Society from the Wain area, Nawae District, 
Morobe Province; and group two consists of 44 farmers who belonged to the 




EHP. These grower groups cooperate with chain leaders and lead partners to produce 
coffee. The two cooperatives are hereafter referred to in the thesis as the Neknasi 
group and the Korofeigu group. 
 
Smallholder Productivity 
The productivity of farmers participating in grower groups is better than that of 
independent farmers. Average productivity reported for the Neknasi group is 876 kg 
gb/ha and for the Korofeigu group 610 kg gb/ha and 747 kg gb/ha for the two groups 
combined. Whilst the average productivity of the two groups is lower than those 
attained from the 1970s to the 1990s, it is higher than the more recent finding of 
UniQuest (2013), which was 382 kg gb/ha by independent farmers (Chapter 5). The 
average number of coffee gardens per households in the Wain area was 1.7 and 3.1 in 
the Korofeigu area. The average garden size at Wain was 0.9 ha and at Korofeigu 
was 1.6 ha. This compares with mean average areas of 0.3 ha from 1960s to 1990s 
were higher from the two study sites (Table 6.1). The higher productivity in the 
Neknasi group may be an outcome of the better maintenance of the Wain farmers’ 
gardens. The Wain farmers also have a smaller area of coffee to care for which may 
account for the higher yields than the Korofeigu farmers.  
 









1965/66    346* 0.15 Goroka, EHP Donaldson and Good, 1988 
1968    425* 0.17 EHP Finney, 1968:399 
1972/73  500 0.20 EHP Anderson, 1977 
1977  530 0.21 EHP, Simbu, WHP Anderson, 1977:10  
1992 1,102 0.43 Bena, EHP Collett, 1992:89 
1994 1,102 0.43 Bena, EHP Overfield, 1994 




2016 1,798 0.7 Baira, Bena, Asaro, 
Marawaka (EHP) 
Curry et al. (2016), 
unpublished 
2016 2,187 0.90 Boana, Morobe  This thesis 
2016 4,048 1.60 Bena, EHP This thesis 
*Goroka area. Tree population and areas are calculated using 2,569 trees/ha (see 






Another reason that may explain the difference in productivity between the two 
farmer groups is education (Figure 6.1). Farm productivity is positively correlated 
with education levels (Appleton and Balihuta, 1996; Kurosaki and Khan, 2006). 
Educated farmers are more likely to adopt technologies that improve farm 
productivity (Li and Ma, 2015). When education levels rise, there is also potential for 
educated households to diversify into non-farm activities to sustain their livelihoods 
(Oseni, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Education levels of household members who are 18 years old and above 
among the Neknasi and Korofeigu group farmers. 
 
A higher proportion of household members from the Neknasi group who were 18 
years of age or older completed Grades 6 and 8 compared with Korofeigu farmers. 
Most respondents who were over 50 years of age from Wain (20%) area attended 
tokples [local language] schools run by Lutheran missionaries compared with only 
2% of the Korofeigu group. Furthermore, 14% of household members from 
Korofeigu have not attended school compared with only 3% of the Neknasi group. 
The basic literacy levels among Wain farmers are better than households from the 
Korofeigu group. Thus, higher literacy rates among the Neknasi group members may 
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Additional factors that influence coffee productivity and production include farm 
inputs, labour, the price of coffee and the health and age of coffee trees. Farmers 
from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups have been planting coffee since the 1960s. 
Some growers have expanded the coffee plantings of their parents or grandparents. In 
this study, a high proportion of coffee was planted in the 1990s among members of 
the Neknasi (55%) and Korofeigu (50%) groups (Figure 6.2). The surge of coffee 
planting in the 1990s could be related to several factors. In the late 1980s, the Coffee 
Development Agency had conducted massive awareness programs on coffee 
production through coffee rehabilitation exercises and field days, which may have 
encouraged many farmers to plant coffee. Another factor that explains the increase in 
planting was the formation of the CIC in 1991. CIC extension officers were stationed 
in all coffee growing districts in PNG. Consequently, the regular contact with 




Figure 6.2: The decades in which farmers from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups 
planted coffee. 
 
Coffee Production Constraints 
Despite the relatively high coffee productivity of farmers in this study, several 
factors combine to undermine their productivity and production. Respondents in this 





























household labour strategies that cause labour shortages; pests and diseases; pig 
damage; cherry theft; lack of credit; lack of training; land scarcity; and, lack of 
coffee pulpers. These are discussed below. 
 
Household labour strategies 
This section discusses how household members allocate their labour. In March 2014, 
just before the onset of the peak coffee season, I interviewed smallholders who were 
members of the two cooperative groups. Farmers were asked to rank activities in 
terms of the total time allocated to coffee farming and processing activity. Labour 
activities included work in coffee, food gardens, and other events including school 
attendance, church, socio-cultural activities, assisting relatives or leisure. Data were 
collected from husbands, wives, and their first-born sons and daughters.  
 
The main activity for men and women in the Neknasi group was coffee production. 
Husbands (71%) and wives (69%) almost equally ranked coffee work as their 
dominant activity (Figure 6.3). The Neknasi group farmers reported that husbands 
and wives have demarcated coffee gardens. The husbands own the coffee gardens 
and allocate a portion of the gardens to the wives to harvest coffee as their own. 
After processing, the couple separately sell their coffee and earn their own income. 
The subdivision of coffee gardens has enabled husbands and wives to both contribute 
equally to coffee production.  
 
Coffee production is also the main activity among households in the Korofeigu 
group. Seventy percent of husbands ranked spending most of their time in coffee 
production while only 12% of wives ranked coffee work as their main activity. There 
are two possible reasons why husbands ranked coffee work as their primary work 
activity. Firstly, the average holdings of households in the Korofeigu area are more 
than double the size established by Collett (1992) for independent farmers (Table 
6.1). The larger coffee garden sizes of the farmers from the Korofeigu area may 
explain why male farmers claim they spend more time in coffee work than food 
gardening. Secondly, the married women members of the Korofeigu group spent 
more time in food production, which may result in husbands needing to do more of 
the coffee work to maintain coffee production. In my interviews with women from 




more control over the income they received from food sales. This finding concurs 
with the findings of Curry et al. (2007a) and Koczberski’s (2007) in the PNG oil 
palm industry where women were reluctant to assist in oil palm production if their 
husbands did not share income with them fairly. However, husbands and wives from 
Neknasi group equally share responsibilities for coffee work because each is assured 
to earn income from coffee they produce. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Household members first ranked activities where they allocate most of 
their labour time. 
 
Farmers were asked to report on coffee activities that were carried out in the previous 
month (Figures 6.4 and 6.5). The Neknasi farmers indicated that both husbands and 
wives harvest ripe cherries, process coffee, market (sell) parchment coffee, apply 
organic fertiliser in coffee gardens and maintain new coffee gardens. The large 
contribution of labour of husbands and wives in the Neknasi group, and of men in the 
Korofeigu group may be related to the positive influence of social capital generated 
through collective action (Chapter 8). This is because farmers in cooperatives are 
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Figure 6.4: Coffee farm tasks in which the Neknasi household members are involved. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Coffee farm tasks in which the Korofeigu household members are 
involved. 
 
Moreover, men from the Wain and Korofeigu areas prune coffee and shade trees. 
The women in the Neknasi group mainly assisted with harvesting, processing and 
working in the new coffee gardens. Fencing and maintaining drains were additional 
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from the Neknasi group (Figure 6.4). Husbands from Korofeigu largely carried out 
coffee garden maintenance work but in harvesting and marketing their wives also 
assisted (Figure 6.5)1. The first-born sons and daughters helped their parents in 
harvesting, processing, weeding and maintaining the new coffee gardens. The first-
born sons assisted with male dominated tasks like pruning coffee trees and applying 
organic fertiliser. By contributing labour, sons are building up a claim to inherit the 
coffee gardens.  
 
Labour shortages 
Labour shortages are a universal problem among smallholders including members of 
cooperatives. The shortage of labour was considered to be one of the most prominent 
constraints on coffee productivity and production among the Neknasi group farmers 
but less so with farmers from the Korofeigu group (Figure 6.6).  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Coffee farming constraints among farmers from the Neknasi and 
Korofeigu groups. 
 
The reason for the Wain farmers’ complaints about labour demands were because 
they comply with stringent Fair Trade standards which were at times cumbersome 
and require more labour to produce coffee. Many households attempt to meet labour 





























Collett (1992) confirms that both reciprocal labour and hired labour were used 
together among farmers in Bena, EHP. However, Collett did not provide details of 
how farmers sourced labour and the modes of ‘payments’ made for labour. I shall, 
therefore, present details on labour sources and the types of ‘payments’ made for 
labour. 
 
As discussed above, household members undertake most coffee farming tasks but for 
some tasks, they engage relatives or paid labourers to supplement labour needs. 
Additional labour is often sought from relatives for harvesting and weeding by both 
farmer groups (Figure 6.7) and this concurs with previous findings in PNG (see 
Finch, 1991; Collett, 1992; Overfield, 1998). The relatives who supply ‘unpaid 
labour’ include extended family members, other villagers and in-laws. ‘Paid or hired 
labourers’ tend to be sports, church and youth groups who are paid an agreed amount 
after the completion of set assignments while others are individual local villagers or 
labourers from disadvantaged areas who are paid fortnightly wages. Generally, 
farmers with larger coffee gardens hire labour to prune coffee, maintain drains and 
load dried parchment coffee for the market. Hired labourers are engaged when 
households have insufficient labour for coffee production.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Farm tasks where relatives assist farmers who are members of the 





























The harvesting period in the Wain area is in the wet season. Farmers require 
additional labour from kinsfolk and paid labourers to harvest quickly before ripe 
cherries are lost to the rain. The majority of farmers grow the Arabica variety of 
coffee, Mundo Novo, which is high-yielding but is susceptible to ripe berries being 
dislodged from the trees because of heavy rain. Some farmers pay cash to relatives 
who help with coffee work, in addition to the cooked or uncooked food that is 
normally provided.  
 
Farmers in the Neknasi group do not provide instructions to relatives when they 
assist in coffee work. Many of the relatives are members of the Neknasi group and 
are well trained in proper coffee husbandry practices or tasks (Chapter 8). In the 
Korofeigu group, farmers reported that relatives assist because the household would 
be unable to complete coffee tasks on their own. Even if the job was of poor quality, 
Korofeigu farmers appreciated that the task has been accomplished. These farmers 
are afraid that if they are critical of the quality of the work undertaken by relatives, 
they may refuse to assist in the future. However, 46% of farmers in the Korofeigu 
group offer advice to hired labourers on how to harvest and to cut grass before work 
is undertaken. 
 
The ability to recruit labour among farmers in coffee production is dependent on 
meeting social obligations, gift and labour exchanges, and participating in socio-
cultural events. Many studies in PNG have confirmed the significance of engaging in 
reciprocal labour exchange to mobilise labour for agricultural farm tasks (e.g. 
Sexton, 1988; Collett, 1992; Curry and Koczberski, 2012; Inu, 2015). Households 
remunerate relatives and hired labourers in several ways (Figure 6.8). The form of 
‘payments’ in order of most to least common are the sharing of cooked food and 
assistance at a later date with labour and cash or in-kind goods for socio-cultural 
commitments (Table 6.2). Cooked food consists of stored foods such as rice, tinned 
fish, noodles and lamb flaps. At times, sugar, cooking oil, soap and liquor are also 
given. Sometimes uncooked food is given to family members to take home. These 
‘payments’ are made as tokens of appreciation for labour supplied. The prevalence of 
exchange labour among farmers in the Neknasi group is higher than amongst the 
Korofeigu group (Figure 6.6). This is because when members of Korofeigu group 








Figure 6.8: The types of 'payments' made by households in the Neknasi and 
Korofeigu groups to relatives for assistance. 
 
Table 6.2: Typical amount of cash contribution for different levels of education and 
to meet other social obligations. 
Activities 
Cash support for relatives or their own 
social obligations* (PGK) 
Regular support One-off payments 
Educational fees 
Primary school 20-30 100 
High school 10-50 200-300 
Colleges/university 10-50 1500 
Mortuary 10-30 100-300 
Menarche (Sik mun) 10-20 100-200 
Het (male) or beksait (female) payments 10-20 100-2000 
*The cash support for school fees offered to relatives is for each year. However, 
support given for other socio-cultural obligations and activities depends on when the 
event is taking place, as these events might not occur every year. 
 
Assistance at a later date, to meet social obligations may include supporting kin with 
cash or in-kind payments towards school fees for children, mortuary payments, 
community events (kominiti hevi2), bride prices, het (head) or beksait (backside) 
payments3, and aiding those seeking medical assistance. Cash support usually occurs 
when a need arises in the community. However, amounts exceeding K100 are 







































obligations given to relatives. A farmer who receives labour assistance from relatives 
may pay school fees for his grandchildren, their siblings’ children or in some cases, 
his in-laws’ children. Some farmers favour supporting their wives’ relatives because 
in-laws are more likely to provide labour. Relatives receive cash or in-kind support 
from the farmer and in exchange provide regular labour in coffee farming tasks as 
required. 
 
Coffee farmers who reside and farm coffee on maternal or wives’ land commit more 
labour and cash support to their maternal uncles and in-laws respectively. These 
farmers stated that they were obliged to assist their maternal uncles or wives’ 
relatives when problems, social obligations or labour for coffee tasks were needed. 
Maternal uncles or wives’ relatives do not formally request help from nephews or 
sons-in-law. Because nephews and sons-in-law live nearby, they are aware of 
pending tasks and therefore are obligated to assist their maternal uncles or wives’ 
family members with cash, labour or food. Providing assistance to their uncles and 
wives’ families facilitates continuous and untroubled access to land and maintains 
social relationships with them. 
 
These forms of ‘payments’ and labour exchange systems fit into Netting’s (1993) 
concept of household implicit contracts. Netting describes implicit contracts as the 
providence of work offered to a family member without expecting an immediate 
payment for the service rendered. The person providing labour can expect that the 
individual assisted will reciprocate in the future with a cash payment, labour or in-
kind payment when needed. Households receiving labour support from relatives are 
expected to reciprocate this help in times of need so that the labour supply is assured 
and the implicit contract is maintained. In my field sites, farmers reported that they 
were compelled to assist their immediate family members, other villagers and in-
laws who regularly supplied labour when a problem or financial need arose. This is 
also akin to observations made by Finney (1968) of ‘big men’ lending cash and in-
kind support to kinsmen in the Goroka area while Koczberski (2007) reports on 
similar labour allocation and payment modes for oil palm growers in West New 
Britain Province, PNG. The recipients of support in return were expected to provide 




social capital within the community. Thus, reciprocal labour exchange practices 
reveal the mutual interdependence of coffee farmers in rural communities.  
 
Smallholders from Korofeigu area with larger coffee gardens appear to spend more 
money, distribute more store goods and give away coffee cherries, than farmers with 
less coffee trees (Table 6.3). These farmers with coffee garden sizes of 2-5 ha allow 
their relatives after harvesting to weigh cherries they have picked; they are paid 
K0.10-0.30/kg or given 10-15 kg of harvested cherries, which they themselves can 
sell. A similar case was observed with the ‘Loose Fruit Mamas’ in the oil palm 
industry in PNG, where husbands gave their wives some oil palm fruit bunches for 
assisting with oil palm work (Koczberski, 2007). The payment of labour with cherry 
coffee is a mechanism to pay relatives for their labour. Paying relatives with coffee 
cherry and oil palm fruits to sell and earn their own income is an innovative way to 
show appreciation of the labour offered and to guarantee continued labour support. 
This illustrates that indigenous and market exchange is occurring simultaneously in 
local rural economies thus creating a form of hybrid labour exchange. 
 
Table 6.3: Modes of payments of labour by smallholders with large areas of coffee. 
Types of hired 
labour 
Farm tasks Types of payment 
Extended family 
members and other 
villagers 
Harvesting, grass 
cutting and pruning 
 Cooked food (store foods, lamb flaps 
(mumu4), garden food) 
 Fresh garden food, store foods (e.g. 5-10 
kg rice bags) 
 Cash given after the sale of coffee (K10-
100) 
 Other items (tobacco, betel nut and beer) 
Youth, church and 
community groups 
Harvesting, grass 
cutting and pruning 
 Cash payment (K20-100) to the group 
depending on the size of the task 
Hired labour Fence repair, drain 
work 
 Fortnightly wages of K50 
 
Disengaging from non-market systems  
More coffee farmers, especially those with good market access or who belong to 
particular churches, are beginning to disengage from participation in traditional 
socio-cultural activities. Some church members limit their assistance, and have 
refused to assist with activities that conflict with their religious beliefs such as 
contributing to compensation payments related to adultery, theft and warfare. Some 




be taking sides with opposing villagers as they also rely on their labour for coffee 
work. However, coffee farmers who refuse to participate in indigenous exchange 
systems may be shunned by the community (Strathern, 1982a; Aba et al. 2012). For 
example, when farmers refuse other villagers’ requests for assistance in coffee work, 
help is unlikely to be reciprocated.  
 
Some farmers reported that they work hard to produce coffee to sustain their 
livelihoods, but social obligations continue to undermine farm investment. The 
ensuing extract from an interview with a farmer, who owns a 5 ha coffee garden 
shows his perspective on village social obligations and their impact on his livelihood, 
and his family’s ability to accumulate household and farm assets. 
 
I contribute cash and in-kind to mortuary payments, bride prices, school fees 
and other socio-cultural activities. Sometimes we need to decide which 
requests for help from our relatives are important to us as a household so 
that when we contribute it also benefits us. I can spend 60-70% of my 
income on socio-cultural activities and, therefore, I do not have sufficient 
money to meet the needs of my household. For me, I need to compete with 
my former schoolmates who are engaged in businesses and others who 
already have permanent houses. We need to adjust and accommodate the 
changing circumstances. If there is a court case and villagers request me to 
accompany them, who will then do my coffee work? I have to decide and 
manage my time. As of 2013, my wife and I made a commitment to 
purchase an item each year. Last year, I bought a knapsack [for spraying 
herbicide]. (SH #23, 06/03/14) 
 
The above interview demonstrates that some farmers realise the need to reduce their 
time and contributions to the indigenous economy and instead reinvest cash income 
in coffee farming, entrepreneurial activities and education. Some farmers prefer to 
assist relatives when they have money or surplus food or selectively support their 
immediate or extended family members over more distant relatives. This study 
reveals that farmers are beginning to recognise that socio-cultural commitments are 
drawing away resources, which could have been deployed to improve their 
livelihoods. However, farmers are intelligent and can exploit indigenous forms of 
economies to meet the labour demands, food and social security. Other farmers fear 
that if they refuse to invest in social obligations, a superstitious calamity will befall 
their family or their coffee gardens, and this compels them to participate in socio-




Coffee pest and disease problems 
Further, constraints on coffee production that Neknasi group farmers recognised 
were the pest and disease problems (Figure 6.6). The Wain farmers reported that pink 
disease (Phanerochaete salmonicolor) was prevalent in the area. Many farmers 
cultivate Mundo Novo coffee variety, which is susceptible to pink disease. The 
problem is aggravated by the use of Lamtoro (Leucaena spp.) as shade, which is 
known to host the disease. Wain farmers sell their coffee under the Fair Trade label 
and are prohibited from using herbicides to spray or spades to weed. To control 
weeds, farmers must slash the weeds with bush knives, however the cut grass creates 
wet and humid conditions, which the farmers believe increase the incidences of pink 
disease. A coffee farmer said that “when we used to spray [herbicide] in the past 
[before partnering with Fair Trade], pink disease was not a major problem, but now 
the disease is prevalent after we began to cut grasses in our coffee gardens” (SH # 16, 
17/03/14). The Wain area is also cold, affirming Kenny et al.’s (2012) finding that 
pink disease is more prevalent in the cooler and humid regions.  
 
Only a few farmers from the Korofeigu group reported that they had pest and disease 
problems. The Korofeigu area is dry and so they do not have as many pests and 
diseases of coffee. The Korofeigu area is highly accessible to extension and advisory 
services. When farmers have pest and disease problems, they can quickly reach 
extension officers located in nearby Goroka. 
 
Pig damage to coffee gardens 
Another significant problem affecting coffee production among members of the 
Korofeigu group is pig damage to coffee gardens (Figure 6.6). In the Korofeigu area, 
many coffee gardens are not fenced5 and are at risk of damage by feral and 
domesticated pigs, which forage freely in coffee gardens often blocking drains and 
damaging coffee trees and roots. In the Wain area, pig damage was not a severe 
problem because most farmers’ domesticated pigs were fenced. Those farmers 
affected by pig damage in the Wain and Korofeigu areas have reported the damages 
to owners and requested them to tether pigs, but some owners have not complied. 
Thus, some farmers have either killed or harmed pigs found damaging their coffee 
gardens, and several owners are now responding by tethering their pigs. Farmers are 




relative can cause disharmony in the extended family. Some Korofeigu farmers 
claimed that coffee gardens further away from the village were not fenced. A 
member of the Korofeigu group has identified a strategy to ward off pigs from his 
coffee gardens. The farmer collects the pig faeces and scatters them in areas pigs 
have freshly dug in his coffee garden (SH #22, 06/03/14). When the pigs comb the 
area and smell the waste, they do not return to the coffee garden. After the waste has 
dissolved, the pigs return to root on the coffee garden.  
 
Cherry theft 
Cherry theft is a problem among some members of the Korofeigu group (25%, 
Figure 6.6). Farmers from the Korofeigu area have high access to coffee markets so 
thieves steal and quickly sell the cherry without being caught. Also, numerous cherry 
buyers are available in the community. Stealing occurs when farmers are away from 
the village, attending church services, or when coffee gardens are not visited for 
several days during the ripening period. Coffee theft affects the morale of coffee 
farmers and is a disincentive for them to produce coffee. The CIC introduced the 
cherry ban policy in 2008 to address cherry theft (Chapter 4). However, coffee 
buyers and some processors are not cooperating with the CIC to enforce the policy, 
and so the cherry ban has been ineffective. Some farmers have also reported itinerant 
coffee buyers to village court officials and CIC inspectors, but the response to 
address the problem remains limited and ineffective. Also, not all villagers are 
members of the cooperative and thus non-members are likely to be involved in 
cherry and parchment theft. A village participating in the Korofeigu group has a 
community law that when a villager catches a coffee thief and is successfully 
prosecuted in a village court, the thief is fined K200, and the fine is paid to the 
witness. This community law has deterred cherry theft in that village.  
 
Coffee theft is minimal amongst the Neknasi group members. One reason for this is 
because there is limited market access and there are very few coffee buyers in the 
Wain area. Moreover, there are several coffee cooperatives operating in the area, and 
most farmers are affiliated to these cooperatives and this makes coffee theft difficult. 
During field visits to the Neknasi group, I observed that farmers could leave their 
hand pulpers, fermenting or drying coffee and roofing iron in their coffee gardens 





Land shortage constrains coffee production (Collett, 1992) and is a widespread 
problem among smallholders. Population increase has led to household heads 
subdividing gardens among their sons (Chapter 5). Thus, individual land holdings for 
coffee are contracting. In this study, land shortages were identified among some 
members of the Neknasi group (11% of households, Figure 6.6). Two factors explain 
land shortages among the Neknasi group. Firstly, the geography in the Wain area is 
steep, hilly and stony so there is little land suitable for coffee and for other farming 
uses. Thus, access to good farm land is shrinking and some families are facing land 
shortages to cultivate coffee. Secondly, when husbands die, the widows return to 
their natal village with their children; thus, many farmers are residing at their 
maternal village and accessing maternal land. In one case, the maternal uncles of a 
member of the Neknasi group reclaimed their customary land with 3,100 mature 
coffee trees (SH #80, 19/02/14). In another case, a village court official, and member 
of the Korofeigu group had to relinquish a block of coffee to a claimant from the 
same village (SH #29, 26/03/14). The claimant argued that the land on which the 
coffee stands was his customary land. In the past, the population was small, so 
farmers used relational exchanges to allow relatives to use the land (Chapter 5). 
However, with an increasing population, the demand for land has grown; leading to 
some landowners reclaiming their customary land. Therefore, farming coffee on 
someone else’s land, maternal land or wives’ land has an uncertain future that can 
undermine productivity and deter investment in the coffee garden.  
 
Limited coffee farming knowledge 
Although farmers from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups have received various 
kinds of training, a few reported that they still require additional training in basic 
coffee husbandry practices (Figure 6.6). Farmers reported that they appreciated 
training when it is organised with practical demonstrations. Many farmers from the 
two cooperatives have attained the skills and knowledge on farming and processing 
coffee. Trained farmers acknowledged that after implementing correct ways of 
pruning, weed control, cleaning drains, and pruning shade, their coffee gardens were 
transformed, and they obtained yield increases with high-quality cherries. Also, 
farmers received training on harvesting ripe cherries (Plate 6.1), the importance of 




appropriate fermenting boxes and bags, washing fermented coffee with clean water 
and drying coffee on raised beds. The farmers from the Wain area take more care in 
fermenting and washing beans and so produce good clean parchment coffee.  
 
 
Plate 6.1: A farmer harvesting coffee cherries in the Korofeigu area (Korofeigu 
group).  
 
Farmers from the Neknasi group acknowledged that they lacked knowledge about the 
control of pests and diseases of coffee. Some farmers were unable to identify some 
pests and diseases when asked to do so. Others did not know how to control 
pathogens like pink disease, which was a major problem among Wain farmers. 
Farmers could have suppressed the problem by carrying out sanitation pruning where 
unproductive branches and stems are removed to ensure coffee rows and inter-rows 
were clear for air ventilation and thus reduces humidity in the coffee garden.  
 
Farmers from the two groups expressed a desire for more training in bookkeeping 
and budgeting. Some believed that if they understood how to budget household 
income, they would limit ‘wasteful’ spending and invest more in areas that will 




Batt et al. (2009) confirm coffee farmers ranked financial management as their most 
critical need. Farmers’ desire for knowledge on budgets and bookkeeping suggests 
that the modern cash economy is gaining a stronger foothold. 
 
Lack of credit 
A small number of farmers from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups reported the lack 
of credit as a further constraint on coffee production (Figure 6.6). This is because 
many farmers in the two groups have been receiving farm inputs like tools and 
pulpers from chain leaders and lead partners through their cooperatives thus their 
need for credit was minimal (Chapter 8). However, a few Korofeigu farmers with 
large coffee gardens reported the need to have access to credit facilities from 
financial institutions so that they could invest in their coffee gardens. Some members 
from the Neknasi group have obtained credit for school fees for their children from 
the cooperative group and have failed to repay the loans. Consequently, their 
cooperative has ceased providing credit services to its members. As pointed out in 
Chapter 5, farmers have in the past accessed credit, repayment rates were very low. 
 
Postharvest Constraints 
Apart from coffee production problems, farmers from the Neknasi and Korofeigu 
groups identified several postharvest limitations at the household level, which 
affected production of quality coffee. Farmers face the following problems: poor 
access to clean water, shortages of motorised and hand pulpers, lack of canvas, 
parchment theft (Korofeigu group only) and lack of fermenting boxes (Figure 6.9). 
Fresh water is essential to pulp cherry and wash fermented coffee. The lack of clean 
water was a major problem for the Wain farmers. Most farmers live away from 
streams and, thus, traverse gorges and steep hills to access water to process their 
coffee. Fair Trade policy restricts farmers from using metal drums to store water for 
processing. The metal drums are likely to rust and contaminate the fermenting bean. 
In 2015, the Neknasi group expended their premium income to establish a water 
supply to Sikilan Village and to a site near the village where the group’s wet mill is 
being established. The Korofeigu area is arid, and access to clean water is limited. 
Korofeigu farmers improvised by using water from water wells to process coffee and 




reticulated water supplies were established in a few villages, although some villages 
such as Namaro and Sozugu villages are unable to access them. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Postharvest constraints among farmers from the Neknasi and Korofeigu 
groups. 
 
The lack of canvas to dry washed beans also limits the production of good quality 
parchment coffee. Of farmers from the Korofeigu group 21% lack polythene canvas 
(or a tarpaulin) to dry washed beans. The canvas is shared among relatives and this 
reduces the availability of the canvas during the coffee season. A small number of 
Wain farmers (15%) reported that the transparent polythene sheets that they use in 
drying have a short lifespan and must often be replaced. It is for this reason why 
some Wain farmers, dry their coffee beans on raised beds while others use polythene 
canvas that lasts a little longer than the transparent polythene sheets. Furthermore, 
many farmers build shelters covered with clear polythene sheets to carry out ‘easy 
drying’6 or skin drying of washed beans (Plate 6.1). A few innovative Wain farmers 
have purchased polycarbonate clear roofing sheets as a permanent solution to dry 
coffee. Some farmers skin-dry coffee under thatched roof shelter in the coffee garden 
and transport them to the village to fully dry the beans (Plate 6.2). Others have coffee 
garden houses, so they thoroughly dry the parchment coffee in their gardens before 






































Plate 6.2: A couple of shelters covered with clear polythene canvas for ‘easy drying’ 
of washed beans in the Wain area (Neknasi group). 
 
About 87% of Wain farmers reported owning a pulper or have access to a relative’s 
hand pulper, and 13% (Figure 6.9) of farmers wished to own motorised pulpers 
because they have larger coffee gardens. Of the farmers in Korofeigu 91% have 
access to a pulper with very few owning motorised pulpers. Some members of the 
Korofeigu group (35%) also reported that they wished to own motorised pulpers. 
Farmers with large coffee gardens and have labour shortages in the household 
lamented that they are unable to complete manual pulping each day. Thus, pulping 
continues into the following day leading to deterioration in coffee quality. To address 
the problem, some Korofeigu farmers pay K7-10 for hired labour for a day’s pulping 
(SH #43, 29/03/14).  
 
Some members of the Neknasi group also reported the lack of fermenting boxes has 
affected their coffee processing. The Wain farmers are banned from using copper 
dishes and plastic containers, as these are banned materials under the Fair Trade 
standards. This is because during the fermentation process, chemical reactions might 




fermenting coffee beans. Farmers are restricted to the use of wooden boxes that rot 
quickly. Thus farmers have to regularly build new fermenting boxes. 
 
 
Plate 6.3: ‘Easy drying’ of washed beans under a palm thatched shelter which is not 
enclosed in the Wain area (Neknasi group). 
 
In summary, the productivity of the Neknasi group is higher than the Korofeigu 
group. Several reasons can be attributed to the higher productivity of the Neknasi 
group such as their higher literacy levels and husbands and wives sharing the coffee 
farming tasks. However, with the Korofeigu group, there is a lower level of literacy 
and women spend much less time in coffee production and therefore productivity is 
lower. Other constraints on coffee production include coffee theft and pig damage 
among members of the Korofeigu group while a lack of coffee knowledge was a 
constraint among the Neknasi group, especially in relation to pests and diseases of 
coffee which are undermining coffee production. The demand for knowledge among 
Wain farmers could be related to higher literacy levels in the area. As a consequence, 
Neknasi group farmers were encouraged to seek more knowledge on coffee farming 






The declining support services from the government and state actors have created an 
opportunity for collective action among coffee farmers to source services and address 
constraints in coffee production. Farmers in grower groups were better equipped to 
attain high productivity and produce better quality coffee, which the farmers in this 
study were able to achieve. This study shows that the average productivity of 747 kg 
gb/ha from the two cooperative groups is significantly better than the productivity 
achieved by independent farmers in parts of the Highlands (UniQuest, 2013). 
Additionally, the Neknasi and Korofeigu group farmers also produce good quality 
coffee (Chapter 8). 
 
Labour strategies and constraints on labour supply are also important constraints 
among members of the two grower groups. The equal sharing of labour input from 
husbands and wives for coffee farming in the Neknasi group led to higher 
productivity than for the Korofeigu group where women’s contribution to coffee was 
very low. However, labour shortages still remain a challenge in both groups and 
farmers were pursuing a range of strategies to recruit labour including reciprocal 
exchange arrangements and using cash to pay labour. The four areas in which 
farmers invest to access relatives’ labour are: providing food, giving gifts, assisting 
relatives in social obligations with cash and food, and giving money. Smallholders 
need to be prudent in engaging in the non-market economy as money and time 
allocated to these activities can draw resources away from efforts to increase coffee 
production. 
 
Members of the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups encountered production problems 
like pests and diseases, pig damage, coffee theft, land shortages and limited 
knowledge of coffee farming, which adversely affected production. With postharvest 
problems, the lack of clean water to process coffee and a shortage of canvas to dry 
washed coffee undermined coffee quality. Factors like better knowledge of farming 
and business that farmers have requested for training can have a positive influence on 
production and the upgrading of coffee quality. This chapter also points out how the 
better literacy levels among farmers in the Neknasi group has had a positive 




produce clean parchment coffee. In all, some of the production constraints have been 
alleviated through group action (see Chapter 8 for details). 
 
This chapter argues that smallholders participating in grower groups also encounter 
coffee production constraints at the household level. However, through collective 
action, smallholders have improved their productivity and quality of coffee by 
receiving support services from partners. It can be argued that farmers have been 
proactive by forming grower groups as a medium to obtain support services from 
partners. Thus, grower groups have filled the void created by the departure of 
plantations and their mills, which used to provide support services to smallholder 
farmers in the past.  
 
In Chapter 7, I present detail case studies conducted for coffee plantations and results 








1. The application of organic fertiliser and use of herbicide took place before farmers 
from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups had their gardens certified under Fair 
Trade and National Association for Sustainable Agriculture, Australia (NASAA) 
Organic respectively. 
 
2. Kominiti hevi (community problems) includes skirmishes, fights, land disputes 
and adultery cases between households, families or with other people. 
 
3. Het (male) and beksait (female) payment is a traditional ceremony honouring 
maternal relatives (see Sexton, 1980). The payment can be made for wives, 
husbands or their children. It is one-off giving of cash and pigs appreciating the 
maternal relatives of allowing their daughter (sister) to marry into another tribe 
and acknowledging the mothers’ contribution in the reproduction of the 
household. This practice is a social obligation prevalent in Unggai Bena, Goroka, 
and Daulo districts in EHP and Chuave district in Simbu Province and certain 
regions of PNG only. 
 
4. A form of meal preparation where stones are heated in open fire and when hot, 
food is placed onto it and is covered with banana leaves, then covered with earth. 
Water is poured in a hole through the top and the food is steamed during cooking. 
It is common practice in the eastern region of the Highlands of PNG. 
 
5. Smallholders in the Highlands spend about 65 days per year mending or building 
new fences to protect their coffee gardens (UniQuest, 2013). 
 
6. Easy drying is a process of drying washed wet beans under a sheltered raised 
drying bed. The aim is to ensure the water from the bean evaporates and 
importantly does not crack the parchment skin, which can happen when beans are 
dried in direct sunlight after washing. The easy drying process produces a better 












The previous chapter discussed coffee production constraints on smallholder farmers 
who are members of cooperative groups. This chapter builds on the discussions on 
the decline of the managed subsector in Chapter 5 by presenting four case studies of 
coffee plantations and interviews of coffee industry experts (CIEs). The managed 
subsector in PNG has lost its pre-eminence as the producer of premium plantation 
coffee. During fieldwork, a few plantations were operating successfully from which 
lessons can be learned and applied to struggling or failed plantations to reinvigorate 
them. The chapter argues that when the institutional leadership provided to the 
managed subsector by CIC and management agencies diminished, numerous 
problems beset the plantations and blocks, and the subsector went into decline. This 
chapter further contends that community engagement, which was active during the 
days of thriving plantations in the 1960s and 1970s diminished after plantations were 
taken over by local business groups. There have been successes for those plantations 
and blocks which are actively involved with their local communities; while those that 
fail to engage in community relations encounter numerous problems.  
 
The case studies on plantations were able to reveal a number of factors that have 
impeded the managed subsector or successes of some resilient plantations. These 
factors include institutional leadership, financial management, socio-cultural 
obligations and prestige, transitional leadership, the inadequacies of modern leaders, 
the negative impacts of internal conflicts in group-owned plantation and blocks, the 
benefits of prior business experience, community engagement, and individually-
owned businesses. The first case study is a group-owned plantation and the second is 
an individually-owned plantation. Both case studies reveal the factors that have 
contributed to the difficulties in maintaining their operations. The third case study is 




final case study is an individually-owned plantation which has remained resilient and 
successful. 
 
The Case of a Group-owned Plantation 
The Akai Coffee Plantation had leadership problems, which contributed to the 
subdivision of the plantation (Box 7.1). It is one of many plantations that Australia 
New Guinea Coffee and Cocoa (ANGCO) had developed and managed from the late 
1970s to 1990s (Sinclair, 1995). 
 
Box 7.1: Akai Coffee Plantation: Lacking institutional leadership 
Background 
The Akai Coffee Plantation is situated at an altitude of 1,356 m asl in the Arona 
Valley, Obura Wonenara District, EHP. ANGCO initially developed the 98 ha 
plantation in 1984 in partnership with clan groups from the Akai villages. In 2001, 
ANGCO went into receivership and the Akai plantation was returned to the 
landowners. 
 
Chain leader support 
ANGCO established the Akai plantation on customary land on a 25-year lease with 
the landowners through the Twenty Hectare Development Scheme (THDS). The 
ownership was 51% to ANGCO for providing capital and management services, 
while landowners held 49% for their land and sweat equity. Four registered clan-
based business groups owned the plantation through their company Akai Pty Ltd. 
ANGCO developed each of the clan’s blocks separately and managed them all as a 
single entity (Table 1). ANGCO also developed and managed other plantations and 
blocks totalling 322 ha (including Akai) in the Arona Valley (Sinclair, 1995).  
 
Table 1: The clan name and the area of land contributed by each clan. 
Block no. Business group name Area (ha) 
Akai 1 Oyadimpa 26 
Akai 2 Domumpa 32 
Akai 3 Oyankake 30 
Akai 4 Onayapa 10 
Total area 98 
 
From 1984 to 1997, Francis Saliau from Manus Province supervised the planting 
and subsequent management of Akai. During the development phase of Akai, 
shareholders supplied sweat equity as part of their contribution. Akai plantation 
used to produce 1,000 tonnes of cherries annually from 1986 to 1997. The 
productivity of the plantation was 1,633 kg gb/ha. The plantation created jobs for 
local people and cash flowed through to the community each fortnight. Sometimes 
Saliau sourced labourers from Simbu, Okapa and Goroka areas during harvesting 
seasons and the labour force could reach 1,000. The fortnightly rate paid in 1984 for 




In 1998, ANGCO transferred Saliau to work at one of the company’s mills situated 
in the Arona Valley. 
 
From 1984 to 1997, ANGCO gave annual dividends to each of the groups ranging 
from K900 to K3,000 depending on the size of their blocks and which groups were 
the first to join the business partnership. ANGCO also purchased for the groups a 
Dyna and two L200 Mitsubishi utilities in the mid-1980s. The Dyna was allocated 
to Akai Pty Ltd, the parent landowner company while the two smaller vehicles were 
given to Akai 1 and 2 clan groups for being the first two groups to partner with 
ANGCO. The income from cherry paid by ANGCO after recouping some of its 
costs was distributed to each landowner group depending on the yield harvested 
from each block. The clan groups did not have bank accounts, and thus, they were 
paid cash from the sale of cherry including their bonuses.  
 
Central coffee mill 
The partnership between ANGCO and Akai plantation was part of a larger effort to 
consolidate the supply base in an agro-nucleus setup in the valley. When the 
number of ANGCO supported plantations increased, it built a coffee factory in a 
central location in the Arona Valley in 1989. ANGCO and the customary 
landowners of the mill site agreed to a 25-year land lease for the factory site. The 
lease agreement allowed landowners to collect rentals of K1,500/month. Partner 
plantations that surrounded the mill supplied coffee cherries in an agro-nucleus 
setup. The mill also purchased coffee from independent plantations and 
smallholdings. Over time, Arona Valley through the ANGCO coffee mill became 
reputable for producing high-quality green bean. 
 
Lack of institutional leadership at lead partner and group levels  
ANGCO maintained a stable leadership of Akai plantation through its management 
service. According to Elias Menta1, the Arona Valley Development Authority 
manager, “The Akai plantation had one principal leader, and that was ANGCO.” 
During ANGCO’s management, logistics like transport, farm inputs and wages for 
employees were readily available to the operations. Hence, there was the timely 
application of agricultural inputs; labourers were paid on time, and reliable and 
timely transport facilitated farm activities. Menta cautioned that for new investors to 
assist the business, the leadership and financial support must come at a level where 
ANGCO set the benchmark.  
 
In 2001, the plantation was returned to the landowners and ANGCO departed. After 
the exit of ANGCO, the effect was twofold. Firstly, the Akai group leaders of the 
four clans who previously relied solely on the institutional leadership of ANGCO 
had to appoint their own manager. Kawoti Serendi from Akai (group) 1 was 
appointed by ANGCO to manage Akai Pty Ltd for the next two years. Prior to 
Serendi’s appointment, he was block supervisor to Akai 1. “I applied for the job and 
ANGCO appointed me to the position,” Serendi mentioned. Because he was using 
the Dyna, other clan group leaders began to feel threatened that Serendi may 
assume control of their land and benefit from it, and thus disputes and suspicions 
began to emerge. The dispute over Serendi’s leadership led to a leader from one of 
the other clan groups forcefully removing the Dyna from Serendi, as a 




Secondly, in 2003 the clan groups were unable to work collectively and eventually 
reclaimed their blocks. Prior demarcations already existed, with each clan having 
their own registered business group and each block developed separately, which 
later made it easier for clans to reclaim their own blocks. The subdivision and 
reclaiming of clan blocks at Akai was similar to what happened in other block 
developments in the Highlands (Hunt and Eko, 2001). ANGCO failed to put in 
place an exit plan to arrange assistance from state agencies when it left in 2001. 
Serendi lamented that ANGCO neglected training landowners to become managers, 
although some villagers had worked as block supervisors. When ANGCO departed, 
there was no state actor like the CIC to assist the clan business groups and so 
plantation production began to decline and the mill soon closed. Attempts to revive 
the plantation were made. However, without strong leadership, the plantation fell 
prey to many opportunists raising false hopes among the landowners about how to 
revive the plantation.  
 
Institutional leadership 
This case study, among others, suggests that group-owned coffee businesses such as 
plantations and blocks require regular advisory services, monitoring and supervision 
from institutional leaders. At Akai plantation, the initial institutional leadership from 
the chain leader, ANGCO, and leadership in the landowner group were good but with 
their withdrawal, the plantation went into decline and eventual disintegration. 
ANGCO’s role in facilitating the development of Akai plantation and subsequent 
management as the leader of the partnership contributed to its success by holding the 
entire group together. The landowning clan leaders perceived ANGCO as 
independent and not favouring any one particular clan group. Thus, ANGCO’s 
leadership and authority were respected and clan leaders were heavily reliant on and 
bound by the institutional leadership of ANGCO. This created stability and helped 
the plantation to successfully produce good quality coffee from 1984 to 2001. The 
plantation also attained a respectable productivity of 1,633 kg/ha from 1986 to 1997. 
 
However, when ANGCO departed, clan rivalry set in and the clan groups were 
unable to work collectively, which resulted in the subdivision of the plantation. Four 
factors explain the subdivision of Akai plantation. Firstly, other clan leaders in Akai 
plantation would not accept the leadership of Kawoti Serendi who was previously an 
assistant manager during the ANGCO management period, as they feared that he 
would take total control of their blocks and redirect revenue to benefit only his own 
family or clan group. Thus, internal conflicts between clans together with the 




the subdivision of the plantation and its eventual demise. Secondly, the reason for the 
Akai landowners not undertaking collective action was because each clan’s block 
was originally developed separately and each clan was a registered business group. 
With the loss of ANGCO’s leadership, this initiated the subsequent return of blocks 
to landowner clans. Thirdly, sometimes in PNG, rivalry can be fierce among clan 
members and clans to assert control over others (Murray-Prior et al. 2009) and some 
within the group can become resentful of other people’s dominance or success 
(Chapter 2; Box 7.2). Such rivalries and jealousies can lead to the subdivision of 
plantations and blocks into smallholdings.  
 
Fourthly, another reason for the failure of Akai plantation was that ANGCO failed to 
institute sustainable approaches to building the management capacities of landowners 
to become managers (see Chapter 5). Serendi confirmed to me that ANGCO had not 
trained shareholders as managers. ANGCO also did not have an exit strategy in place 
in case the partnership broke down. Unlike other management agencies, ANGCO 
relied heavily on the sweat equity of landowners during the development phase of the 
coffee blocks (Stewart, 1992). Thus, ANGCO’s decision not to invest in training 
shareholders might be because its commercial interest was paramount; that it wanted 
to maximise profit unhindered by the non-participation of shareholders at the 
management level. Other studies reported that many plantations acquired under PRS 
or blocks developed through THDS failed because of poor management, internal 
conflicts and poor leadership (e.g. Walter, 1981; Sinclair, 1995; Orlegge, 2010). 
 
When ANGCO managed its coffee mill in the Arona Valley, the mill produced top 
quality coffee. ANGCO offered agro-nucleus services to most of the plantations and 
blocks and was able to produce premium coffee. The central processing allowed for 
quality assurance systems where only good quality cherries or parchment were 
purchased (Chapter 8). Also, coffee growers that supplied the mill were aware of the 
quality requirements of the mill. Since it was sold to Arona Valley Development 
Authority in 2002, the mill remains underutilised. If Arona Valley Development 
Authority can take the lead in reviving the coffee mill with the agreement of mill 
landowners, the mill has the potential to re-engage in agro-nucleus services. 
Plantations such as the Akai clan groups can then be supported to once again come 




The Case of an Individually-owned Plantation 
Noiya Se’e owns Etawa Coffee, which is a coffee plantation located at Ontenu 
Village, Tairora area, EHP. Anthropologist John Finch (1997) chronicled the 
transition of Se’e from ordinary villager to ‘big man’, who embodied multiple 
identities as villager, shopkeeper, entrepreneur and a ‘big man’ in his society. The 
case study (Box 7.2) highlights the financial difficulties that can arise when business 
managers make poor investment decisions.  
 
Box 7.2: Etawa Coffee: The challenges of modern business principles 
Background 
Se’e went to a mission school to attain literacy in the 1950s but left school early at 
the insistence of his father to assist in the village. Finch (1997) explained that Se’e’s 
exposure to the modern cash economy by working in a shop in Kainantu, EHP 
enabled him to later enter into business. Se’e’s decision to engage in coffee was 
made when he realised that the income from casual employment in Kainantu was 
minute compared to what he could earn from his coffee garden in the village. In the 
early 1970s, Se’e sold ten bags of coffee and he was surprised to earn A$600 
(Finch, 1997). Finch further reported that Se’e purchased a second-hand Land 
Rover and used it to buy coffee around the Kainantu and Okapa areas. 
 
Plantation acquisition and management phase 
Etawa coffee plantation is situated at an elevation of 1,366 m asl. John Boi, a 
European ex-serviceman, initially purchased the 46.1 ha of land for £165 in 1959 
and planted coffee (Finch, 1991). Boi obtained a loan from the Ex-Servicemen’s 
Credit Board and planted half of the land before he died in 1962. The creditor 
assumed control of the plantation and in 1967 assigned its lease to the PNG 
Development Bank (Finch, 1991). The bank sold the plantation under the PRS to 
Se’e in 1975. With the help of clansmen, Se’e completed planting the 46.1 ha.  
 
In the 1980s, Se’e had two land cruisers, a second-hand tractor and a cattle farm. He 
used the tractor to plough his land to plant coffee and also assisted other coffee 
farmers who wanted to establish plantations and blocks at a cost of K150/day. In 
1981, Se’e obtained a loan of K90,000 from the PNG Development Bank to expand 
Etawa plantation and develop wet processing facilities. The wet mill to process 
coffee cherries was established in the mid-1980s. The National Plantation 
Management Agency (NPMA) became involved as part of the bank loan 
requirement. Since the NPMA was reluctant to consider some of his interests in 
management decisions Se’e severed ties with the agency. He reported the 
unwillingness of NPMA to train him or some of his children on farm and financial 
management. He claimed that the NPMA received K650/ha/yr as management fees. 
After the NPMA had exited, a local management agency assisted Se’e for one year. 
When Se’e took control, he hastily repaid the loans. “I thought that money would 
continue to come so whatever income that I earned, I quickly repaid the loans,” he 






However, when I visited Se’e at his plantation during my first period of fieldwork in 
2014, he was having financial difficulties. His financial problems hampered his 
ability to maintain his plantation and fully equip his wet and dry coffee mill. At the 
time no labourers were working on the plantation. Se’e’s land cruiser had broken 
down, and he was unable to afford to repair it. Se’e began building his dry factory 
in 1997 (Plate 1). The dry coffee mill depleted much of his savings, and the mill is 
still incomplete. Vital equipment like a densimetric table has not been installed. 
Although, the dry mill operates, a few problems require Se’e’s attention. For 
instance, the stove to churn in hot air for the dryer is not working at its optimum; 
the present dryer is small, thus there is a need for another one. The huller’s polisher 
needs adjustment but the huller does not have an operating manual and, thus, relies 
on guesswork to fix faults. Se’e revealed that he did not obtain a loan and depended 
on coffee income to construct the dry mill and the purchase of equipment. He has 
built a permanent house close to his factory, which was completed in 2005. 
 
 
Plate 1: Se’e in front of his dry coffee factory. 
 
Because of the diversion of coffee income into the dry mill, Se’e was unable to 
purchase farm inputs and pay labourers. In March 2014, the plantation was 
overgrown with thick bushes, and the coffee trees had not been pruned for several 
years. The current annual production is estimated to be 10-15 tonnes of green bean 
(i.e. productivity was 217-326 kg gb/ha). Conversely, in 1987, the plantation was 
attaining 34.1 tonnes of green bean giving a productivity of 742 kg gb/ha (Finch 
1991). In 2015, Se’e sold his parchment coffee to Beser Coffee, a nearby plantation 
(see Box 8.4). 
 




schedules to guide him in management decisions. He paused for a long while before 
he replied:  
 
I now realise that this is my biggest problem. I can see that it is having an 
adverse impact on my operations after going through the present 
financial crisis. Money plan is an essential part of business operations.  
 
Dick, one of Se’e’s sons, who has an accounting certificate, was with his father 
during the interview in 2014. They were further asked if they had some form of 
record-keeping of income and expenditure to which Dick responded that they had 
none. In March 2015, Dick had left home to work in Madang. Se’e approached 
banks for a loan, but they declined his request, as he was unable to produce the 
required 30% equity. 
 
His children, especially his sons have made attempts to assist but Se’e does not 
delegate responsibilities to them to manage the plantation. The children come from 
Se’e’s two wives. He has nine sons who will eventually split the assets of their 
father. “My children are not helping me nor offer advice to me on how to manage 
the business so I am thinking of selling my plantation and other assets in Kainantu 
town,” he said. Although he is blaming his children, a couple of them informed me 
that Se’e makes most of the business decisions. In an earlier interaction in 2010, one 
of his sons was asked why they were not practising recycle pruning on the farm. He 
replied that Se’e decides on how the plantation is managed. 
 
Plantation labour 
In the late 1980s after the plantation was fully developed, Se’e hired around 100 
workers from the neighbouring Kamano tribe, Kainantu to harvest but now locals 
and settlers who live nearby are engaged. Se’e also had permanent workers whom 
he has now laid off. He says that when he finds money, he engages harvesters to 
pick the ripe cherries and his relatives to assist in processing coffee. When the 
operation was running smoothly in the 2000s, Se’e paid K100-120 to permanent 
workers fortnightly, and cherry pickers were paid K0.30/kg. After facing financial 
difficulties, Se’e began to engage groups of young men, and they were given tasks 
to slash grass and prune coffee. After the tasks were completed, they were paid K5-
10 depending on the size of the task. Kinsmen no longer assist Se’e in his 
operations. “In the past, I gave them food after work but the younger villagers no 
longer help me in my coffee work,” he lamented. Villagers now insist on immediate 
cash payment from Se’e for work done on the plantation. 
 
Engaging in the local socio-economy 
“My father advised me to be generous in the society, and in return, I will be 
blessed,” Se’e declared with tears in his eyes. This principle drives Se’e to assist 
relatives and villagers and to contribute towards community activities with cash and 
in-kind goods. He contributes to mortuary rituals (K500 each time), bride prices 
(K100-200) and school fees (K100-10,000) for his children, including relatives. In 
2000, he paid compensation of K5,000 and a cow because his car accidently ran 
over and killed a villager. His status as ‘big man’ is maintained occasionally by 
hosting large feasts. He hosted two huge traditional feasts portraying himself to be a 




1987. The other was associated with the opening of the coffee mill in 2002. In 
addition, he has assisted churches and primary schools and sometimes maintains the 
feeder road and bridge that leads to his property and village. 
 
Table 7.2: Contributions to two traditional feasts. 
Items used 
1988 2002 
Mortuary for Se’e’s mother Coffee factory opening 
Cash (PGK) - 1,600 
Cattle 1 2 
Pigs 42 13 
Chicken - 30 
Meat cartons 50 - 
(Source: Finch 1991:268-269) 
 
His financial problems have prompted him to consider entering real estate. His 
plantation has a reasonable number of lumber trees, which he can mill to construct 
residential houses for public servants. The other option he mentioned was that the 
government was searching for a piece of land to build a high school in the area, and 
he is planning to lease the land to the state. 
 
Financial management 
Initially Se’e succeeded in his coffee business. He was able to purchase the 
plantation, several vehicles, a tractor, and build the coffee factory, which consists of 
both wet and dry mills. A key factor in his success was better coffee prices in the 
late-1970s and the availability of loan facilities, which the government supported 
through the PRS and THDS. Additionally, management agencies supported Se’e to 
comply with budgets, which also facilitated the proper use of recurrent income in 
relevant operational activities. The management agency ensured that Se’e’s debts 
with the banks were retired according to repayment schedules so the plantation 
operations ran smoothly. 
 
Se’e is semi-literate and lacks financial management skills, which have negatively 
impacted on the long-term viability of his business. His inability to fully understand 
the economic processes of managing a modern business during periods of downturn 
affected his investment decisions. In my interviews with CIEs (25%), they reported 
that the lack of basic understanding of business principles and concepts, and the 
tendency of business managers or owners to divert, misuse or misapply funds 
reduced reinvestment in plantations and blocks. Several studies on the managed 




productivity (e.g. Walter, 1981; World Bank, 1992; Hunt and Eko, 2001; Orlegge, 
2010). This is illustrated in the case of Etawa Coffee. Likewise, poor record keeping 
is prevalent among business managers and owners, which could have been used for 
planning allocation of funds and future investment and this has often resulted in the 
misappropriation of revenue.  
 
When Se’e took over as business manager after the departure of the management 
agency, he repaid all his outstanding loans by 1998 but failed to follow a repayment 
schedule to retire his debts. His high rate of repayment: greater than required by the 
loan repayment schedule affected his cash flow. Without a planned budget, Se’e 
could not adequately allocate financial resources to various parts of his business to 
maintain their operations. At the same time, coffee prices were high because of a 
frost that devastated coffee in Brazil (Talbot, 1997) and Se’e believed coffee prices 
would remain high. David Freyne in elucidating the dilemma of business managers 
and owners reported that many locals lack understanding of the influence of world 
supply and demand on coffee prices (CIE #3, 03/02/14). Rarely did local business 
managers or owners save for bad times.  
 
The costs of farm inputs including labour have increased, which has undermined 
plantation and block production. The 2014 rural minimum wage determinations have 
increased the hourly rate from K2.29 (2008) to K3.50, an increase of almost 53% 
(Imbun 2015). Plantation business managers and owners like Se’e were paying 
wages ranging from K70-120 per fortnight, which were below the rural minimum 
wage of K280 per fortnight (Bank of PNG, 2016). On many plantations and blocks, 
the new rates have not been able to be implemented as rising farm costs have exerted 
greater pressure on recurrent budgets.  
 
A further problem of Etawa Coffee was the lack of a succession plan which the 
management agencies and Se’e failed to implement. Similar cases of agencies’ 
unsustainable approaches to managing plantations and blocks have been reported in 
the coffee industry in PNG (see Stewart, 1992; Sinclair, 1995; Hunt and Eko, 2001; 
Box 7.1). The engagement of management agencies was part of the loan conditions 
under the PRS and THDS policies, which local business groups or owners had with 




management services, even if they were not satisfied with the performance of the 
agencies. Owners were mere spectators and had very little to do with daily 
management (Chapter 5). Relationship problems between owners and management 
agencies sometimes led to owners harassing agency staff or farm labourers. 
Sometimes the owners stole coffee. Agency advisors may have feared that owners’ 
involvement would lead to low productivity, and management agencies were 
reluctant to involve them in the day-to-day management (Stewart, 1992). However, 
as experience shows, involving owners or business managers in a participatory 
manner in management would help them to take ownership of farm problems 
(Ballantyne, 1985; McConaghy, 1985).  
 
Se’e is now 73 years old and desperately needs his children’s input for a transition in 
management. His hesitation to groom his children to assist in management has been a 
mistake. His children claimed that Se’e does not heed their advice in managing the 
plantation. Se’e’s reluctance to effectively engage them in the business has resulted 
in his son with the accounting qualification deserting his father to work in Madang. 
 
Socio-cultural obligations and prestige 
Abuse of plantation assets and finances sometimes originates from the socio-cultural 
context in which the plantations and blocks operate (Fingleton, 1981; Sinclair, 1995). 
Finances earmarked and budgeted for farm investments are often diverted to fund the 
indigenous economy such as social obligations, compensation payments and 
traditional gift exchanges. McKillop (1981) points out that the village socio-cultural 
environment made it difficult for businesses to succeed due to the demands on the 
business managers or owners to meet social obligations. In my interview with 
Francis Saliau, he affirmed that, “… many owners receive income from coffee and 
spend on socio-cultural activities which reduce the level of reinvestment in the 
plantation” (CIE #09, 28/01/14). Some business managers and owners knew about 
the technicalities of farm operations but elected to spend their financial resources on 
socio-cultural responsibilities (Finney, 1973), and even delayed loan repayments or 
the purchase of agricultural inputs to direct coffee revenue to the indigenous 
economy. For rural business owners like Se’e, maintaining a harmonious relationship 
with his clansmen was very important and he invested considerable amounts of 




Se’e’s continued involvement in meeting his social obligations to the clan was also 
important for the viability of his business as it reduced grievances among the clan 
and any attempts to reclaim clan land. It is also known that the failure of owners and 
business managers to become involved in socio-cultural activities in the community 
may cause grievances to develop around the business from local villagers. It is 
important for business managers and owners to participate in the local socio-
economy to ensure cordial relationships are maintained with clansmen and the 
community. In group-owned plantations and blocks, it is also vital to ensure that the 
company meets shareholders’ social obligations: if they are not met, reprisals may 
ensue and undermine commercial operations (Box 7.3). 
 
Finally, Se’e like other local plantation owners perceive their plantations and blocks 
as a status symbol that give them prestige and help them attain and strengthen their 
‘big men’ status (Grossman, 1981; Turner, 1986; Finney, 1993). Finney (1987) gives 
an illustration where owners of newly bought vehicles in the Goroka area placard 
their names on the sides of vehicles to show ownership to other villagers. For some 
PNG entrepreneurs and business managers the objective of making profits and 
growing the business takes a subservient role to using company finances and 
resources to pursue non-market activities that are culturally important and provide 
personal prestige (Curry, 1999; Boyd, 2013). It can be argued that the shift from the 
indigenous economy to the modern cash economy has been rapid, and many locals 
like Se’e did not immediately grasp the amount of work and finance management 
skills required to manage high input-high output production system, and so diverted 
business resources to the non-market systems, which undermined productivity on 
plantations and blocks.  
 
The Case of a Group-owned Plantation 
The OK Corporation has operated consistently for the last 37 years. This case study 
covers two eras: the first era under the guidance of the late Kisan Pau, a ‘transitional’ 
leader; and the second era when ‘modern’ leaders took over. There were successes 
during the reign of Pau, but when modern leaders took over, problems began to 






Box 7.3: OK Corporation: Leadership critical to business success 
Background 
The OK Corporation plantations namely Kimel (147 ha) and Koban (447 ha) are 
situated at an altitude of 1,575 m asl and located in the fertile Waghi Valley, near 
Banz township, Jiwaka Province. The total area is 620 ha with 594 ha under coffee 
planting and 26 ha used for a coffee factory and houses. The plantations have 500 
permanent workers and employ over 1,700 seasonal workers annually during good 
coffee seasons. The company produces between 3,000 and 4,000 tonnes of green 
bean per year, which includes coffee sourced from smallholders and blocks. In 
2014, for farm tasks, the rate for labourers was K70/fortnight except for pulping the 
cherries, which was K75/fortnight. Cherry pickers are paid K2 per drum (15 kg) of 
cherry picked. 
 
Pau’s leadership, 1960s to 2000 
Bobby Gibbes planted coffee on Kimel from the late-1950s to early 1960s. Gibbes 
sold Kimel Plantation Ltd to Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd in the early 1970s. 
ANGCO managed the estate for Koitaki from the 1970s to 1979 until it was sold. 
The local landowner business group acquired the Kimel Plantation in 1979 under 
the PRS. The OK Corporation is 100% nationally-owned by several clans and tribes 
in the Kimel area and Jimi Valley. Subsidiary businesses of the company include 
Kundu Coffee Exports, Kui Kopi Ltd2, Kimel Estate and Kopan Ltd (Koban 
plantations). The Kimel Estate also has processing facilities to process its plantation 
coffee and coffee purchased from surrounding growers. 
 
Pau instigated the creation of OK Corporation in 1979. He was already an adult 
when he went to a Catholic Mission School in Banz in the 1950s. Despite being 
semi-literate, he was a councillor for over five clans in the 1960s. Pau was one of 
the ‘big men’ who made an early entry into the modern cash economy by farming 
livestock and commodity crops when they were being introduced during the post-
independence period. Pau mobilised his clansmen to venture into cattle farming in 
1976 and vegetable farming in 1978 and 1979. By then he was a village councillor 
and a church layman and had some knowledge of the modern cash economy. The 
cattle farm was prosperous, and Pau’s clan group succeeded and was one of the 
local business groups in the area to repay a loan. Later, a rural development officer 
offered to assist Pau’s clan group to venture into coffee farming. Pau mobilised his 
clansmen’s labour and land and began planting a 20 ha coffee block under the PRS. 
 
Pau’s father, a traditional leader, Pau Win, who originally sold the Kimel land to a 
European settler in the early 1950s, felt obligated to re-possess the land for his tribe. 
The bank required more than K100,000 as equity to purchase Kimel Estate and his 
people contributed cash ranging from K2 to K1,000 that totalled K14,000 as an 
initial investment. The purchase price plus the K86,000 equity for the group came 
from Plantation Acquisition Trust Funds. Pau visited the late Sir Barry Holloway, 
then Finance Minister when the PRS was under his ministry (Sinclair, 1995) at his 
office in Port Moresby. Sir Holloway asked Pau how much he had to contribute as 
his group’s equity. Pau responded “I do not have enough money but I want to 
inform you that I am representing my people and they come from several villages 
surrounding Kimel Estate and we are also original landowners” (Francis Pau quoted 




equity and gave it to Pau to pass it onto the Koitaki owner in Banz. 
 
Pau excelled in mobilising his family and clansmen to engage in customary 
activities. Pau led his people in bride price payments, feasts, mortuary, and 
compensation payments. He helped to resolve feuds among the tribesmen by using 
his traditional leadership and organisational skills. In public speeches, Pau’s 
persuasive oratory was respected, and people readily participated in his 
undertakings. His son Francis Pau stated: “my father had excellent leadership skills; 
… and he was always inclusive saying the shareholders are my children” 
(09/04/14). Pau possessed an intricate knowledge of kinship relationships, which 
assisted him in traditional distributions and exchange thus making him a natural 
leader for his people. From 1979 to the mid-1980s, OK Corporation had a stable 
board of directors led by Pau as its pioneer secretary and the company had minimal 
problems. He commanded the respect of company directors, general managers, 
shareholders and the expatriate community. 
 
Business governance arrangements 
OK Corporation has three directors and two ex-officio members who include the 
company secretary and the general manager. Under the leadership of Pau, some 
innovative and foresighted policies were developed and administered to safeguard 
the operations and these policies in part enabled the company to survive for 37 
years. Policies significant to this success included: not to recruit Papua New 
Guinean general managers and shareholders; dividend payments to shareholders; 
mortuary assistance for shareholders; and coffee block development for some 
shareholders.  
 
Company policy disallows the recruitment of a national general manager. This 
policy is still in place and since 1979, nine general managers have been recruited. 
The reason why Pau and other directors refused to recruit local general managers 
and divisional managers was that they could easily be swayed by the demands of 
the indigenous socio-economy and thereby deplete savings and profits. Thus, it was 
argued that an independent person without kinship ties with shareholders and locals 
would focus on managing the business on commercial principles, which has enabled 
the company to sustain its operations over the years.  
 
OK Corporation has a committee system3 to distribute shareholder benefits. 
Bonuses and dividends have been paid since 1980. The amounts have ranged from 
annual totals of between K80,000 and K300,000 depending on annual profits but in 
some years there were no payments especially when the company made losses. The 
company also assists in community, church and sporting activities. Support is given 
to groups and not to individuals. Shareholders also benefit from mortuary 
assistance4. However, non-shareholders do not receive mortuary assistance. The late 
Paul Koi5, a divisional manager, stated, that “every shareholder knows this policy, 
so it restrains them from making unnecessary demands on things that are outside of 
this rule” (04/04/14). 
 
In the 1980s, the company developed seven coffee blocks for shareholders with 
support from the THDS. The company invested initially with capital and was the 




recipients of this finance provided land and labour to develop the blocks. The 
company originally provided agro-nucleus services in the 1980s but no longer offers 
this service. Infighting among shareholders of blocks led to the subdivision of the 
blocks into smallholdings. However, for some of the surviving blocks, the OK 
Corporation purchases the coffee cherries only. 
 
In 1998, under the leadership of Pau, the OK Corporation successfully acquired the 
Koban coffee plantations from New Britain Palm Oil. The Koban land is adjacent to 
Kimel Estate. Just after the purchase of Koban, Pau passed away in 2000 and in his 
honour, the land title was registered in his name. The late Koi explained to me that 
Pau before dying, eloquently declared “I am [buying] these plantations for your 
children; it is a flower garden to me and keep it for me [in remembrance of me]” 
(04/04/2014). After Pau’s passing, dissension within the shareholders began to 
surface and has beset the company since then. 
 
Problems during transition of leadership from mid-1980 to now 
In the mid-1980s, a person from Dei Council electorate, WHP, became a member of 
the OK Corporation board. He was the only educated person on the board and made 
many of the decisions that eventually led to financial difficulties for the company.  
 
The director from Dei Council was said to have manipulated many board decisions. 
Some shareholders claimed this director had no shares but dominated decision-
making and later became Chairman. In 1999, he influenced the building of Kui 
Factory near Mt Hagen as a subsidiary of OK Corporation to purchase coffee. 
However, the mill operated at a loss, as rental disputes emerged with the 
landowners of the factory site. The disputed mill was handed over to the landowners 
and the company sold the coffee processing equipment. Another poor decision 
made by the director from Dei Council was to buy cherries, and thus, the company 
had several cherry buying depots. Cash given for cherry purchases and the value of 
the quantity purchased did not reconcile. The decision to buy cherries led to a 
severe cash flow problem and nearly brought the company to bankruptcy in 2008. 
According to the current managers, this director colluded with buying depot owners. 
He also collected rentals from depot owners and also for the mill in Mt Hagen. The 
cherry buying project was carried out under the guidance of the seventh general 
manager, who later resigned. In the late 1990s, this director defaulted on a personal 
loan from the Bank of South Pacific and the bank initiated moves to recover its 
money from the company. He resigned as the chairman of OK Corporation. He then 
ensured his son became a director, but the son meddled with company assets and 
finances, so he was removed with a court order in the early 2000s.  
 
The company policy on the recruitment of shareholders was relaxed in 1989. A few 
shareholders’ children had graduated from agricultural institutions and OK 
Corporation began to employ shareholders as divisional managers and permanent 
casuals. Some shareholders believed that this led to certain families dominating 
senior management roles and accruing unfair benefits from the plantation. 
Disgruntled shareholders in 2013 started to steal cherry from the plantations. 
Company security guards caught one of them, and a fight ensued resulting in two 
deaths. The fight was between two shareholding clans. During my first visit in 




compensation to the relatives of the deceased. A community leader remarked on a 
few shareholders’ influential roles in the company. “When Pau was around, we 
knew that the business was for all of us, but after his death, it has become more like 
a family business”, the community leader said (11/04/14). 
 
A court case was pursued by certain factions of the shareholders against the 
company for a 60% share of Kopan Ltd. The aggrieved factions are ordinary 
company shareholders and based their claim on being the customary landowners of 
Koban plantation land. The company won the case. However, the disputing faction 
is determined to obtain the 60% shareholding, thus this dispute continues to simmer 
and is likely to re-emerge in the future. 
 
The company’s processing facility is leased to a local company to process coffee 
under a memorandum of agreement. OK Corporation has had cash flow problems 
since 2008. Rilke Coffee, a coffee buying company in Mt Hagen, has assisted and 
bailed the company out of the crisis. Rilke Coffee was operating the OK 
Corporation’s coffee mill at Kimel during my first field visit in 2014. However, OK 
Corporation manages Kimel and Koban plantations and the cherries are sold to 
Rilke Coffee at market price (K1.00/kg). Rilke Coffee also purchases coffee from 
the surrounding community to process at the Kimel factory.  
 
The Kimel and Koban plantations were well-maintained when I visited in March 
2014 (Plate 1). Drains were clean, weeds were under control, coffee trees were 
pruned according to farm schedules, shade levels were sufficient to allow sunlight 
to penetrate through to coffee trees and roads on the farm were in a usable state.  
 
 
Plate 1: Recycle pruned Catimor trees, a semi-dwarf Arabica coffee variety on one 





During my second fieldwork period in March 2015, the coffee trees on the 
plantations were nutritionally stressed, there was considerable dieback of coffee 
beans and the plantations were in poor conditions. Fertiliser was not applied on the 
plantations on time and this reduced production in 2014. Because of cash flow 
problems, the company could not afford fertiliser or pay labourers to work on the 
farm. Cherry theft was a major problem for the company in 2014 and 2015 and the 
company incurred losses in those years. The eighth general manager resigned in 
early 2015 and the ninth expatriate manager was recruited later in the year. In my 
third field visit in January 2016, the plantations were in poor conditions (Plate 2). 
 
 
Plate 2: The poor status of coffee trees on one of the plantations in January 2016. 
 
Transitional leadership 
OK Corporation was once a successful group-owned coffee business. Its success was 
largely attributable to the leadership skills of Kisan Pau. Pau’s leadership attributes 
epitomised a combination of traditional and modern values to mobilise his people 
effectively for coffee production. Sengere et al. (2008, p. 93) in a case study of a 
group-owned plantation contends that traditional leaders “live similar lifestyles to the 
others in the group, but whose drive, intelligence and charisma attract and stimulate 
other people” to engage in communal activities. When leaders like Pau who is 
inclusive in public speeches, which are backed with charitable behaviour towards 
shareholders and being good examples to their community, they can command the 




environment. Pau was a transitional leader, a leadership style that embraces both 
traditional and modern leadership attributes, and can be seen as a hybrid form of 
leadership. Finney (1993) terms leaders such as Pau as first-generation business 
leaders. These were leaders who had been exposed to the modern cash economy and 
who were able to engage their people to enter into commercial business. Also, Pau’s 
prior leadership in the clan business activities also positioned him to undertake larger 
leadership roles in OK Corporation. Thus, Pau was able to provide appropriate 
leadership that enabled the company to thrive during his period of management. 
 
During Pau’s leadership, the company developed unique and innovative company 
rules that assisted in meeting indigenous socio-cultural and economic aspirations of 
shareholders by providing mortuary expenses, paying dividends, and developing 
coffee blocks. Moreover, Pau and his directors were also conscious of the influences 
of indigenous values that could permeate into company operations through the 
employment of local business managers, thereby undermining business operations. 
Thus, the company had rules to prevent the recruitment of shareholders and national 
general managers. The two policies were intended to create a bulwark against the 
misuse of company finances and assets through indigenous values like the wantok 
system, which is deemed to be responsible for the demise of many commercial 
businesses in PNG and stifling opportunities for development (Martin, 2007). For 
example, some management agencies feared that when unemployed shareholders 
requested assistance, local employees would willingly misuse company resources to 
assist relatives and therefore many management agencies ceased recruiting managers 
from the shareholder group (Stewart, 1992).  
 
However, others pointed out that some indigenous values have beneficial aspects in 
which social capital within groups can blossom and stimulate developmental 
activities (Mannan, 1976; de Renzio, 2003). For instance, clan and tribal groups 
collectively pooled resources like cash, land and labour to develop coffee blocks or 
purchase European-owned plantations as discussed in Chapter 2. Shareholders of 
Akai Coffee Plantation and OK Corporation used comparable approaches to develop 





Inadequacies of modern leadership 
The elevation of educated directors and recruitment of shareholders to managerial 
roles has undermined the operations of OK Corporation. The poor decisions of the 
director from Dei Council led to the cash flow problems of the company. Under his 
direction, he proposed projects, which later resulted in company losses. For example, 
the OK Corporation director proposed the cherry buying depots and later colluded 
with depot owners to financially benefit from the rentals. The embezzlement of 
company finances by the director undermined business operations. At OK 
Corporation, the rule on the recruitment of shareholders was relaxed and the 
company began recruiting shareholders, which led to some problems. A few of the 
recruited young managers at OK Corporation are influential in the decision-making 
of the company, which other shareholders resent. Several studies on plantations show 
that directors and business managers in PNG exploited their members by embezzling 
group-owned business income and abuse resources and this often damaged the 
groups’ business interests (Ketan, 2004; Orlegge, 2010). Similar observations of 
group leaders exploiting members to take over group-owned assets have been 
reported from elsewhere in PNG and in the Pacific (e.g. Finney, 1968; Quinn, 1981; 
Grossman, 1984; Adams, 1997; Howard and Rensel, 1997; Bainton and Macintyre, 
2013). The modern leaders from Kimel, who now manage OK Corporation, have not 
embraced the leadership virtues that Pau employed to hold the group together. Thus, 
the company’s present leaders have failed to appreciate the importance of the 
indigenous economy on holding groups together. A better understanding of 
indigenous and modern market economies can assist business leaders to become 
transitional leader like Pau, which can contribute to the sustainability of group 
businesses. 
 
Internal conflicts in group-owned businesses 
At OK Corporation, the uneven distribution of income and the non-involvement in 
the management of company led to internal conflicts as a few families are beginning 
to take control of operations. In response, a faction of disgruntled shareholders 
initiated court proceedings to gain more shares in Kopan Ltd. Furthermore, cherry 
theft became rampant; company security guards caught cherry thieves and a fight 
erupted. The latter led to deaths and as a result, shareholders have been further 




coffee businesses were unlikely to succeed, as internal conflicts are common. Many 
problems prevail in group-owned coffee plantations and blocks in PNG, which arise 
from competing interests among shareholders. It has been reported elsewhere in PNG 
that the dominance of one family or clan faction can lead to ongoing internal 
conflicts, which can be detrimental to the survival of the coffee business (Sinclair, 
1995; Ketan, 2004; Orlegge, 2010). 
 
In some coffee plantations, a faction within a shareholding group manages the 
business for several seasons and then the next faction moves in and operates the 
plantation. Ketan (2004) in his study of community business groups that owned 
coffee plantations in WHP reports that the main aim of the factions’ frequent change 
of management was to pursue private interests rather than for the benefit of the 
business group. McKillop (1981, p. 28-29) affirms that “Melanesian cultural 
tradition” does not recognise a hierarchal gap between a business manager and 
ordinary villagers, and thus many locals assume that they can also become business 
managers. In the Highlands, there is often fierce rivalry among shareholders to 
assume leadership of the business in order to access public goods and services as has 
happened in cooperatives (see Chapter 8). The difference between the modern 
leaders and Pau of OK Corporation is that he genuinely wanted his people to succeed 
in business which means honesty in leadership is essential. During Pau’s leadership 
period, there were few disputes. 
 
When a coffee business becomes a success, business managers and directors often try 
to marginalise others especially those shareholders who are not actively involved in 
the daily management. Afflick (1981) provides an example of plantations where 
records of shareholder listings were missing, and there was the danger of a few 
people assuming total control of the plantation. Group leaders’ manipulation of 
business records to assert control over a business defeated the original intentions of 
the PRS and THDS for equal distribution of wealth among shareholders. For 
example, the dominance of a few families in the OK Corporation has led to reprisals 
against the company. However, business audits for group-owned plantations and 
blocks can facilitate long-term sustainability of their enterprises and ensure business 





Disgruntled shareholders at OK Corporation have resorted to stealing cherries, which 
have had a detrimental effect on coffee production by imposing greater costs. Cherry 
theft is exacerbated by lawlessness in rural areas. In my interviews with CIEs, 36% 
attested to law and order as being responsible for the decline in the managed 
subsector. A significant cost factor on the subsector is security, as plantations and 
blocks spend more money to protect farm assets and deter coffee theft (Eko, 2002; 
Imbun, 2014). Philip Kapal reported the inconsistencies of law enforcement agencies 
when he said: “Thieves were caught and handed to local police to be locked up, but 
they were released thus the effectiveness of policing is dismal” (CIE #17, 03/04/14). 
 
Some smart business leaders can misuse company resources to ‘buy’ support of 
shareholder leaders by providing gifts. Ketan (2004, p. 155) in his study of group-
owned plantations argues that a few “clever business leaders entice traditional 
leaders with gifts and favours of mainly cash and beer … to downplay economic 
disparities and promote the worthy efforts” pursued by the company. Thus, 
traditional leaders within communities can indirectly assist fraudulent business 
leaders by contributing to suppressing discontentment and potential reprisals from 
shareholders. 
 
The Case of a Successful Individually-owned Plantation 
Sero Bebes from Kainantu, EHP owns Akwitana Coffee Plantation (Box 7.4). He had 
retail stores before venturing into coffee in 2004. 
 
Box 7.4: Beser Coffee: Business management expertise 
Background 
Beser Coffee operates the Akwitana Coffee Plantation, which is located in Aiyura, 
EHP, at an altitude of 1,622 m asl. Bebes is the fifth owner of the estate. The 
National Development Bank (NDB) tendered the property in 2004, and he 
successfully acquired the plantation. The original European planter purchased the 
land as a state lease and formerly farmed vegetables and later planted coffee in 1964 
and 1965. The European planter sourced funding from the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia to develop Akwitana. Later he developed a wet and dry coffee mill on the 
plantation. In 1979, the European planter sold the estate through the PRS to a 
nationally-owned company, Kainantu Komuniti Bisnis (KKB). Later, two other local 
group-owned companies acquired and managed Akwitana for a varying number of 





The Akwitana estate is 42 ha in total, of which 12 ha is vacant. About 27 ha have 
mature coffee trees. In 2005, Bebes obtained a loan from the ANZ Bank for 
K145,000, with a compound interest rate of 12.7%. He used the loan to acquire the 
title of the plantation from the NDB. He successfully repaid the loan in 2009. 
 
Previous business experience 
Bebes was a bright student but dropped out at Grade 6 and worked with KKB and 
quickly learnt the trade to become assistant manager. He resigned from KKB to run 
his family trade store in Kainantu. He spent 18 years managing family businesses. 
His engagement as assistant manager with KKB and managing family stores 
enhanced his management skills for both assets and finances. Bebes resigned from 
the store business in 2005 to concentrate on his coffee business. Bebes did not 
register Beser Coffee as a company until 2013. He said that because he was moving 
into a new venture, the non-registration period gave him time to learn the intricacies 
of the coffee business. He once proudly commented that “I should have engaged in 
the coffee business a long while ago.” He was implying that his family store 
businesses were less lucrative than his coffee business. Bebes intends to open a 
separate bank account for the plantation and he has kept records of harvests, income 
and expenditure since 2007. Bebes claimed, “I have monies [budget] to invest in my 
farm for the following year.” While in the retail business, he engaged the services of 
an accountant for his budgets and cash flow schedules. In January 2016, he was 
preparing his 2015 annual records for audit purposes so as to comply with statutory 
requirements and submit claims for tax rebates with the Internal Revenue 
Commission of PNG. Coffee buyers trading green bean coffee are eligible to claim 
the rebates from the state. 
 
Beser Coffee used to have an annual contract agreement with Arokara Coffee, an 
exporter based in Goroka under which the price for green bean coffee for the year 
was fixed. The fixed price was always above the market price and favours the Beser 
Coffee. Bebes explained that he bargained with Arokara after selling to the company 
for some years. He threatened to severe his ties with the exporter and move to 
another exporter. The exporter responded and increased the price. In 2011, Bebes 
was receiving K11.00/kg green bean while at the time K9/kg green bean was offered 
as the market price. The benefit for the exporter was a guaranteed supply of coffee. 
Since 2011, the prices he attains have been above the prevailing market price. 
However, in 2015, he severed ties with Arokara and partnered with Outspan (Olam 
International), a new exporting firm based in Goroka. He reported to me in January 
2016, that Outspan also pays above the prevailing market price. Bebes sent coffee 
samples from his plantation to Olam’s Germany-based office and the physical and 
cup quality was rated 95% for his Y1 green bean which is very high quality coffee. 
A representative from Outspan was then sent to Bebes’ farm to verify the source of 
coffee. In the last quarter of 2015, Beser Coffee through Outspan had exported three 
containers of green bean (320 x 60 kg bags each) to importers in the USA. “To fulfil 
my contractual agreements, I began to buy cherry and parchment coffee from other 
blocks and plantations”, said Bebes. During, the dry season, Bebes advises his 
partner coffee growers to process their cherry but during wet days, he requests them 
to bring cherry to his farm for wet processing. This ensures coffee is dried properly 





Rehabilitating the estate 
Bebes began building a permanent house on the farm in 2014, which was completed 
in early 2015. He now resides permanently on the plantation (Plate 1). As manager, 
Bebes works 12 hours per day seven days a week on the plantation. He leads by 
example by performing manual tasks, and his casual workers follow him. In 2014, 
Bebes had 12 permanent casuals working on the plantation. During peak periods, the 
casual labour force average is 55 and during non-flush periods about 25 people are 
employed. In 2014, the company fortnightly wages were: K120 for permanent 
workers, K80 for casuals with bos bois [boss boys] receiving K90. Cherry harvesters 
are paid K0.25/kg. Beser Coffee is currently concentrating on rehabilitating its 
plantation and processing facilities. From the 1980s to 2004, the former owners 
dismantled and removed all processing equipment and the shed is still standing idle. 
In April 2014, Bebes was renovating the dry mill shed and making improvements on 
the wet mill. In 2015, Beser Coffee started to purchase most cherries and parchment 
from two plantations and blocks in the vicinity. One of his clients is Etawa Coffee 
(Box 7.2). Additionally, the company also buys coffee from other farmers. However, 
he does not have any formal coffee buying arrangements with farmers. 
 
 
Plate 1: Coffee drying area and in the background is the newly built homestead 
(insert: new lounge items for the house). 
 
The plantation was in good condition when I visited in January 2016. The coffee 
trees were healthy although the owner had ceased applying fertiliser about 4-5 years 
ago. Most of the coffee trees on the plantation are under Casuarina (C. oligodon) 
shade trees. The average productivity for the period 2007 to 2015 was 432 kg gb/ha 
(Table 1). When Bebes was asked why he was getting lower yields at the plantation, 




need to be replaced.” Also, as noted above he hasn’t been applying fertiliser for 4-5 
years. Because of the abandoned state of the plantation when he took over 
ownership, many coffee trees have died and these are being replanted with new 
seedlings.  
 
Table 1: Cherry harvests from Akwitana plantation from 2007 to 2015. 
Year Cherry harvested (kg) Productivity (kg gb/ha) 
2007 107,235 636 
2008 65,035 385 
2009 80,243 476 
  2010* 47,477 - 
2011 65,488 388 
2012 58,446 346 
2013 68,754 407 
2014 73,680 437 
2015 63,629 377 
Average 74,126 432 
*The weights of coffee harvested from July to December of 2010 were missing.  
 
Bebes plans to obtain a bank loan to purchase processing equipment for the dry mill. 
He lamented that “I cannot mortgage my plantation and other assets to get a 
commercial loan to build a dry factory because the banks have classified Aiyura as a 
remote location. Banks claimed the rule of law was absent in Aiyura and this will not 
guarantee their money.” Bebes was optimistic that if he succeeds in obtaining a loan, 
he will invest 70% in purchasing equipment for the dry mill, and the balance would 
be spent on farm inputs. Additional plans he has for the future include:  
a) providing extension and management services to smallholders and blocks so 
they will supply cherry and parchment to his plantation; and 
b) to produce high-quality coffee and target differentiated markets overseas. 
 
Community engagement 
Bebes believes taking part in socio-cultural activities that involve his neighbours and 
relatives are essential to his business success. He reported that he maintains close 
links with his clansmen in Kainantu in case some violent incidents occur on the 
plantation. Thus, security is imperative for Bebes as he is operating in a place where 
his relatives are not nearby. Coffee cherry theft used to occur on the plantation but 
has declined over time. The decline in theft started when Bebes began organising 
local villagers and migrant youths in sporting competitions, which he sponsored. His 
sponsorship of youth has helped maintain friendly relationships with the community. 
Bebes also seems to have excellent relationships with local politicians. 
 
As part of community engagement, Bebes assists in mortuary, bride price payments 
and often transports the sick to nearby health clinics. For these activities, he 
recounts, “I spend less than K1,000 annually.” Local villagers are also engaged as 
farm workers. Bebes explained that it was better to help with a little support before 
bigger problems ensue, which may cost a lot more money to rectify. He delivers help 
by himself and avoids using ‘intermediaries.’ Intermediaries were unreliable in 
delivering the support he offered. The intermediaries are people who approach Bebes 




witness. He sometimes does not give cash but instead allocates specific tasks for 
villagers to work on, and they are paid wages to meet the pending obligation.  
 
Benefits of prior business experience 
Bebes’ case study illustrates how prior skills in business management assist in the 
transition into new business enterprises. However, as the next section shows, they are 
not sufficient on their own and indigenous economic relations must also be managed 
carefully. Bebes gained vital business skills and knowledge from his employment as 
an assistant manager with KKB in the retail store operation, which he was then able 
to apply in his coffee business. He has used his business skills and knowledge to 
negotiate coffee prices above the prevailing market price in the area. Furthermore, 
Bebes has built his reputation for producing top quality coffee. Other research work 
elsewhere confirmed that prior business involvement or participation in the modern 
market economy can be beneficial in entrepreneurial activities (e.g. Finney, 1987; 
van der Grijp, 2004; Lan et al. 2014). Bebes is constantly seeking new business 
opportunities. He reported to me in 2014 during my first visit that he would like to 
export coffee directly from his farm. He accomplished his dream when he exported 
57.6 tonnes of green bean to the USA market in 2015. Unlike many plantation and 
block owners who constantly seek financial support from the state or chain leaders, 
Bebes has a committed budget for his plantation, allowing him to be prepared for 
downturns in coffee prices, or when production from his plantation drops. Bebes 
exemplifies what Finney (1993) coins as a ‘third generation business leader’ who 
pursues an individualistic approach to business. Bebes is successfully operating in 
his home area, which is near to his natal village and is readily accessible to his 
relatives. Finney asserts that third generation business leaders would need to relocate 
their businesses away from their home areas to avoid excessive demands from 
relatives to meet cultural obligations (also see Imbun, 2000). However, Bebes shows 
it is possible to manage these demands to the advantage of his business. 
 
Effective community engagement 
Given plantations and blocks are rural-based, managers need to engage prudently in 
community relation activities to earn the ‘social licence’ to operate successfully 
(Imbun, 2013; 2014). In their efforts to strengthen community relations, some 




example, who allocates K1,000/yr to cater for community engagement. My case 
studies reveal that the two most commonly assisted activities were mortuary 
exchange and compensation payments. In the traditional context, relatives of the 
deceased expect other villagers and neighbours to show their respect for the deceased 
especially those with standing in the community by attending the haus krai 
[mourning house] and contributing cash and food to mortuary-related activities. 
Similarly, for compensation payments, villagers also expect local coffee plantations 
to contribute to such payments. Often customary activities are timed to occur during 
the coffee season when incomes are high. Locals and shareholders in some areas 
often request plantations and blocks to contribute to the event. Max Kumabong of 
Niugini Mountain Coffee reported that “… either the plantation owners participate in 
social obligations or their business suffers [from reprisals]” (CIE #23, 08/04/14). 
Company rules like the OK Corporation can guide plantations and blocks as to who 
should benefit from the support offered so that it curtails unnecessary demands from 
shareholders and local villagers. 
 
It is vital for businesses to undertake community engagement to maintain a 
harmonious relationship with the community and landowner groups (Kalinoe and 
Kiris, 2010; Imbun, 2014). When providing assistance to villagers, it was beneficial 
for plantations to invest in activities where many community members benefit. Bill 
Gardner ensures his support targets the wider community: “I do not look at 
individual problems … I only contribute to schools, health, haus krai [mourning 
house] and water supply projects” (CIE #20, 06/04/14). Bill has spent most of his life 
on the plantation and has good local knowledge of community expectations and 
rarely has problems with local landowners (e.g. MacRae, 2016). In my interviews 
with CIEs some reported that several plantations had funded the building of 
permanent houses for shareholders, clinics and classrooms. Some plantations also 
upgrade access roads (Box 8.5) and transport the sick to clinics as part of their 
community relations efforts. 
 
Maintaining absolute honesty in dealing with community members has also proven 
essential for the successful running of plantations and blocks in rural areas. Tebi Ato, 
a former coffee block advisor, said that when providing assistance to community 




workers fairly (CIE #6, 23/01/14). When business managers abuse their positions of 
power or lack integrity in discharging their duties, locals are likely to take advantage 
of the situation and create problems or make excessive and unnecessary demands on 
frivolous matters. Thus, the onus is on management to ensure they are conscious of 
the local socio-political environment and carefully manage the relationships. 
Moreover, active community engagement can earn the support of the local 
community during unstable and uncertain times. For example, during periods of 
dissent with certain factions of the community, local workers have been known to 
become allies of the plantation and protect plantation assets from destruction. Imbun 
(2013) provides evidence of a similar situation among Porgera Mine landowners who 
were either employees or locals on the company payroll who defended company 
assets during social upheavals at the mine site. 
 
Individually-owned plantations and blocks 
Beser Coffee and Etawa Coffee plantations rarely have land ownership disputes or 
problem with cherry theft, which are prevalent in many group-owned plantations. 
Kumabong pointed out: 
 
Historically, we have not done well with group-owned businesses. … If we 
need to move forward, individual entrepreneurs must be promoted and they 
will always take ownership of challenges that confronts their business. Who 
takes ownership in group-owned businesses? (CIE #23, 08/04/14) 
 
It can be argued that individually-owned plantations have minimal problems and are 
likely to succeed. In group-owned plantations and blocks, problems like rivalry and 
land disputes can undermine their operations, which are evident at OK Corporation 
and Akai Coffee Plantation. Thus, good prospects remain with individually-owned 
plantations and blocks to thrive and to be sustainable. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
Internal and external problems highlighted in this chapter and those outlined in 
Chapter 5 have challenged the managed subsector and its future is gloomy. The post-
independence exodus of experienced expatriate plantation managers after the sale of 
European-owned plantations in the 1970s created a void in management expertise. 




plantations encountering problems. The internal problems such as poor management, 
lack of leadership, poor financial management skills and knowledge, and internal 
conflicts in group-owned plantations have all contributed to the decline of the 
subsector. External problems like increased cost of farm inputs, poor rural 
infrastructure, lawlessness and land disputes are other factors suppressing the 
subsector. However, some plantations are able to mitigate these challenges and 
remain resilient.  
 
Institutional leadership is critical to the success of business enterprises like 
plantations and blocks. In the 1970s and 1980s, some semi-literate entrepreneurs like 
Noiya Se’e and Kisan Pau succeeded in business. Institutional leadership from the 
state and parastatal agencies especially advisory services were effective in assisting 
Se’e and Pau’s enterprises to be successful. Although, Se’e and Pau had limited 
understanding of business imperatives, state agencies supported them to comply with 
modern business practices. However, when institutional leadership from 
management agencies and lead partners began to weaken in the late 1980s and 
1990s, many plantations and blocks had to fend for themselves and ran into 
management problems. Etawa Coffee, for example, began to face financial 
difficulties from 2000 onwards where the owner earned coffee revenue but failed to 
spend according to a planned budget, which affected operations. The Akai Coffee 
Plantation exemplifies the need for institutional leaders to assist plantations in 
crafting policies, structures, training and mentoring of business managers and 
owners. This would enhance the management capacities of plantations and blocks 
when partners exit. As a result of poor advisory services and declining contact, 
plantations ran into problems and were struggling or abandoned while blocks were 
subdivided into smallholdings. 
 
The early growth and success of OK Corporation was attributable to the leadership 
skills of Pau, a transitional leader. Under his leadership, innovative policies that were 
considerate of the indigenous economy were developed and implemented. These 
policies assisted in consolidating shareholders’ interests and also minimised negative 
influences of non-market systems on the operations of the company. However, when 
corrupt modern leaders began to join the board and management, problems arose that 




recruit shareholders has led to dissent amongst factions of the shareholders. If OK 
Corporation had retained its policy of not recruiting shareholders, then many of its 
present problems may have been averted. 
 
Prior business experience and effective community engagement are important for 
business success. Bebes’ experience as assistant manager in a private company and 
managing family stores prepared him to make a smooth transition into the coffee 
business. Bebes and Bill Gardner were effective in their community relations efforts 
which were based on their local knowledge that enabled them to earn the ‘social 
licence’ to operate their plantations. Thus, Bebes and Gardner’s better understanding 
of indigenous economy and its influences on the modern market economy has placed 
them in a strong position to effectively manage their businesses. Bebes demonstrates 
that plantations can be resilient and operate successfully with minimal problems, as 
did OK Corporation for many years. In group-owned plantations, internal conflicts 
between factions can undermine businesses. In individual-owned plantations, they do 
not have many problems but may be still faced with poor management problems like 
Etawa coffee. 
 
This chapter shed some light to the query of Finney (1993) about the prospects for 
third generation business leaders. Although some of the third generation business 
leaders have avoided the demands of the indigenous economy by moving their 
enterprises to other provinces, Bebes and Max Kumabong have managed to straddle 
both traditional and modern market economies to remain respected in their locality. 
Bebes and Kumabong are typical of hybrid business leaders or “transitional business 
leaders,” who have better business knowledge, can effectively manage non-market 
and modern market systems and are always looking for new business opportunities. 
Furthermore, Bebes who was equipped with business knowledge was able to 
negotiate contracts in his favour successfully. Being business savvy, he kept a 
lookout for business opportunities that enabled him to realise his vision of becoming 
a coffee exporter. Bebes’ former exporter could not assist so he partnered with a new 
company to export three containers of coffee in 2015. Thus, Bebes exemplifies a 





In Chapter 8, I present the results of case studies of smallholder cooperatives and 
discuss some advances that have been made in value chain partnerships among 






1. Elias Menta is an in-law of Akai villagers and resides at Akai village. 
 
2. Kui Kopi Ltd was publicly tendered for leasing at the time of my visit in March 
2014. 
 
3. OK Corporation’s shareholder committees provide feedback to the board in which 
shareholder grievances are communicated to the board or vice versa. Sixteen 
subcommittees consist of shareholders, and each committee has six members. The 
16 chairmen of the subcommittees form the core committee chaired by the 
company secretary and the three company directors. 
 
4. Mortuary assistance is to pay for coffin, iron sheet, gravel and cement for the 
tombstone. 
 
5. The late Paul Koi provided most of the information on OK Corporation. He 
passed away in 2015 in a tragic car accident at Kalanga, Banz, Jiwaka Province. 














Chapter 8 builds on Chapters 6 and 7 by showing how smallholder farmers who are 
members of cooperatives, blocks, and plantations can become linked with chain 
leaders to develop sustainable value chains for markets that are mutually beneficial. 
The chapter discusses collective action of smallholders and value chain partnerships. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, since the mid-1960s, smallholders have dominated coffee 
production. However, they produce poor quality coffee and as a result they receive 
low prices. With the decline of the plantations, the plantations and their mills’ ability 
to engage as chain leaders and partner with smallholders has also faded as the rural 
mills were relocated closer to urban centres. Therefore, alternative mechanisms such 
as cooperatives and partnerships could fill the void left by the closed plantations and 
their mills of the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
This chapter addresses the question of how effectively can smallholders and chain 
leaders engage in productive relationships to raise production and improve the 
quality of coffee? In responding to this question, the chapter is divided into three 
parts. Firstly, the discussion begins with a brief outline of value chain partnerships. 
Secondly, the chapter gives insights into cooperatives as social enterprises and 
presents case studies that reveal the opportunities and constraints in collective action. 
Lastly, it identifies the benefits of partnerships among coffee growers and chain 
leaders, and describes potential problems that can emerge in these relationships.  
 
Value Chain Partnerships 
Since the 1990s, collaboration between the private sector, civil society organisations 
(CSOs), and state actors has improved in PNG. The partnership theoretical 
framework embeds resource use, social problems, and stakeholder management and 




al. 2007; Bitzer et al. 2013). Bitzera et al. (2008) define a partnership as two or more 
parties who are involved in collaborative activities. A wide variety of terms are used 
for collaborations, which include global networks, cross-sector partnerships, public-
private partnerships (PPP), multi-stakeholder alliances, and inter-sectoral 
partnerships (Glasbergen, 2007). International institutions like the World Bank are 
ardent proponents of the PPP concept (Loftus, 2008). Locally, policies like the 
farmer demand-driven extension, Productive Partnerships in Agricultural Project (see 
Chapter 4) and agro-nucleus setups are modelled on collective action and 
partnerships. Although, partners can have their own goals and aspirations, through 
consensus, their agendas coalesce to pursue a common goal (Glasbergen, 2007; 
Gray, 2007). Partnership is an institutional framework that serves the interests of 
participants to cooperate and address issues of mutual interest. The global agri-food 
value chain partnerships derive from North-South relationships. The global value 
chain involves production structures, spatial networks and relationships, and 
institutional frameworks (Daviron and Ponte, 2005). The institutional framework 
sanctions lead agencies like chain leaders with expertise in marketing to collaborate 
with subordinate partners like farmer groups at the production level. In the coffee 
industry, partnerships grew significantly after the collapse of the quota system of the 
International Coffee Agreements (ICA) in 1989. The ICA collapse reconfigured 
coffee policies, which meant that farmers were no longer, protected from price 
fluctuations therefore giving the advantage to multinational companies (Linton, 
2005; Auld, 2010). In many coffee growing countries such as PNG, the state could 
do little to stop falling coffee prices, which opened a niche for the private sector and 
CSOs to intervene (Daviron and Ponte, 2005). As a result, value chain actors had to 
modify their social, economic and political engagement in coffee trading and 
production patterns that led to partnership formations.  
 
Governance in partnerships entails rule-setting that facilitates sustainable production 
and the way the global coffee industry operates (Bitzer, 2012; Pattberg and 
Widerberg, 2016). In coffee, the governance systems can be enforced through 
certification processes (Linton, 2005; Auld, 2010) where coffee farmers comply with 
certification standards to meet the criteria for niche markets. From a development 




of farmers; thus efforts such as partnerships are designed to address production 
problems (Bitzer, 2012).  
 
Cooperatives as Social Enterprises 
In PNG, the cooperative society movements started in the 1940s in the coastal areas, 
with the first Central Highlands coffee cooperative established in 1964 (Singh, 
1974). However, many of the cooperatives collapsed in the 1970s (Singh, 1974). In 
the late 1980s, farmer mobilisation and cooperative formation became prominent 
again in the PNG coffee industry as a way to channel services from service 
organisations (Overfield, 1993; CIC, 2008a). In the 1990s and 2000s, coffee 
cooperatives began to decline again (e.g. Murray-Prior et al. 2009; Sengere, 2010). 
The demise of cooperatives in PNG was connected to lack of supervision, poor 
financial management, lack of social cohesion and weak leadership: similar to the 
problems that beset the plantations after independence (see Chapter 7) 
 
Studies have highlighted two main advantages of farmer cooperatives. They include, 
for example: 
 Smallholders produce coffee in small quantities and are dispersed, which 
means they have weak bargaining power. Through collective action, farmers 
can bargain for better prices (Ferris et al. 2014), overcome information 
deficiencies among farmers including transactions costs (Issa and 
Chrysostome, 2015; Wollni and Fischer, 2015) and become mediums for 
sourcing development services. Thus, grower groups can become a means for 
accessing farm inputs, extension services and training (Kolk and Lenfant, 
2015). 
 Cooperatives can also function as social enterprises to pursue a communitarian 
agenda and concurrently achieve sustainable development (Poon et al. 2009; 
Lan et al. 2014). Poon et al. (2009, p. 98-99) further argue that social 
entrepreneurship entails “social and institutional embeddedness” in its 
approach to focusing on harnessing relationships and ensuring communal 
benefits. Cooperatives as social enterprises ensure collective action among 





In collective action, social capital is crucial as it ensures trust among members and 
encourages a shared vision, values and norms among members as they strive to 
achieve common objectives (Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000; Hall, 2006). However, 
certain local structures can erode social capital and group action. Rivalries among 
cooperative members have been identified amongst groups in the PNG Highlands 
(see Reilly and Philpot, 2002). The competition among male group members to 
assume leadership roles to wield influence and power over others can undermine 
collective action (Murray-Prior et al. 2009). The case studies below report on 
leadership and governance aspects in grower groups and their influences on social 
capital and group cohesion. 
 
Case Studies of Coffee Cooperatives 
Focus group discussions were held with members of the two cooperatives: the 
Neknasi group (Morobe) and the Korofeigu group (EHP) (Chapter 3). The focus 
group discussions formed the basis of the two case studies. 
 
The Neknasi group case study (Box 8.1) gives insights into the dynamics of 
collective action in a cohesive group that is able to collaborate with partners to lift 
coffee production. 
 
Box 8.1: Neknasi Coffee Growers Cooperative Society 
Background 
The Neknasi group initially consisted of farmers from four subgroups (villages). It 
was formed in 2008 in the Wain area of Nawae District, in Morobe Province. The 
Wain area is in the Sarawaged Ranges and is relatively accessible to markets. The 
group was formalised through a modified version of participatory rural appraisal 
planning. The CIC having initiated the Neknasi group began at its inception 
providing support services. Since 2008 eight other subgroups have joined, totalling 
12 by 2015. One of the new subgroups comes from the Markham electorate, in 
Morobe Province. The member farmers cultivate coffee at an altitude of 903-1,384 
m asl (Table 1).  
 
The Neknasi group aims to work collectively to produce good quality coffee that 
fetches better prices for its members. The group also envisioned that other services 
that the members desired could be sourced through the group. Villagers realised 
that through group work, they could mobilise their resources and jointly pursue 
economic goals.  
 




sales in 2009. However, coffee prices earned in later years averaged K120/bag2 
except for 2011 when global prices were at a record high. The group earned K2.4 
million from coffee sales from 2009 to 2015 (Table 2). On average, a member 
earned K764.66/yr from 2009 to 2014 from coffee sales3. With additional members 
joining in 2015, the quantity of coffee sold has increased. Farmers received farm 
tools and training from partners and this has boosted their production capacities. 
Productivity is relatively high among farmers at 876 kg gb/ha. 
 
Table 1: The participating villages, number of farmers and coffee trees, and area 
under coffee cultivation. 
Village No. of farmers No. of trees Area under coffee (ha) 
Bandong 97 100,824 39 
Konex* 57 74,756 29 
Sikilan 36 51,429 20 
Warup* 47 29,286 11 
Bosagen 45 29,050 11 
Napinots* 40 29,411 11 
Kasin 67 69,398 27 
Kwasi 37 30,320 12 
Munengan 39 32,721 13 
Nifau 93 55,485 22 
Wasin 62 35,538 14 
Buaso 54 43,470 17 
Total 674 581,688 226 
*Subgroups that joined the Neknasi group in 2014. 
 
Table 2: Quantity of green bean sold by the cooperative and income earned from 
2009 to 2015. 
Year Quantity sold (60 kg gb bags) Amount earned (PGK) 
2009 550 252,000 
2010 820 533,034 
2011 760 533,034 
2012 1,092 393,964 
2013 640 316,038 
2014 320 105,324 
2015 537 221,916 
Total 4,719 2,355,310 




Niugini Coffee Tea and Spice (NCTS), now Agmark, based in Lae originally 
partnered with the Neknasi group in 2008. Yosh Reilly, a former NCTS general 
manager, gave a contract to the group to supply parchment coffee. Yosh 
challenged the group to supply 500 parchment bags and if they did, he would assist 
farmers in building their coffee production capacity. A week later, the group 
delivered 1,000 parchment bags to NCTS. Yosh was so impressed that he invited 




Neknasi group and organise their certification. Since then, the group has attracted 
several other partners to support their coffee work including initiating community 
projects in the area (Table 3). In October 2015, the group received an eco-pulper 
from the CIC, which is to be used for processing cherries from members.  
 
Table 3: Partners of the Neknasi group and interventions these partners have 
provided since 2009. 
Partner Interventions Value of intervention 
NCTS Invited Fair Trade to visit 
Neknasi group 
Fair Trade certificate issued 
Purchases group coffee Income for group and farmers 
Fair Trade Certification, training on 
producing Fair Trade coffee 
Good clean parchment coffee 
is produced, enhanced 
productivity Payment for surveillance audit 
Premium payments for 
community development 
To establish water supply and 
other community projects 
Gave a solar panel Used in group office 
CIC Extension services, training on 
coffee husbandry, processing, 
and marketing 
Good clean parchment is 
produced, increased 
productivity 
Provision of farm tools Improved production capacity 




Financed farmer training  Upgraded farm productivity 
Supplied fuel to CIC vehicle Received extension services 




Built access road to Sikilan 
Village and beyond 
Built road access to coffee 
farmers 
PNGSDP* Allocated financial help Contributed finance to build 
coffee mill 
SPC Training on bookkeeping and 
organic farming 
Small business activities like 
trade store, poultry, and 
sewing Fair Trade first audit was paid 
NDB Conducted awareness on 
banking products and services 
Awareness of credit services 
it offers for clients 
ADRA** Conducted feasibility study for a 
water supply project 
Cost estimates for water 
supply 
Micro Bank  Facilitates banking services  Farmers able to save 
Local 
parliamentarian 
Financial support  Contributed finance to build 
coffee mill 
Leadership  Negotiated land to build a mill 
Morobe Mining Donated two Tuffa tanks Improved water supply 
*PNGSDP - PNG Sustainable Development Project, **ADRA - Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency  
 
The group attained Fair Trade certificate in 2011. Certification allowed the group 
to access premiums totalling K87,000 of which K17,000 was spent on a feasibility 
study for a water supply project and the purchase of a motorbike for the group’s 
extension officer. In October 2015, the group spent an additional K10,000 to re-




proportion of farmers do not have water access in their coffee gardens where the 
pulping of cherry occurs. 
 
In 2010, the Neknasi group successfully sought financial help from partners to 
build a coffee mill (Table 4). Group members contributed K400,000 (K860/farmer, 
excluding members that joined in 2015). The farmers’ contributions came from the 
income they received from selling coffee. In 2014, the CIC issued an export 
license to the group. The local Parliamentarian planned to establish an agricultural 
centre where other mills including a dry coffee mill were to be located. The mill is 
intended to serve other coffee farmers in the electorate. Finances have been 
available since 2011 and the groundbreaking ceremony to build the mill was held 
in March 2015. Physical planning of the site has not been completed and the 
construction of the mill has not started. The politician’s involvement has delayed 
the factory construction.  
 
Table 4: Financial support from partners to build coffee mill. 
No. Partners Amount (PGK) 
1 Neknasi Coffee Growers Cooperative Society 400,000 
2 Morobe Provincial Government 400,000 
3 PNGSDP 500,000 
4 Local Parliamentarian 300,000 
Total 1,600,000 
Source: Neknasi profile submitted to PNGSDP for funding. 
 
Enterprising group 
The Neknasi group has two businesses in addition to coffee sales. These businesses 
are undertaken as part of the Fair Trade conditions4 to engage in commercial 
activities. Firstly, the group has a fleet of vehicles: two trucks and two land 
cruisers. The trucks are named ‘Dirty Finger 1 and Dirty Finger 2’ signifying that 
the money collected to purchase the trucks came from hard work. The trucks offer 
transport services for members and non-members between Wain area and Lae. The 
village women use the trucks to transport vegetables to Lae for selling. I observed 
during my stay at Sikilan Village that women ferried vegetables to Lae from 
Mondays to Saturdays. The fare is K15 for each passenger for a one-way trip (K30 
return). To transport members’ coffee, K0.30/kg is charged. Parchment buying is 
the second enterprise, and one of the land cruisers travels to nearby areas to 
purchase coffee. When members sell parchment to the group, they receive a 
premium of K0.10/kg on top of the prevailing market price. The other land cruiser 
assists with the administrative functions of the group.  
 
The Neknasi group is advancing by diversifying into other income generating 
activities for its farmers. In 2014, the group’s extension manager introduced three 
honey hive boxes and plans to introduce more in the future. A member of the 
group has four large fish ponds (32 m x 12 m) built in 2009 and began selling 
tilapia fish (Oreochromis sp.) in 2012.  
 
Governance systems 
There are clear cases of group members exercising their delegated duties, which 




Labelling Organizations International, 2005). Each of the 12 sub-groups of the 
Neknasi group has a chairman who ensures group cohesiveness prevails among 
subgroup members5. Some farmers operate as extension officers for the group. 
Other members are assigned specific tasks like being a crewmember for the 
group’s public motor vehicle (PMV) trucks. The group members respect their 
leaders. During individual interviews and in casual conversations, they rarely 
uttered negative commentary about their group leaders even when I asked 
specifically about leadership problems. Instead, they digressed to discuss other 
topics. However, in the focus group discussions, a few members remarked on some 
leadership problems.  
 
Leadership problems 
The cooperative began with much excitement because it was believed that the 
group would be managed competently. The Neknasi group complied with advice 
from key partners in the early life of its existence. However, during my fieldwork 
in March 2014, it was evident that the Neknasi group had some problems with 
their board directors. In discussions, farmers furnished the following responses to 
support their claims: 
 Some leaders were undermining group laws by not observing the rules they 
had set for themselves. For example, there is a rule that group vehicles after 
use each day are to be parked at the office, but some leaders are not adhering 
to this policy. 
 Leaders after attending national and international events on behalf of the 
Neknasi group were failing to report back to group members in a timely 
manner. 
 Members’ concerns that have been passed at annual general meetings as 
resolutions were not actioned.  
 
The above problems farmers raised have weakened their motivation to work 
collectively as a group. However, in my second fieldwork period in March 2015, 
there was an air of excitement as they had acquired a second truck and additional 
subgroups had joined the original group. 
 
Socio-economic aspects 
The communal undertaking of community projects, coffee farming, and socio-
cultural activities are entwined in the Neknasi group (Chapter 6). Farmers 
exchange assistance with labour, cash, and food during periods of need such as 
mortuary and church activities. These reciprocal arrangements extend to coffee 
farming activities in which extended family members assist relatives during 
harvesting and grass cutting activities. Focus group attendees admitted that 
participation in village social events impact negatively on coffee production but 
they were able to manage labour demands for coffee tasks. 
 
Successes and problems 
After the group was formed, the Neknasi group was able to achieve some 
successes but also encountered problems (Table 5). See also some successes listed 






Table 5: The Neknasi group’s successes and problems. 
Successes Problems 
 Heightened collaborations between 
the group and partners 
 Obtained Fair Trade certification 
 Sourced funding to build coffee 
mill 
 Possess a fleet of vehicles 
 Received premiums for social 
development from Fair Trade 
 Received export license 
 Increased number of group 
members 
 Obtained eco-pulper from the CIC 
 Leaders fail to communicate and 
report to members 
 Leaders abuse group rules 
 Chain leader delays processing group 
parchment coffee  
 Delays in building coffee factory as a 
result of the involvement of local 
politician 
 Lack of access to water for processing 
coffee 
 Poor institutional leadership 
 Delayed payments to member farmers 
 
Conclusion 
The success of the Neknasi group is derived from its partnership with 
collaborators, which has delivered support services to farmers. Regular contacts 
and interactions with partners through meetings, training, and extension services 
have developed into long-term relationships. The coffee productivity of the group 
farmers is high, and they produce superior quality parchment. The Fair Trade 
certification conditions are positively influencing the group governance systems. 
The group’s high social capital has led them to diversify into other entrepreneurial 
activities. However, the group also has challenges such as some leaders continuing 
to thwart group rules and delayed payments from coffee sales are causing anxiety 
among members. 
 
The Korofeigu group has progressed to forge alliances with development partners 
and this has enabled group members to boost their coffee production capacities 
(Box 8.2). However, social capital and group cohesion remain low in the group. 
 
Box 8.2: Korofeigu Organic Coffee Farmers 
Background 
The Korofeigu cooperative is located in the Korofeigu area, Unggai/Bena District 
which is approximately 5 km east of Goroka, EHP. The Okuk Highway passes 
through some of the villages of the participating farmers. The Korofeigu area is 
relatively dry and prone to prolonged droughts. The primary vegetation in the area 
is savannah grassland. Farmers cultivate coffee in the low-lying valleys. Most of the 
farmers’ coffee gardens are heavily shaded under Albizzia spp. Members of the 
Korofeigu group cultivate coffee at altitudes of 1,391 to 1,511 m asl.  
 
Group formation 
Agriculture graduate, Steven Asilala, initiated the group’s formation. Asilala is from 
Beneveto Village and had previously worked in Kimbe until his return in 2007. 




production, he collaborated with village leaders and conducted awareness among 
the villagers to improve the process. Meetings were held in late 2008 to consolidate 
the group. In mid-2010, the group established a board, appointed executives, and 
village representatives to manage the affairs of the group with Asilala leading as 
interim manager. 
 
The Korofeigu group received its registered cooperative certificate in 2011. The 
group envisioned that through collective action, members could reap benefits from 
collaborating with development partners. Also, the group planned to participate in 
the differentiated markets and attain premium prices, which they could not achieve 
as individual producers. The group now has registered members from seven 
villages: Beneveto, Nagamito, Bush Bata, Namaro, Nupasafa, Sozugu, and Upegu 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1: The participating villages, number of farmers and coffee trees, and area 
under coffee cultivation. 
Village No. of farmers No. of trees Area under coffee (ha) 
Sozugu 41 90,504 35 
Beneveto 30 117,030 46 
Bush Bata 8 27,135 11 
Nagamito 7 34,075 13 
Namaro 7 21,714 8 
Nupasafa 3 4,886 2 
Upegu 1 2,981 1 
Total 97 298,325 116 
 
Coffee is a major source of income for these farmers while some earn money from 
citrus and vegetables. Other sources of revenue are from small-scale business 
activities like trade-stores, poultry, and firewood sales. The income from coffee 
including those from small-scale businesses meets the farmers’ livelihood needs, 
savings, school fees and social obligations.  
 
Achievements 
Since 2013, the Korofeigu group has sold all of its coffee to New Guinea Highlands 
Coffee Exports (NGHCE). The exporter transports the group’s parchment from the 
village to its mill and hulls it into green bean. Although the first coffee sale was 
made in 2013, record of sale was unavailable. In 2014, 22.7 tonnes of green bean 
was sold and earned a total net income of K188,597. In 2015, 64 tonnes of green 
bean was sold, and it netted K439,444. The group also has a bank account under 
which K0.05-0.10/kg green bean is deducted from group sales to build the financial 
capacity of the group. Korofeigu group is in a high market access area and some 
farmers also side-sell their coffee. 
 
Productive partnerships 
The partners of the Korofeigu group assisted in developing coffee production 
capacities of the farmers (Table 2). For instance, NGHCE organized NASAA 
auditors to visit the Korofeigu group in 2013 to conduct an audit for organic 
certification; a selected sample of coffee gardens was inspected. The NASAA 




used in coffee plots; b) no ‘parallel production’6 is practised; c) activities carried out 
in the coffee gardens are consistent with sustainable agricultural practices, and d) 
record keeping is carried out for farm activities. The NASAA Organic issued the 
group’s certificate in July 2014, and Korofeigu farmers are now producing coffee 
under the NASAA Organic label. The NASAA Organic imposed governance 
system through its certification is weak and not as rigid as the Fair Trade 
certification system. The NASAA certification only considers sustainable 
production systems and prohibits child labour. It pays little attention to the 
economic and social welfare of participating farmers. 
 
Table 2: Partners’ support to Korofeigu group since 2010. 
Partner Intervention Value of intervention 
NGHCE Organised certification Participate in differentiated market 
Hulls and buys the group’s 
coffee 
Market access is ensured 
Provides extension services Built farmer’s capacities to 
produce 
CIC Provided training on coffee 
husbandry practices, processing 
and marketing 
Good quality coffee is produced, 
and improved productivity 
Supplied farm inputs like tools, 
pulpers and knapsacks 




Issued NASAA organic 
certificate 
To participate in the high-value 
market 
PNGSDP Funded K300,000 for water 
supply project 
Water access for coffee farmers 
NASFUND Conducted awareness on 
banking products and services 
A farmer has savings account with 
NASFUND 
ADRA Constructed the water supply 
project for the community 
Water access for coffee farmers to 
process coffee 
EHP Governor Funded K350,000 for water 
supply project 




Supplied coffee pulpers Upgrade capacity of farmers to 
produce quality coffee 
Gave K350,000 for water supply 
project 
Water access for coffee farmers 
 
In 2013, ADRA collaborated with a local community based organisation in the area 
to establish water supplies in Beneveto, Nagamito, Bush Bata, and Nupasafa 
villages. Villagers, including the Korofeigu group farmers, contributed K13 per 
head towards the project. The PNGSDP and politicians also made substantial 
monetary contributions to the project. The water supply project was completed in 
July 2014, and farmers now have access to safe, clean water.  
 
Other partners of the Korofeigu group provided training, farm tools, and conducted 
awareness workshops on the kinds of services they can offer to farmers. The 
farmers received training from CIC in coffee production, processing, and marketing. 
The farmers were impressed to see that after implementing the training on coffee 
rehabilitation7, their coffee gardens were transformed. Observations made in March 





Leadership and communication problems 
Asilala as manager of the group ensured that the group established linkages with 
partners from 2010 to 2013. In mid-2013, Asilala took up a permanent job in 
Goroka and concurrently was the cooperative manager. In February 2015, Asilala 
relinquished the managerial position and Papsy Kanipa took over to manage the 
group. Asilala planned to mentor Kanipa but since February 2015 has been residing 
in Port Moresby. 
 
Since 2014, no meetings have been held, and communication has become less 
regular among members. A group member said, “we realize that there is no longer 
regular communication between members and the executive” (SH #16, 04/04/14). 
The group has cooperative representatives in each of the participating villages. 
However, their roles are vague, and they are inactive in group activities. It was 
reported that “the village representatives only meet when the group collects coffee 
from members for group sales, and it occurs once a year.” Kanipa performs most of 
the group duties and there is little delegation of tasks among the members. In 2015, 
the chairman of the group resigned and requested the group to relocate the group’s 
office, which was currently on his land. Kanipa informed me in January 2016 that 
the former chairman had some differences with Asilala and did not want to be a 
member anymore. Kanipa had identified a place where the office will be relocated. 
 
Successes and problems 
After forming the Korofeigu group, the cooperative was able to generate some 
successess but, it also encountered problems (Table 3). See also some successes 
listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 3: Successes and problems the Korofeigu group encountered since it was 
established in 2010. 
Successes Problems 
 Increased partnerships with collaborators 
 Engaged in community projects e.g. 
water supply project 
 Gained NASAA Organic certification 
 Improved production capacity of farmers 
 Poor leadership since 2014  
 Lack of delegation of responsibilities 
 Poor group governance systems 
 No regular group meetings 
 
Conclusion 
At the community level, the cooperative is successful in attracting services from 
partners. The partners of the group have developed the coffee production capacities 
of the farmers through training, accessing farm inputs and the coffee gardens were 
certified. Subsequently, farmers attained higher coffee productivity. The NASAA 
Organic certification has lifted the morale of farmers as they are participating in 
differentiated markets that should pay better prices. The quantity of coffee sold 
through the group has increased by almost 65% in 2015. Since mid-2013, the group 
has experienced unsteady leadership, and there is a lack of delegation of group tasks 
among the members. Also, the NASAA certification governance system imposed on 
the grower group is not rigid and quite weak; as a result their level of social capital 





Summary of case studies 
The two case studies illustrate that formal groups can form successful long-term 
relationships with chain leaders and lead partners. For farmers to participate in 
grower groups, there are pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits including the 
organisation of production systems to function more efficiently (see Wollni and 
Brümmer, 2012; Murray-Prior, 2011; 2013). The case studies demonstrate that 
through collective action, farmers are able to access services from a range of 
organisations that include chain leaders, politicians, CSOs, and state actors and in 
this, the two groups have been successful. 
 
Four positive aspects of formal grower groups are highlighted by the case studies, 
which include: 
 
Firstly, the relatively good governance systems enabled the Neknasi group to 
accumulate social capital which subsequently created opportunities for 
entrepreneurship in three ways:  
 The Fair Trade certification at the Neknasi group bolstered the group’s 
institutional capacities with sanctioned meetings and the delegation of 
responsibilities among members. The improved governance system helped 
overcome some of the inadequacies of the Neknasi group leaders and further 
strengthened their accountability through regular meetings. Importantly, the 
institutional leadership from partners by maintaining regular contacts ensured 
members and leaders comply with group by-laws, and that group activities are 
conducted transparently.  
 The enhanced governance systems also raised trust levels and cohesion among 
the Neknasi group members further elevating social capital levels. This study 
affirms Batt et al. (2009) and Hernandez-Aguilera’s (2015) findings in PNG 
and Columbia respectively that Fair Trade-supported smallholder groups have 
high levels of social capital and trust.  
 The governance structures enforced through certification in the Neknasi group 
has enabled business activities for the group to flourish. Krupka (2012) and 
Ruben and Fort’s (2012) assertion that Fair Trade partnerships with farmers 




business relations with partners appear true. For instance, the Neknasi group 
has ventured into new enterprises in addition to the group coffee sales. 
 
Secondly, partners can assist with building the production capacities of farmers to 
increase productivity and improve the quality of coffee (Table 8.1). Productivity is 
higher in value chain relationships as cooperative farmers participate in social 
learning and are more likely to adopt innovations (see Hartwich et al. 2010; Murray-
Prior et al. 2011; Murray-Prior, 2013). The support for farmers in the two groups was 
in the form of training, premiums (Fair Trade only), financial aid, farm inputs, 
extension services, freighting of coffee and improved market access. This support 
has enabled farmers from the Neknasi (876 kg gb/ha) and Korofeigu (610 kg gb/ha) 
groups to attain an average productivity of 747 kg gb/ha. This is almost double the 
average productivity of smallholders recorded in other parts of the Central Highlands 
(UniQuest, 2013). Issa and Chrysostome’s (2015) study among Rwandan cooperative 
coffee farmers also shows that member farmers achieved significantly higher 
productivity levels (759 kg gb/ha) than independent coffee farmers (635 kg gb/ha). 
Other studies show increased productivity among smallholders who are participating 
in certification schemes (e.g. Rao, 2010; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011, Hernandez-
Aguilera et al. 2015).  
 
Table 8.1: Timeline of major achievements for the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups. 
Year 
Group achievements 
Neknasi Korofeigu  
2008  Group established  
2009  Sold coffee as a group 
 A member introduced fish 
farming 
 Had meetings to form the cooperative 
group 
2010  Partners and Neknasi farmers 
contributed K1.6 million to build 
dry mill 
 Group established 
2011  The first truck was purchased 
 Obtained Fair Trade certificate 
 Cooperative certificate issued to 
group 
2012  First land cruiser was purchased  CIC conducted training on coffee 
husbandry practices 
2013  Purchased second land cruiser  First group coffee sales to NGHCE 
 Training conducted on marketing 
2014  Three new sub-groups joined 
 Received export license 
 A second truck was purchased 
 Water supply established 
 Obtained NASAA Organic certificate 




Thirdly, group work and partnerships have also brought new marketing opportunities 
and established novel social networks to the benefit of smallholders, who participate 
in grower groups as shown with the Neknasi and Korofeigu cooperatives. For 
instance, international certification agencies through local-based partners are able to 
certify the coffee gardens of farmers, which than gives smallholders access to higher 
value differentiated markets. 
 
Fourthly, another positive outcome from collective action and collaborations with 
partners was the production of high quality coffee by smallholders. van Rijsbergen et 
al. (2016) confirm that smallholders participating in certification schemes produce 
better quality coffee. Hartwich et al. (2010, p. 239) further expound that the type of 
communication flow in a value chain is about ‘upgrading’, which is derived from 
improved information transfers from the private sector to farmers. For example, the 
overall physical and cup quality of coffees from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups 
were of very good quality (82%) and near-plantation standards. The Neknasi group 
farmers in particular were producing much bigger size beans than farmers in the 
Korofeigu area, although the latter were still producing better than standard 
smallholder coffee (Table 8.2). Also, social learning at the Neknasi group has 
resulted in several farmers beginning to introduce apiculture into coffee gardens 
which has the potential to raise productivity (Plate 8.1). Ricketts (2004) points out in 
a study in Costa Rica that bees are known to increase coffee yield by 10-50% in 
coffee groves. 
 




Neknasi cooperative Korofeigu cooperative 
Parchment Even coloured, very clear bright, 
clean and odour free sample 
Even coloured parchment 
(pale yellow) 
Green bean Looks very good, less defects. 
Higher percentage of larger 
beans: screen size of 17-18 mm 
Had both medium and large 
sized beans: screen sizes of 
15-18 mm, variation in bean 
sizes 
Cup quality Aroma of coffee stood out, 
producing sharp acidity that can 
be felt but it’s a bit lacking in 
body 
Medium body with citric 
acidity and generally good 
clean cup quality 
Overall rating (%) 82 82 





Plate 8.1: A farmer with bee hive boxes in his coffee garden in the Wain area 
(Neknasi group). 
 
The two case studies also reveal several challenges formal grower groups can 
encounter. They include: 
 Collective action can be challenging as reported in other studies of coffee 
cooperatives in PNG (Murray-Prior, 2008; Murray-Prior et al. 2009). The two 
case studies exemplify this phenomenon where poor leadership and lack of 
communication is prevalent in the groups, thus demonstrates the potential to 
impair social capital and lead to eventual demise of groups. Furthermore, the 
poor performances of past coffee cooperatives in PNG mean that partners’ 
inputs are vital for building cohesive groups. Sengere (2010) asserts in a study 
on coffee grower groups in PNG that building the trust and confidence of 
members by regular contacts with farmers and monitoring group activities will 
help create stable and cohesiveness groups. Thus, regular contact with partners 
and nurturing farmer-chain leader linkages will help alleviate some of the 
challenges in grower groups to ensure groups are sustainable.  
 In the Korofeigu group, organic certification criteria focuses on sustainable 




only social aspect of organic certification is that it disallows child labour 
(NASAA Australia Ltd, 2004), which is a generic criterion for many 
certification organisations. NASAA Organic certification does not enforce 
rigid governance systems in grower groups to the same extent as Fair Trade. 
Thus, social capital is lower in the Korofeigu group than the Neknasi group. 
 
Present Value Chain Partnerships 
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of commercially driven 
partnerships are provided from the perspective of chain leaders and partners. 
Thirteen chain leaders and a lead partner were interviewed (Table 8.3). 
 
Through value chain partnerships, farmers have improved their capacity to produce 
quality coffee and as a result are able to attain better prices. This is because 
smallholders are producing coffee according to production and quality standards that 
chain leaders impose. Typically, a single chain leader had an average of three 
partnerships with individual smallholders, grower groups and or blocks (Plate 8.2). 
This suggests that the chain leaders are using partnerships with growers to source 
coffee. 
 



















1 1 n.d. 2 Yes Smallholders 
3 n.d. 4 Yes Smallholders 
2 n.d. 4 No Smallholders 
2 8 439 10 Yes Smallholders 
3 1 100 14 Yes Smallholders 
4 1 80 10 Yes Smallholders 
1 30 3 Yes Smallholders 
5 2 3,000 11 Yes Smallholders 
1 n.d. 4 No Smallholders 
6 1 70 2 Yes Block holders 
1 70 2 Yes Smallholders 
7 1 500 11 Yes Smallholders 
1 n.d. 11 Yes Smallholders/ 
Block holders 
8 13 1,000 4 Yes Smallholders 
9 1 1 n.d. Yes Block holder 
2 2 n.d. No Block holders 
10 1 300 4 Yes Smallholders 
11 9 9 n.d. No Block holders 





Plate 8.2: Leaders of farmer groups in a meeting with a partner chain leader in Banz, 
Jiwaka Province. 
 
Longevity of partnerships 
Some of the productive partnerships between grower groups and chain leaders that 
were examined as part of this study were long-term relationships. However, Batt et 
al. (2009) report on relationship difficulties between coffee farmers and chain 
leaders, like distrust among value chain actors and the inconsistent supply of good 
coffee. These problems can be minimised through establishing efficient supply chain 
linkages between individual farmers or grower groups and chain leaders. In this 
study, partnership periods ranged from 1.5 to 14 years. Interestingly, the four long-
term partnerships that have been in place for 10 to 14 years were all participating in 
differentiated markets. Shorter-term partnerships of 1.5 to 6 years were mostly for 
cherry delivery to coffee mills, with farmers receiving farm inputs, cash advances 






Agro-services in partnerships 
Partners provide a range of agro-services to coffee farmers by organising markets, 
and providing farm inputs, cash advances, extension, and savings services. In 
promoting partnerships, Best et al. (2015, p. 1) argue that agro-services can 
“stimulate demand for technical and social innovations.” Agro-services can create 
opportunities for mutual relationships between farmers and chain leaders to advance 
in the coffee industry. In the rest of this chapter, I shall focus on the 12 chain leaders 
interviewed who are profit-driven and engage in these partnerships.  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, some European planters in consultation with landowners 
created local companies to engage in productive partnerships. The landowners 
contributed labour and cash toward the establishment of central wet mills and 
planters organised the processing and marketing of villagers’ coffee. Box 8.3 
provides examples of European planter and landowner associations. 
 
Box 8.3: European planter and landowner partnerships in EHP 
In 1966, Ian Downs of Korfena Coffee Plantation in EHP organised the formation 
of the Upper Asaro Coffee Community Ltd (UACC) and built a wet mill so that 
he, the chain leader, would have quality control over the villagers’ coffee. He 
processed farmers’ parchment into green bean, and the UACC Ltd charged a 
processing fee to farmers, which met the running costs of Korfena Ltd. Downs 
used his contacts overseas to sell the coffee as an equivalent to his own, and 
shipped coffee to the same clients but in separate contracts. Downs had registered 
the trademark ‘Korfena’, and it attracted favourable remarks and interest in 
Hamburg, Germany. His coffee volume was small. If he could sell the UACC 
marked bags giving an assurance that the coffee was equivalent to Korfena, then 
the UACC shareholders would receive a good price, and his clients overseas would 
know that they could obtain a certain volume from Downs. Later Downs started 
Coffee International Ltd, an exporting company, and the Korfena, UACC coffee, 
and other coffee were marketed. Downs would send a truck to the UACC buying 
points in the valley to collect cherry from the UACC shareholders (Downs, 1986). 
 
In the 1960s, John Wells of Hobe Plantation, at Kotuni and Bob Frame of Lapegu 
Plantation, both near Goroka organised similar setups. The landowners that Wells 
and Frame registered had their own wet mills, which were built separately from the 
plantation’s processing facilities. The partner villagers would bring in their cherry 
coffee, which company employees would process to parchment and after drying, 
would hull into green bean. The shareholders’ coffee was sold through the 
companies of Wells and Frame. Both plantation owners organised management for 
the villagers’ coffee by keeping records and after sales income was disbursed to 




up to the same standard as the plantations. The coffee was sold as equivalent to 
their own plantation coffee. 
 
European planters used local labour during the coffee season as pickers without the 
need to bring in people from outside the area. In each case above, planters worked 
out a schedule so that the villagers would harvest their own coffee for their wet 
mill on a day or days that did not conflict with the plantation harvesting scheduled 
days. This allowed the plantation to employ villagers to earn some extra cash by 
harvesting the plantation crop. This suited both plantation owners and villagers, as 
all the coffee was picked, and the locals received wages as well as income from 
their own coffee (CIE # 1, 02/06/14). 
 
The collaborations outlined in Box 8.3 illustrate the European planters’ efforts to 
organise and support landowner groups and local villagers ensured improved quality 
coffee was maintained and supply was consistent from the 1960s to the 1970s. The 
European planters organised villagers and processed their coffee to the same or 
almost the same as plantation standard coffee and exported it. Because of the 
associations that existed between villagers and European planters, local labour for 
harvesting and other menial tasks on the plantation was readily available. Also, it 
created a safe environment for European planters because of the amicable 
relationship many planters had with surrounding villagers. 
 
Partnerships between villagers and European planters also extended to assisting 
villagers to expand their coffee gardens. In the 1980s, European planter, Fred Leahy 
of Foinda Coffee in Daulo, EHP, assisted locals to plant coffee with financial support 
from THDS. He supplied the local ‘big men’ with seedlings, pig fencing wire and 
gave cash to establish larger coffee gardens. Some of the ‘big men’ farmers were 
well educated and were either employees of Fred Leahy’s company, entrepreneurs or 
community leaders. One of the beneficiaries, Raisis Klink, reported that:  
 
Fred Leahy assisted the Baiyango brothers Paul and Gono and myself of 
Korfena Village, Sowa Gunia of Korepa area, Mondawe Wobo of Lunumbe 
Village and Paul Asaro of Gimisave Village to plant larger coffee gardens. 
Fred wanted us to earn income from coffee, and become living examples 
[coffee entrepreneurs] to local villagers. (CIE #14, 14/03/14) 
 
These ‘big men’ farmers are influential leaders in their own areas and one later 




villagers to plant larger coffee gardens. Fred Leahy also initiated a local company, 
which was owned by Daulo LLG; the company ensured that most of the access roads 
in the district were operational (Sinclair, 1995). Accessible roads enabled local 
people to farm coffee as an enterprise and ensured they had access to decent roads 
for freighting coffee and service delivery to the communities. 
 
With the demise of the plantations, most rural coffee mills were relocated near urban 
centres. Several of these mills took the initiative to partner with individual growers 
or farmer groups to source coffee. Some of these chain leaders who were interviewed 
reported that they could produce good quality coffee from smallholder cherry at their 
mills as had happened in the past. The desire of chain leaders to purchase cherry is 
because very little or nothing can be done to upgrade the quality of parchment 
purchased from smallholders, as the quality of the coffee is determined during the 
wet processing stage (see Chapter 5). However, with the wet processing of cherries, 
the desired quality of coffee can be achieved. For instance, a processor in Jiwaka 
Province purchases cherry from smallholders, processes it and sells the coffee to 
high-value markets (CIE #20, 06/04/14). The processor uses a variety of processing 
techniques to process the cherry, and eventually cup tastes the quality and produces 
quality assessments of each batch. He then directly liaises with potential buyers. 
When an overseas buyer registers an interest for one of his products, he tailors his 
wet processing to meet the market demand. He sells some of his coffee to Starbucks. 
 
Additionally, individual farmers and grower groups who have long-term 
relationships with chain leaders tend to regularly deliver superior quality coffee. An 
exporter reported that “organised groups were producing good quality coffee and had 
done this consistently” since the partnership began in 2002 (CL #5, 04/02/14). A 
processor also claimed that his farmers knew the kind of product that needed to be 
delivered to the mill (CL #7, 04/02/14). This confirms Imbun’s (2014) finding that 
farmer groups who partnered with chain leaders tend to produce good quality coffee. 
Two chain leaders in this study have been facilitating sales of grower groups’ coffee 
to differentiated markets, and farmers had been receiving good prices. Similarly, 
Hartwich et al. (2010) points out chain leaders in Honduras have purposely organised 
relations with coffee farmers to obtain quality coffee. Another processor reported 




inconsistent (CL #1, 08/02/14). This chain leader does not invest in building the 
production capacity of farmers by providing farm inputs and extension services. 
 
Chain leaders also reported that they provided interest-free cash advances ranging 
from K500-100,000 to coffee buyers, blocks, plantations and smallholders with large 
gardens. For these growers, the advances are either given in the form of farm inputs 
or as cash. Four of the chain leaders interviewed offered cash advances to coffee 
buyers who operate as middlemen and purchase coffee for chain leaders. Coffee 
buyers receive a commission on their purchases. The chain leaders recoup the cash 
advances when growers and coffee buyers bring in coffee. However, some chain 
leaders have refrained from providing cash advances because it has been difficult to 
recover their monies. A few growers and buyers misused the cash advances, and 
coffee was not delivered.  
 
The 12 chain leaders interviewed reported that they provide extension services such 
as advisory services and training to smallholders and some plantations and blocks. 
Furthermore, a processor near Goroka taught the smallholders the importance of 
budgeting and saving and deducts K0.05-0.10/kg of coffee that his farmers sell to his 
mill as savings for them. The savings are kept and accessed by the farmers when they 
have a need for cash. 
 
Certification and premium prices in partnership 
Partnerships also give farmers access to coffee certification programs. Several chain 
leaders interviewed either assisted individual farmers or grower groups to have their 
coffee gardens certified. The certification schemes under which PNG farmers 
participate include Fair Trade, Tree Kangaroo (KT), Common Code for the Coffee 
Community (4C), Fair Trade Organic, Utz, and Rainforest Alliance, while the high-
value coffees are Organic A, Organic X and AX (Figure 8.1). Some of these 
certification schemes come under the category of sustainability, and cover three 
broad areas: a) the economic viability of coffee farming; b) environment-friendly 
production systems; and c) ensuring coffee farmers’ social welfares are catered for in 
the coffee business. However, a limitation of participating in the Fair Trade scheme 




in conventional markets (Valkila, 2009). This also happens with farmers in PNG 
selling Fair Trade coffee.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: The quantity of differentiated coffee exported and foreign exchange 
earnings for PNG in 2015 (Source: CIC data). 
 
Another benefit of individual farmers and grower groups partnering with chain 
leaders is it enables smallholders to access the growing differentiated coffee markets. 
Differentiated coffee accounts for 9-12% of total global coffee transactions (Lewin et 
al. 2004). Globally, the consumption of differentiated coffee is increasing while 
consumption of regular blends remains steady (Daviron and Ponte, 2005). Since 
2003, PNG exports to differentiated markets have been growing steadily. In 2015, 
PNG exported almost 10% of differentiated coffee (Figure 8.2). Coffee bought from 
growers that possess certified farms is destined for differentiated markets, and chain 
leaders pay the above-market price to farmers that supply coffee consistently. Thus, 
potential remains to increase the share of exports to differentiated markets. 
 
Individual growers or farmer groups that produce coffee under certification regimes 
earn premiums on the coffee they sell to chain leaders. For cherries purchased from 
certified farms, growers earn higher premiums of K0.20-0.50/kg from partner chain 
leaders. However, several chain leaders interviewed also paid price premiums to 






























































of the usual market price for cherries. The price premiums act as an incentive for 
farmers to supply coffee to the same mill consistently. 
 
 
Figure 8.2: The growth of coffee exports in the differentiated markets from 2003 to 
2015 (Source: CIC data). 
 
Also, farmers earn better returns on cherry than on parchment coffee. Coffee 
farmers’ return on selling cherry is 34% higher than parchment; farmers make 
savings on labour and time in pulping, fermenting, washing, drying and providing 
security for coffee (Batt et al. 2009). The 34% return on cherry price relates to an 
equivalent of a parchment coffee that a farmer would forgo if sold as parchment. 
Elsewhere, Rao (2010) shows that when a Fair Trade farmer group in India began to 
deliver cherries to a central mill, the coffee prices farmers received increased by 
251% (Rupiah 25-35/kg to 123/kg). The lower prices that Indian farmers previously 
received were based on the lower quality of coffee they sold. The Indian farmers 
applied their own methods to process and trade coffee as independent farmers.  
 
Another example of good quality coffee emerging through a smallholder and chain 
leader partnership comes from a district in the Central Highlands. The local coffee 

























































continuing to sell quality coffee to the factory. Box 8.4 outlines how the chain leader 
modified its buying tactics to purchase good quality parchment from smallholders.  
 
Box 8.4: Adjusting value chain relationships to accommodate changes with farmers 
The ‘Nenge Specialty Coffee’ was a product of a partnership project among 
Lulume, Kofi Roast International, local villagers and the CIC to create a specialty 
coffee, which began in 2000. Villagers surrounding the mill volunteered to 
participate in producing the specialty coffee. The project ensured smallholder 
coffee gardens were rehabilitated, and the farmers supplied parchment to the mill. 
Lulume conducted training for farmers on coffee husbandry and postharvest 
practices. Initially, the company invested finance as an upfront credit in assisting 
farmers to purchase canvases to dry their parchment, and to subsidize the 
acquisition of hand pulpers. Farmers were taught to build elevated drying beds and 
trained in the use of proper postharvest practices to ensure production of clean 
good quality parchment coffee. 
 
The arrangement was an informal mutual agreement. In 2005, some of the 
participating farmers began to make unrealistic demands on the company. Farmers 
requested the company supply all farm inputs such as farm tools, pulpers, and 
canvasses. The excessive demands were not met, and Lulume was forced to 
change its mode of operation to produce the Nenge Specialty Coffee. 
 
The new strategy employed by the company was price-driven. If a farmer wished 
to obtain a better price, they had to produce good quality coffee. If the company 
was satisfied with the quality by assessing the physical appearance of parchment 
coffee, it paid the farmer a premium at the factory. A company employee said that 
“The company did not have formal agreements with the farmers, and the farmers 
did not have any obligation to the company. The informal relationship was the 
exchange of parchment coffee for cash. The farmers were satisfied with the price 
received which was K0.50-0.60/kg on top of the factory door price (FDP).” The 
highest price premium paid was K1.00/kg for parchment, so if the FDP was K3.00, 
then the premium price was K4.00. 
 
In 2011, Lulume scrapped the above payment strategy. Introducing a new 
approach, the company enforced more stringent quality control measures and 
began to evaluate the cup quality, which had not previously been undertaken and 
also continued to analyse the physical appearance of the beans. Based on the 
results, the company offered premiums on a sliding scale; the minimum price 
premium was a K0.30 premium. Only in exceptional cases, did farmers receive K1 
price premium. The informal partnership is currently in operation (CL #4, 
14/02/14). 






Box 8.4 shows that the company reduced its agro-services because of excessive 
demands from farmers. However, farmers who participated in the earlier investment 
program continued to sell parchment coffee to the chain leader. Lulume made 
adjustments to the pricing and support service strategies to accommodate the 
changing perceptions of the partner farmers. By doing so, the company was able to 
continue to produce the specialty product. The main strength of the company was the 
potential for farmers to receive the highest premium of K1 on a kilogram of 
parchment coffee delivered. Furthermore, the initial investment in farmer education 
and the appropriate processing facilities helped to influence the mindsets of farmers 
about the quality of coffee that the mill demands (e.g. Murekezi et al. 2012). 
Although, the mill buys parchment from a multitude of farmers, the product is sold in 
the differentiated markets. This is unusual because smallholders are known for 
producing inconsistent and poor quality coffee. However, Box 8.4 demonstrates that 
with the right effort and training, high-quality parchment coffee can be produced by 
smallholders, as is also demonstrated by the Neknasi group case study (Box 8.1). 
 
Partnership problems among value chain actors 
As outlined above, partnerships among value chain actors have merit, but they also 
have their own challenges. Some of the challenges include: delayed payments to 
grower groups, demands on partners and leadership problems in grower groups. 
 
Delayed payments to grower groups 
One of the major constraints found among cooperatives was the problem of delayed 
payments for coffee. In collective marketing, delayed payments and volatile prices 
can be a disincentive for farmers to produce coffee. The delayed payments for group 
marketing can be as long as 4-6 months for Neknasi group farmers. A few Neknasi 
group farmers believe that the chain leader deliberately delayed the processing of 
their coffee so that he could purchase their coffee when the price was low. This 
erroneous view is demonstrated in the comments of a member of the focus group: 
 
… here at the production base, we bulk our coffee and transport it to Lae 
where the processor delays the hulling and thus it affects the final quality 
of our coffee. … the processor also delays the buying of our coffee and 





While the above quote cannot be substantiated, it exemplifies the distrust that persists 
among farmers and chain leaders. Farmers believe they are not receiving a fair price 
when delays occur in processing and payments. Murray-Prior et al. (2008) report of 
farmers perceiving that chain leaders were responsible for the low prices they 
received for their coffee. As for exporters, they have forward contracts; therefore, in 
many cases short-term price fluctuations in the markets do not affect their margins. 
However, the delayed payments result in farmers reluctantly contributing their coffee 
for group marketing. In the Neknasi group, there is a slight decline in members 
contributing coffee for group marketing. For Korofeigu farmers, an exporter in 
Goroka that hulls and purchases the group’s coffee did not issue the quality report for 
coffee sales in 2013. The exporter failed to explain the costs of hulling and freighting 
so farmers were not satisfied and believed that the sale of their coffee to the exporter 
was not carried out transparently. 
 
Demands on partners 
Partnerships can be difficult to maintain for long periods because of the unrealistic 
demands placed on chain leaders by farmers and local villagers (e.g. Box 8.4). Some 
grower group leaders think that their chain leaders should offer loans and other 
benefits. A processor near Goroka was frequently asked for cash advances from 
farmers that supplied cherries to his mill (CL #3, 04/02/14). Another chain leader8 
gave an account of how local villagers reneged on an agreement (Box 8.5).  
 
Box 8.5: The importance of being conscious of local villagers' attitudes 
The current owner of Ka’u Coffee is a son of a pioneer European planter who was 
born on the plantation. The present owner and his son manage their plantation and 
their mill. In 2005, there was a need for road access to bring coffee to the factory 
so the chain leader had about six meetings with local villagers who would be 
affected by the road construction. In the final meeting villagers agreed that no 
compensation would be paid for road construction. The villagers said “we do not 
care about the land, we need services.” That being the case, the chain leader 
confirmed he would build a short-cut road from the mill to Mofa Village (Figure 
below). This short-cut road would save time for the Mofa Village farmers and 
others travelling to the nearby town and coming to the estate, by reducing the 
travel distance by 11.5 km. The villagers agreed, and after shaking hands, a meal 
was shared among them with the chain leader - symbolically celebrating the 
proposed new road. The company began to build the road, but as soon as the 
grader reached Mofa Village, villagers chopped trees across the road to block it 




road had not been made. 
 
The company requested that the local police address the situation, but they failed 
to attend. The company was forced to retrieve its grader at its own peril. The 
villagers demanded K500,000 for the land affected by the road-works. The 
company mediated for some time but no compromise was reached, consequently, 
the coffee farmers were informed that their cherries would not be collected. The 
disgruntled villagers had their own meeting and invited the chain leader, but the 
chain leader did not attend. The villagers decided to reduce the demand to 
K50,000. The villagers informed the chain leader about the reduced amount, but he 
refused to pay them. The chain leader asked the villagers if anyone was paying the 
company to construct the road. The villagers replied that the company would make 
money from the cherry purchased from them by using the new road, so he had to 




The villagers had another meeting and decided to reduce the claim to K5,000 and 
the chain leader agreed. The chain leader invited the local district administrator, 
the police and in their presence the company paid K5,000 to the villagers. After a 
year, the villagers came and demanded K150,000. The chain leader repudiated the 
villagers’ request. The villagers dug trenches and placed stones to block the road. 
The villagers held another meeting without the involvement of the chain leader and 
decided that the company should pay another K5,000. The company declined the 
demand, so villagers dug more trenches on the road. When the coffee season 
began, the company did not buy the cherries. Farmers had to carry their coffee 
from their gardens and travel to the coffee mill. The affected farmers requested the 
company to negotiate with the disgruntled group, but the chain leader refused. 
After some time, the villagers realized that the chain leader was not budging, so 
they repaired the dug trenches, removed the stones and allowed the vehicles to 
pass through. The company is now using the road. In the end, the company had 
paid K5,000 to the villagers for the road (CL #1, 31/02/14). 












Box 8.5 illuminates the challenges facing rural-based chain leaders as they negotiate 
partnerships with coffee farmers. The villagers who gave the undertaking for the road 
construction had hidden motives to extract payments from the company. If the 
villagers’ demand was genuine, they could have permanently closed the access road 
or demanded compensation at the initial meetings. Because the villagers reneged on 
their promise with the chain leader, delivery of coffee to the mill was delayed thus 
negatively affecting coffee farmers. Also, the policing effort during the dispute was 
lacking, making business impossible to operate. In this case, the chain leader who 
has excellent local knowledge was able to mitigate some of the hostile behaviour that 
challenged his operations and was able to finally address the problem amicably. The 
excessive demands by farmers on chain leaders as highlighted in Case 8.5 illustrate 
why some partnerships are short-lived.  
 
In other cases, some plantations, blocks and smallholders with large gardens sell 
their coffee elsewhere in breach of the agreements they had entered into with chain 
leaders to supply coffee. These agreements can either be formal or informal. When 
these ‘wayward’ growers encounter problems, they return to the original partner for 
assistance. In such cases, most chain leaders refuse to assist unless amends are made 
on the prior commitments. For this reason some chain leaders stressed the 
importance of maintaining good relationships with growers over a couple of years 
before interest-free credit or other farm assistance is offered to them (CL #6, 
06/04/14).  
 
Leadership problems in grower groups 
A further problem in grower groups can occur when leaders use their positions to 
gain benefits for themselves instead of their groups as was the case with business 
leaders in group-owned plantations and blocks (see Chapter 7). Unscrupulous 
smallholder group leaders requested agrochemicals, tools and equipment for their 
own use instead of their groups. Others have received cash advances from chain 
leaders on behalf of their groups and have then disappeared and left the groups. 
These leaders lack moral and ethical values and use the partnership opportunities to 





Poor leadership has led to the demise of many farmer groups in PNG. A former CIC 
employee informed me in an interview that leadership was no longer visible in many 
rural villages (CL #4, 14/02/14). Some studies in the Highlands conclude that lack of 
trust in leaders by members has contributed to the decline in grower groups (Murray-
Prior, 2008; Murray-Prior et al. 2009; Sengere, 2010). The social aspects of many 
societies including the absence of a shared vision have created differences in 
opinions and social divisions, which have badly impacted on social capital and group 
cohesion in coffee cooperatives.  
 
Conclusion 
The partnership framework has merits for resource sharing among collaborators in 
which individual smallholders, blocks, farmer groups, chain leaders and lead partners 
can mutually benefit. The plantations and their mills of the 1960s thrived because 
chain leaders partnered with village coffee farmers, which ensured high coffee 
production and quality: PNG coffee was renowned for its quality in overseas 
markets. The demise of plantations and their mills have created new opportunities for 
current coffee stakeholders to engage in innovative value chain linkages to produce 
coffee. This chapter shows that some of the present value chain partnerships and 
collective action in grower groups have improved coffee productivity, quality and 
incomes. The relationships have benefited smallholders to increase productivity and 
earn premiums, while chain leaders are guaranteed delivery of consistently high 
quality coffee. 
 
The two case studies on grower groups demonstrate that groups attracted agro-
services from development partners in which partners offer support services, provide 
farm inputs, certify farmers’ gardens, facilitate savings and credit access, organise 
marketing and arrange freighting services. Thus, extension efforts from chain leaders 
delivered through value chain partnerships and grower groups are beneficial and 
have resulted in increased productivity and the consistent supply of quality coffee. 
 
Grower groups’ partnerships with chain leaders have also facilitated linking farmers 
directly with the expanding differentiated markets. Participation in certification 
schemes has advanced long-term partnerships between partners. Certification further 




quality requirements of differentiated markets. The close collaboration facilitates the 
exchange of information and thus quality products are expected to be produced 
which meet the demands of the differentiated market.  
 
Transparent and accountable leadership and delegation of responsibilities among 
group members can heighten trust, cohesion, and social capital formation in grower 
groups. The high levels of social capital in the Neknasi group have led to members 
producing good quality coffee, and their productivity levels are high compared with 
other smallholders in the Highlands. Fair Trade certification has strengthened 
governance systems in the Neknasi group by ensuring leaders are accountable 
through the conduct of regular meetings. These governance systems have helped the 
Neknasi group to diversify into other entrepreneurial activities. Also, cooperatives as 
social enterprises have allowed members to actively participate in group activities to 
establish a communitarian agenda to improve their livelihoods. However, in the 
Korofeigu group, NASAA Organic certification lacks stringent governance system. 
Poor leadership and governance in the Korofeigu group has resulted in lower levels 
of trust and poor social capital. Therefore, Fair Trade imposed governance systems in 
grower groups facilitates the creation of sustainable groups with high social capital 
levels and group cohesion.  
 
Certain barriers to partnerships and collective action endure. Unrealistic demands 
from farmers on chain leaders can stifle relationships. Also, lingering distrust 
between farmers and chain leaders can undermine collaboration. In grower groups, 
delays in payments of coffee sold in group marketing can be a disincentive and 
undermine collective action as seen in the Neknasi group. 
 
In Chapter 9, I bring together the discussions from the earlier chapters to highlight 
the weaknesses of partnerships and constraints that were causing the decline of the 







1. Farmers indicated a range of K200 to K400 as good prices for a 50-60 kg of 
parchment coffee. 
 
2. Farmers indicated that prices below K160 were poor for a 50-60 kg of parchment 
coffee. 
 
3. The average income received excludes the three subgroups that joined the 
Neknasi group in 2015. 
 
4. As part of Fair Trade certification, the Neknasi group has social, economic, 
environment and labour committees. The labour committee ensures child labour is 
prohibited in coffee production; the economic committee ensures the cooperative 
operates as a social enterprise; the environment committee ensures sustainable 
practices are employed in coffee production; and the social committee ensures the 
welfare of farmers is catered for in group work. 
 
5. Subgroup leaders are second tier leaders who are leaders of each subgroup as per 
Fair Trade criteria. A subgroup will include one or two villages. 
 
6. Producing exactly the same crop on an organic and non-organic farm by the same 
farmer (NASAA Australia Ltd, 2004). 
 
7. Coffee rehabilitation includes pruning, digging new drains or maintaining old 
drains and shade control. 
 
8. The chain leader was a recipient of an Award from the CIC in 2008 for grading 













The previous chapter outlined the opportunities and challenges in collective action of 
smallholder farmers and value chain partnerships. This chapter brings together and 
summarises the challenges discussed in Chapters 5 to 8, which currently impede the 
PNG coffee industry. As outlined, the coffee industry is beset with a range of 
problems that have impacted negatively on the performance of the industry. In the 
early stages of coffee development in PNG, the thriving European-owned plantations 
established a solid rural infrastructure, which provided easy access to markets, goods 
and services for smallholder coffee farmers. However, with the decline of the 
plantations, many of these support services in the rural areas collapsed. The key 
findings in this thesis are summarised in two parts. Firstly, the specific challenges 
causing the long-term decline of the managed subsector are discussed as well as the 
reasons for smallholder farmers’ low productivity and supply of poor quality coffee 
to the market. In the second part of the chapter, the broader institutional context and 
external factors, which constrain or pose threats to the PNG coffee industry, are 
summarised. 
 
Figure 9.1 shows how the various interacting factors (socio-economic, institutional, 
external, management and socio-political) caused the decline of the managed 
subsector and the problems in smallholder coffee production. If the current decline 
continues, the remaining struggling coffee plantations and blocks may convert to 
smallholdings or to other uses. However, smallholders and block and plantation 
owners and business managers who are able to mitigate the challenges confronting 
them can survive and thrive. Some strategies successful coffee growers deploy to be 
resilient under the present socio-economic and political context are outlined in 






Figure 9.1: Key factors contributing to the poor performance of PNG coffee industry. 
 
Managing indigenous and modern market economies  
The non-market system has a significant influence on social and economic activity in 
rural communities and does not appear to be diminishing under the influence of 
modernization and the expansion of the modern market economy. Smallholder 
farmers and entrepreneurs have to tread a careful path to ensure indigenous values do 
not override fundamental modern market imperatives in managing their coffee 
gardens, blocks, and plantations. As discussed in Chapters 2, 6 and 7, the traditional 
relational economy has both beneficial and negative aspects. Traditional labour 
exchange is beneficial for the modern market economy, where households can recruit 
labour through reciprocal exchange relationships for coffee farming tasks. However, 
for some plantation and block business managers and owners, they can invest too 
much cash and in-kind support in non-market systems, which can be detrimental to 
the operation of their businesses. Thus, block and plantation business managers, 






Abandoned or struggling 
plantations and blocks
Turned into smallholdings 
or subsistence farming
Smallholdings
Subsistence farming or 
adopt other cash crops
Socio-economic factors
Labour shortages, pig damage
low ownership of tools, indigenous 
exchange economy, cherry theft
Institutional context
Disorganised  sectoral  policies and 
industry strategies, lack of partnerships, 
poor extension & advisory services, 
poor institutional leadership
External factors
Poor rural infrastructures, law and order 
problems, land disputes/access, climate 
change, coffee berry borer threat
Management factors
Poor farm and financial management, 
poor leadership, banks reluctance to 
give loans, increased costs of farm-
inputs
Socio-political factors
Lack of community relations, group 
internal conflicts, prestige (status 
symbolism), negative impacts of 
politics




Managed Subsector’s Problems 
Plantation productivity in the 1980s averaged 2,000 kg gb/ha. However, from 2000 
to 2006, plantation productivity declined to 600 kg gb/ha, a fall of almost three 
quarters (Chapter 5). In my study, the productivities of two operating plantations 
were 217-326 kg gb/ha for Etawa Coffee (Box 7.2) and 432 kg gb/ha for Beser 
Coffee (Box 7.4), which are dismal by plantation standards (Table 9.1). 
 
Table 9.1: Plantation productivities of this study. 
Plantation Productivity (kg gb/ha) Year of operation 
Akai 1,633 1990s 
Etawa 217-326 2014 
Beser 432 2016 
 
This section highlights some of the difficulties faced by the managed subsector 
which have contributed to very low productivity. The problems identified in this 
chapter include: failures in state support; management factors; lack of community 
engagement; and poor leadership. 
 
Government interventions in the coffee industry have brought both positive and 
negative results. The Plantation Redistribution Scheme (PRS) and Twenty Hectare 
Development Scheme (THDS) were poorly conceived and implemented. The PRS, in 
particular, was driven by a political agenda to appease customary landowners of 
plantations by returning their land to them. Similar problems have occurred in many 
former colonial countries. The guidelines for the purchase of plantations failed to 
uphold proper business protocols. For instance, many landowner groups who were to 
provide equity contributions towards the total purchase price as initial deposits paid 
much less, and the state had to subsidise the acquisitions heavily (Chapter 5). 
Therefore, plantations were given as ‘gifts’ to landowners. 
 
Another factor that has led to the decline of the managed subsector was the 
management problems that persist today and which were prevalent in the decades 
from the 1980s to 2000s. Chapters 5 and 7 exemplified the financial 
mismanagement, poor farm practices and abuse of company assets like coffee 
income and vehicles, which together have been responsible for the decline of the 




business imperatives. In fact, many business managers and owners lacked the 
knowledge of business values and skills to run their commercial operations 
prudently. Many business managers underestimated the efforts that were required in 
managing a high input-high output system of coffee production. For instance, 
without the guidance of a budget, Noiya Se’e diverted most of his coffee income, 
which came from his plantation, into building a dry coffee factory (Box 7.2). 
Consequently, Se’e was unable to purchase farm inputs to maintain his plantation. 
Lacking in knowledge of coffee husbandry practices Se’e’s coffee trees became 
overgrown making it difficult to harvest ripe cherries, thereby increasing the labour 
costs for the plantation. Se’e’s problems are akin to the situation of many nationally-
owned plantations and blocks. 
 
The rising costs of agricultural inputs have also made plantation ownership an 
unattractive enterprise. The higher costs of fertilisers, herbicides, farm tools and 
equipment as discussed in Chapter 5 have reduced the ability of plantations and 
blocks to operate profitably. Additionally, the recent wage determination in 2014 has 
increased rural minimum wages for plantation labourers by 35% (Imbun, 2015). 
Therefore, many plantations and blocks are unable to meet the higher costs of farm 
inputs and the new wage rates. 
 
Another problem contributing to the decline of the subsector is the reluctance of 
banks to lend finance to the managed subsector. Commercial banks are no longer 
offering loans to the subsector because of non-repayments on past arrears (Chapter 
5). Also, lawlessness in rural areas where most of the plantations and blocks are 
located has deterred bank investments in the sector. Sero Bebes, a plantation owner, 
attempted to secure a commercial loan, but his bank was unwilling to provide the 
loan (Box 7.4). The bank claimed that his plantation was situated in a rural area and, 
thus, was unsafe to invest in. Also, the bank refused to accept Bebes’ assets as 
collateral, which included the land title of his plantation and personal savings.  
 
The lack of community involvement of plantations in their neighbouring 
communities has compounded problems further for the subsector (Chapters 5 and 7). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the European planter-landowner partnerships enhanced 




1980s when most of the plantations were acquired by landowner business groups or 
local corporations. The new owners were unable to replicate the success of early 
European planters who had harmonious relationships with local village farmers to 
produce coffee (Box 8.3). The new owners believed that the plantations, which 
became locally owned had no need for community relations. Furthermore, the local 
business managers who were in charge did not maintain cordial relationships with 
shareholders, which also exacerbated internal conflicts in group-owned businesses. 
 
A related problem has been the poor leadership provided by egocentric business 
leaders, especially in group-owned plantations and blocks. Group business leaders, 
directors, and business managers have applied group-owned resources to advance 
their personal ambitions to the detriment of the coffee businesses (Chapter 7). 
Sometimes dishonest business leaders lack expertise in leadership, and have ulterior 
motives to embezzle company finances and assets when they enter into positions of 
influence in the company. They at times exclude shareholders from participating in 
management roles so that they can assume total control of the business. Some 
modern business leaders or shareholder-business managers assume total management 
control and make decisions, which sometimes results in internal conflicts among 
shareholders. Shareholders’ dissatisfaction can be expressed through cherry theft, 
harassing of company workers and land claims to plantation land.  
 
As for blocks, non-sharing of dividends led to disputes and the subdivision of coffee 
blocks. The group leaders in block development projects failed to share company 
profits fairly, which angered shareholders who were mainly family or clan members. 
In other cases, block leaders failed to involve shareholders in the management of the 
coffee blocks and as a result, shareholders reclaimed their land portions with coffee 
trees and began managing them as smallholdings. Therefore, many coffee blocks 
ceased operation. 
 
Another important factor was the waning of institutional leadership from lead 
partners like the CIC. The lack of institutional leadership created spaces for corrupt 
practices to emerge and harm business operations. This study revealed the 
inadequacies of state institutions to support, train, mentor, and build the management 




This led to many plantations and blocks struggling or failing to sustain their 
operations (Chapter 7). The banks as fund managers of the PRS and the THDS, and 
the government as financier failed to monitor the execution of funded-projects. The 
banks and the state did not appraise the performance of the management agencies 
who managed the PRS and THDS funded-projects, which led to very poor services 
being delivered. The CIC attempted to provide advisory services, but its services to 
the subsector were inadequate. The inconsistent and lack of support services from 
CIC resulted in business managers and owners of plantations and blocks not 
receiving advisory services. Consequently, business managers and owners were 
demoralised and were ineffective in managing their plantations and blocks. Also, 
they did not know where to seek assistance when they had management problems. 
For instance, when the managing partner departed from Akai Plantation as shown in 
Box 7.1, it operated for only two years and later collapsed as a result of internal 
conflicts among clan leaders. There was no state agency available to assume the role 
of institutional leader and assist the Akai Plantation. 
 
Challenges in Smallholder Production 
Smallholder farmers continue to dominate coffee production and will continue to do 
so in the years to come. However, their productivity is now lower than their average 
productivity between 1970 to the mid-1990s with a decline of around 60% in 2013 
(Allen et al. 2009; UniQuest, 2013). Moreover, smallholders produce inferior quality 
coffee and their supply to market is also inconsistent (Murray-Prior and Batt, 2007; 
Murray-Prior et al. 2008). Smallholders are part-time farmers and producing coffee 
is one of a range of livelihood strategies. Their other livelihood activities draw part 
of their resources away from being invested in coffee, which may include labour, 
land, money and farm inputs (Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
Coffee production constraints among smallholders for both independent farmers and 
members of grower groups that continue to persist include: old tree stock; poor credit 
access; cherry theft; lack of clean water to pulp and wash fermented coffee; land 
shortage; lack of pulpers; and, volatile coffee prices (Chapters 5 and 6). Four major 
problems, identified in this study, in smallholder production that resulted in low 
productivity and production of poor coffee quality were: labour constraints; poor 




Labour constraints in smallholder production 
Labour shortages are widespread among smallholders, which include independent 
farmers and grower group farmers and are a major obstacle to coffee production 
(Chapters 5 and 6). The larger the coffee garden sizes, the more labour farmers 
require undertaking coffee farming and processing tasks. Sometimes family labour 
may be insufficient to maintain a large garden. Several reasons for labour shortages 
of households include: school-aged children in boarding schools; adult children 
being married or migrating elsewhere; and, household heads becoming too old to 
maintain their coffee gardens. Furthermore, the unequal sharing of coffee income can 
affect labour supply. In the Korofeigu group, the wives spent less time in coffee 
production because of their perception that they were underpaid. Therefore, the 
group’s productivity was lower than farmers in the Neknasi group (Chapter 6). 
 
Poor extension and training programs 
In the PNG coffee industry, the marked decline in farmer contact with extension 
officers began in the late 1990s when numerous staff retrenchments were carried out 
to reduce overhead costs in the CIC. The ratio of the CIC extension officers to 
farmers is one to almost 15,000 households (Chapter 5). Mauro (2010, p. 24) further 
identifies other institutional problems like “unpredictable budgetary support, poor 
governance, corruption and misappropriation of funds” as undermining extension 
services in the industry.  
 
A review of past extension services show that extension programs were rarely 
completed when priorities change as a result of management change at the CIC 
(Chapter 5). Typically, in the CIC, a ‘new’ management team embarks on new 
initiatives and sets aside existing programs. The decision to set aside ongoing 
programs is carried out in haste without proper evaluations of past and present 
programs. Thus, their programs have an uncertain future. The frequent changes to 
programs suggest that most extension initiatives are short to medium term and 






Unsustainable grower groups 
Several challenges relating to poor group leadership persisting in grower groups have 
contributed to the demise of many cooperatives. Deficiencies in group leadership 
impeded the build-up of social capital and trust levels in some grower groups. As a 
result, attempts to establish cooperatives, especially in the PNG Highlands, have 
been largely unsuccessful (Chapter 8). Three problems were identified relating to 
poor group leadership: 
 Leaders often failed to comply with group rules. For instance, some leaders 
from the Neknasi group did not abide by the rules that they had set for 
themselves and group members to follow (Box 8.1).  
 Group leaders use groups as a means to solicit materials and farm inputs from 
partners for their own use. Such actions, when the partners become aware of 
them, strain the partners’ relationships with groups. 
 Often, leaders do not command the respect of community members as before. 
One of the reasons for the lack of respect for leaders is because they use 
grower group leadership as a route into politics. As a consequence, divisions 
often appear in the grower group.  
 
Poor institutional leadership from chain leaders and lead partners also resulted in 
uncooperativeness among group members and the subsequent demise of grower 
groups. The lack of regular contact of institutional leaders with grower groups can 
demotivate smallholders from working in their coffee gardens, and farmers are likely 
to adopt other crops to cultivate. Farmers in the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups 
explained that the lack of contact with partners like the CIC served as a disincentive 
to cultivate coffee (Chapter 8). Also, the decline in contact can result in group 
leaders and members failing to uphold the tenets of good governance such as the 
conduct of regular group meetings. 
 
Poor governance systems in grower groups can undermine collective action. Many 
grower groups do not have group by-laws, which can be used to guide group 
activities. Also, the lack of regular group meetings at which members are kept 
informed of group activities can lead to poor governance. Furthermore, the 
reluctance of leaders to delegate group tasks to members of the group often 




Korofeigu group lacked social capital because tasks were not delegated to members 
and group meetings were hardly held to report on the group’s activities. 
 
Lack of partnerships 
The performance of the coffee industry has been negatively impacted by the lack of 
partnerships among value chain actors, which have contributed to the decline in 
production and coffee quality. The decline of the plantations has resulted in the 
inconsistent supply of poor quality coffee to international markets, with farmers 
therefore receiving discounted prices (Chapters 5 and 8). In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
European-planters organised landowners and processed their coffee and exported it 
for them (Box 8.3). The centralised processing led to higher quality coffee. However, 
when the plantations were sold to landowner business groups in the 1970s, most of 
the support services that European planters provided ceased. Farmers used a variety 
of sub-standard processing techniques that produced lower-quality coffee (Chapter 
5). The handling of coffee from harvesting to parchment is a major determinant of 
the difference between Y-grade coffee and some of the Plantation A-grade coffees 
sold as top quality coffee (Murray-Prior and Batt, 2007). Thus, the argument that the 
lack of partnerships with plantations and their mills led to low coffee quality is valid. 
 
Another problem in partnerships was the failure of cooperatives to supply parchment 
coffee consistently to chain leaders. In the late 1980s and 1990s, grower groups were 
promoted in the PNG coffee industry to undertake collective marketing. Many 
cooperatives delivered inconsistent quantity and coffee quality (Chapter 8), and chain 
leaders paid prices equivalent to those offered in conventional markets, which also 
discouraged groups from maintaining the relationship. This also affected the morale 
of farmers to continue participating in the group and thus many cooperatives 
disintegrated. These chain leaders did not provide agro-services for the grower 
groups but made transport available to ferry parchment coffee to the mill. Most of 
these relationships were informal and therefore many of them collapsed. 
 
Furthermore, partnership arrangements with different tiers of governments, resource 
companies, and civil society organisations to promote coffee development among 
smallholders have partially achieved their intents (Chapter 5). The monitoring and 




assess their progress. Minimal results were achieved in these partnerships and 
therefore the productivity and production of smallholder farmers remains low. 
 
Institutional Context 
Development policies and strategies framed on Western models have 
underperformed in transitional economies like PNG because of the influences of non-
market systems. In the agriculture sector and the PNG coffee industry, poor 
institutional frameworks have undermined their success and growth. Policymakers 
did not consider the influence of non-market factors as well as modern market 
signals to craft policies to facilitate sustainable development. Because of 
policymakers’ failures to take account of prevailing socio-economic and political 
realities, numerous policies and strategies, which were implemented produced mixed 
results (Chapter 2). Problems associated with localised political economy and 
industry strategies are further examined below. 
 
Localised political economy 
A form of localized political economy is also unfolding in transitional economies 
like PNG, where elites who are coordinating and executing national policies are at 
times involved in malpractices. As a result, the rural population including coffee 
growers are not benefiting from policy initiatives, and development is stalled 
(Chapter 5). The level of corrupt practices among educated modern leaders holding 
senior positions in the public sector is significant; they employ relational networks in 
modern governance systems to embezzle public funds (Chapters 2 and 7). The 
traditional and transitional leaders also engage in corrupt activities but at a smaller 
scale. Furthermore, institutionalised systems of syphoning public funds like the 
NADP by politicians and elites have resulted in public funds not reaching coffee 
farmers. This and other examples provided in Chapters 5 and 7 have caused many 
sectoral policies to fail, or many of their targets not to be met.  
 
Industry strategies 
The coffee industry strategies developed and implemented over the years were 
intended to raise coffee production, while others were designed to arrest the decline 
of production, which had begun in the late 1980s. Many industry strategies that the 




past, the government provided loans as price support and a certain percentage was 
paid to farmers when coffee prices were low. However, many argue that farmers 
gained very little as chain leaders tended to reap most of the benefits (Chapter 5). 
Moreover, the approaches taken in implementing the village coffee rehabilitation and 
the nursery projects were unsustainable. In coffee rehabilitation, money was spent on 
activities like walkathons, which had no direct bearing on coffee productivity. In the 
case of nurseries, instead of outsourcing nursery projects to schools and coffee 
cooperatives, the CIC is managing most of the nurseries, which was undermining 
priority programs like coffee research. Also, there was a prevalence of project 
managers failing to keep proper records of expenditures and inventories in industry 
projects (Chapters 4 and 5). There have been instances in the coffee industry where 
monitoring and evaluation, which were normally undertaken to ensure projects were 
carried out with due diligence, were sometimes poorly executed if at all so that 
problems or abuses were not detected early enough for corrective actions to be taken.  
 
Some of the institutional reforms carried out in the CIC have also produced mixed 
results. The merger of the Coffee Research Institute (CRI) with the CIC in 1991, 
resulted in research activities not being funded adequately, and became heavily 
reliant on donor funds. The under-funding of the CRI has incapacitated its ability to 
generate innovations and technologies through research for coffee growers. 
Furthermore, restructures in the CIC were not planned properly, and this negatively 
affected the delivery of extension services to smallholders (Chapter 5). 
 
External Factors 
Furthermore, external factors adversely affect smallholders, blocks and plantations. 
These factors include: poor rural infrastructure and market access; land disputes; 
lawlessness; climate change and the threat of coffee berry borer (CBB).  
 
Poor rural infrastructure negatively affects the coffee industry through reduced 
market access for smallholders and owners of blocks and plantations (Chapter 5). 
Additionally, poor rural infrastructure also adversely affects the potential income 
coffee growers can earn. Coffee growers spend more money and labour to transport 
coffee and sometimes they become victims of robberies in their efforts to reach 




impassable or no longer in use. In addition, many plantations and blocks have been 
abandoned because of difficulties in sourcing farm inputs and recruiting harvesting 
labour during the coffee season. For these reasons, business managers and owners 
have to spend more money, which inflates their production costs, often making rural 
businesses unviable. 
 
These problems are further accentuated by rising lawlessness in rural areas which 
makes coffee production costly as shown in Chapter 7. The state’s inability to 
enforce the rule of law has put the lives of plantation business managers, owners and 
farm workers in danger. Cherry theft occurs on plantations, blocks and smallholder 
gardens, which sometimes lead to tribal feuds when thieves are caught (Box 7.3). 
These skirmishes have contributed to plantations and blocks being abandoned while 
coffee trees in smallholder gardens have been chopped down. Thus, the business 
climate in rural areas is often not conducive to coffee production. 
 
Added to this is that many plantations and blocks have been abandoned because of 
land disputes. It is common for customary landowners to believe that they have 
ongoing residual rights to the land that was sold legally (Chapter 7). Customary 
landowners expect certain benefits from plantation owners, and if the latter refuse to 
assist in socio-cultural activities, hostile responses from the customary landowners 
towards the plantation can be provoked (Chapter 5). Customary landowners often 
express their frustrations through cherry theft or harassing company workers to 
communicate to the company that some of the profits from the plantation should be 
channelled through community engagement to them so they also benefit (e.g. Boxes 
7.3 and 8.5). Additionally, many of the land disputes arise from the manner in which 
European planters made the initial land 'purchase'. For example, the customary 
landowners were not correctly identified and compensated properly at the time the 
land was acquired to develop plantations and therefore their children are disputing 
ownership (Chapter 5).  
 
A further factor adversely affecting the coffee industry is the decline in the supply of 
land to farm coffee in high market access areas. This is the result of three main 
factors. First, population growth has exerted pressure on the household to restructure 




more land for food production. Second, some smallholders who have released their 
land to relatives through the relational economy in the past have retrieved their land 
for other purposes. As shown in Chapter 6, a couple of farmers have returned land 
with mature coffee to customary landowners. Third, in high market access areas, 
competition from high-return crops like vegetable production is competing with 
coffee for land. Some farmers have uprooted coffee to plant vegetables, which 
generates returns quickly (Chapter 5). Although, land is available in remote areas, 
market access hinders growth in these areas. 
 
Alongside these external factors currently affecting coffee production, two growing 
threats to the future sustainability of the industry are climate change and CBB. 
Coffee production is undergoing dramatic changes to accommodate the effects of 
climate change. Rainfall patterns have changed with some areas receiving more rain 
while other regions are experiencing prolonged droughts. Moreover, temperature 
fluctuations can impact on coffee flowering and bean development. Davis et al. 
(2012) confirm that the Arabica variety, the main export coffee of PNG, is sensitive 
to fluctuations in temperature and rainfall. Others predict that production of the 
Arabica variety is likely to decline as a consequence of increases in temperature 
(Zullo et al. 2011; Wallengren, 2012; Bunn et al. 2015; Ovalle-Rivera et al. 2015). 
Haggar (2008) shows that the income of Nicaraguan coffee farmers was reduced by 
75% (from US$2300 to US$600) as a result of climate change. Noticeably in PNG, 
flowering is occurring throughout the year in some areas, so seasonal production is 
becoming less marked. Thus, continuous production can impose stress on coffee and 
nutrition availability which can reduce yield and quality. 
 
Climate change is also imposing changes in coffee production spaces, which may 
also lead to socio-economic and political upheavals. Areas that were once conducive 
to growing coffee are becoming less suitable while regions that used to be cooler and 
unsuitable for coffee can now grow the crop (Haggar and Scepp, 2012; Jaramillo et 
al. 2013; The Climate Institute, 2016). The recommended altitudes for coffee 
growing are changing, and this may continue into the future. The changes in farming 
spaces will exert pressure on land use; thus, livelihood strategies will have to modify, 
thereby causing social instability. Consequently, some farmers will be forced to 




availability, into new locations. Regions where land access is limited could 
experience social conflict as a result of migration. Furthermore, climate change is 
intensifying the incidence of pests and diseases and thus negatively affecting coffee 
production. 
 
Finally, PNG is one of a few coffee-producing countries in the world that does not 
yet have the CBB. The CBB occurred at the PNG border (PNG-Indonesia) area in 
2009, however, it was successfully eradicated. Since PNG shares the same landmass 
with Indonesia, the CBB will intrude again in the foreseeable future. With recent 
increases in diurnal temperatures, the life cycle of the CBB has risen from 5 to 10 per 
cycle of Arabica coffee production (Jaramillo et al. 2011). The CBB completes its 
life cycle in the bean and can therefore destroy the saleable bean. Its presence in 
PNG will have a devastating impact on the lives of many thousands of coffee 
growers. PNG smallholders’ low input-low output system of coffee farming will 
facilitate the spread of the pest because it thrives in poorly managed farms. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it is argued that the managed subsector’s future is bleak. Poor 
management, lack of community engagement, poor leadership including the broader 
institutional context and external factors have all contributed to the long-term decline 
of the subsector. Business leaders, managers and owners are not conscious of the 
effects of the indigenous economy on plantation and block operations. Company 
resources have been diverted into the pursuit of the ‘big men’ status, which is 
counterproductive to business operations. Also, tyrannical business leaders and 
managers have corruptly manoeuvred company resources to promote their private 
interests in group-owned businesses. Because of mismanagement, internal conflicts 
are common in many group-owned plantations and blocks. Moreover, the lack of 
institutional leadership to train and mentor business managers and owners has also 
adversely affected plantation operations.  
 
Smallholders do not fully realise their potential to attain higher productivity and so 
continue to produce poor quality coffee because of the numerous constraints that 
they encounter in coffee production. The diversity of livelihood strategies 




which can undermine coffee production. This study showed that labour shortages for 
coffee harvesting and weeding are universal among smallholders. Also, inconsistent 
extension services and the approaches employed to provide these services have been 
inefficient and erratic. Extension services that the CIC provides or perceives as vital 
are in many cases not consistent with market demands. Although, farmers can 
possess technical knowledge on production, without market linkages extension 
services have little value (e.g. Poulton et al. 2010). Moreover, attempts to develop 
sustainable grower groups as a means to organise production and marketing have not 
worked well, especially in the Highlands of PNG. 
 
Institutional factors such as policy failures in the coffee industry have also 
contributed to the decline of the coffee industry. Political demands drove policies 
like the PRS, so it was not a well thought out plan. During PRS implementation, it 
became apparent that its procedures to access the fund lacked prudent guidelines, 
which later affected loan repayments. Also, industry strategies performed poorly or 
were mismanaged because of the absence of rigorous auditing, monitoring and 
evaluation, and this led to abuse and corrupt practices. Moreover, the lack of 
partnerships among value chain actors contributed to low productivity and poor 
coffee quality. One reason for the lack of partnership is the distrust that prevails 
among chain leaders and coffee growers, which undermines partnership development 
and thus requires further investigation.  
 
Finally, the global phenomenon of climate change is altering coffee farming spaces 
in many countries, including PNG. Regions known for coffee cultivation have 
become unsuitable due to increases in temperature. The warmer climate is also 
leading to increases in the incidences of pests and diseases. 
 













After discussing the challenges confronting the coffee industry in Chapter 9, this 
chapter outlines the strategies to arrest the present decline of the PNG coffee 
industry. This thesis took a very broad perspective to investigate the PNG coffee 
industry and analysed past and present contexts to formulate strategies for the 
industry. There are lessons to be learned from the experiences and successes of the 
early growth of the coffee industry and from the isolated cases of successes today 
that can be used to formulate appropriate strategies to revive and advance the coffee 
industry. The strategies suggested in this chapter are based on the data and 
discussions in Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8. The strategies are discussed below in the 
following categories: governance systems; the managed subsector; smallholder 
sector; and supply chain linkages in the coffee industry.  
 
The development and greater acceptance of the modern cash economy is modifying 
the livelihood strategies of smallholders, plantations and block owners as they 
become more active participants in the modern market economy. The current crop of 
smallholder farmers, plantation and block owners, and business managers desire to 
learn more about how they can control their incomes from coffee to sustain their 
lives and businesses.  
 
Governance Systems 
Good governance is vital for effective implementation of policies and strategies. In 
developing policies and strategies for the agriculture sector and the coffee industry, 
policymakers should also recognise and accommodate the role of socio-economic 
factors so that policies correspond with the realities of economic activity in PNG. 
Also, when implementing sectoral policies and industry strategies, audit mechanisms 




to the financiers who provide project funds so as to avert corruption. Regular 
auditing, monitoring and evaluation will be more likely to assist in ensuring finances 
are spent on stipulated activities, which will result in sectoral policies and industry 
strategies achieving their intents. Institutional leadership is vital to the success of 
commercial enterprises like plantations and blocks. If institutional and external 
problems like those discussed in Chapter 9 are addressed, incentives can be created 
for the managed subsector and smallholder sector to engage meaningfully in the 
modern market economy. Policies and strategies such as extension services, proper 
supply chain linkages, freight subsidies and price support can generate favourable 
conditions to encourage coffee growers to produce more and better quality coffee. 
For instance, a more sustainable approach for price support from the government 
would be to subsidise the costs of farm inputs rather than price subsidies. This 
intervention would have a direct bearing on farm productivity. 
 
Strategies for the Managed Subsector 
Several strategies were identified in this thesis which have the potential to revitalise 
the managed subsector which, as explained in Chapter 7, is in long-term decline. The 
strategies for the plantations include improving community engagement, an adequate 
understanding of business concepts and transparent leadership. 
 
Effective community engagement 
Good community relations are paramount for trouble-free operations for businesses 
like plantations and blocks in the rural areas of PNG. A few plantations that are 
currently operating with some success have active community relations activities and 
therefore are socially embedded and more resilient. Business managers or owners’ 
efforts to engage local people in farm-work or to participate in local socio-cultural 
activities can generate a greater level of acceptance of plantations by their host 
communities. Also, honest and transparent use of farm and company assets by 
business managers is likely to gain the favour and support of landowners. Chapter 7 
discussed the efforts of Sero Bebes and Bill Gardner, who equipped with local 
knowledge were able to undertake community relations activities and interact 
effectively with local villagers resulting in their plantations encountering fewer 
problems. Bebes reported that when he took over Akwitana Plantation, he undertook 




Furthermore, businesses require company rules to guide them in providing support to 
the community and can act as a buffer against unnecessary demands. 
 
Adequate business knowledge and skills 
Another strategy to revitalise the managed subsector is for business managers and 
owners to possess a greater understanding of business principles to manage their 
plantations and blocks as commercial entities. Moreover, institutional leadership 
from the CIC could strengthen the management capabilities of business managers 
and owners. Advisory services must include provisions for mentoring and training 
business managers and owners on financial and farm management. Also, business 
managers and owners who grew up in towns without rural experience require a better 
understanding of the indigenous economy and its influence on modern business 
operations. 
 
Furthermore, education and exposure to modern market values as pointed out by 
Finney (1973; 1993), which this thesis also confirms, are valuable factors that 
positively impact on those venturing into business activities. Chapter 7 showed that 
Bebes was knowledgeable of business practices and procedures which equipped him 
to manage his plantation successfully. Bebes, as a prudent entrepreneur, sought new 
business opportunities which enabled him to export coffee in 2015. He also led by 
example and worked on the farm, unlike many plantation business managers and 
owners who were struggling or failed because they spent less time on their farms 
supervising their labourers.  
 
Transparent leadership  
Accountable and transparent leadership can promote the growth of businesses. 
Business leaders who are credible, financially prudent and possess sound industry 
knowledge can enhance the growth of their businesses. Business leaders with social 
networks, who are knowledgeable about indigenous economies, are honest and who 
are morally principled, will help ensure communal-owned enterprises prosper, and 
that profits are equitably distributed among shareholders. Such actions will reduce 
discontentment and rivalry, which have undermined many group-owned businesses. 
However, there are minimal problems associated with individually owned 




individual-owned coffee plantations and blocks. This study showed that community 
members have more respect for plantations and blocks that are individually-owned 
than group-owned. 
 
Embracing transitional leadership 
For leaders involved in group-owned coffee plantations and blocks or other business 
activities, the PNG context requires business leaders, including individual 
entrepreneurs, to straddle traditional and modern styles of leadership if they are to be 
successful (Figure 2.2). Kisan Pau’s leadership roles and experiences gained in 
traditional socio-cultural ceremonies were effectively utilised to perform a leadership 
role in modern business (Box 7.3). This thesis argued that leadership that embraces 
both traditional and modern leadership is the hybrid transitional leadership style. 
Transitional leaders deployed non-market structures and relations to garner resources 
to engage in the modern market economy. For rural entrepreneurs, it is essential for 
them to take a deft approach to entrepreneurship and ensure that indigenous values 
do not overshadow modern market values, which may undermine the successes of 
business. 
 
Many transitional leaders are second generation business leaders who are mostly 
involved in group-owned enterprises (Chapters 2 and 7). Third generation business 
leaders tend to be better educated and pursue individualistic approaches to business 
more strongly than second generation business leaders. Finney (1993) points out that 
some third generation business leaders relocated their enterprises to other provinces 
to avoid meeting social obligations, which might undermine their businesses. 
However, if third generation business leaders are to be successful in commercial 
businesses in rural areas of PNG, they need to embrace the transitional leadership 
values while pursuing a more individualistic approach to business. In this study, a 
few third generation business leaders like Bebes and Max Kumabong portrayed the 
hybrid transitional leadership style. These leaders were able to manage their 
businesses successfully by managing the demands of the indigenous economy in 
their communities effectively. Bebes and Kumabong qualify as ‘transitional business 
leaders’ which embodies attributes of second and third generation business leaders 





Strategies for Smallholder Production 
Smallholder farmers have the potential to improve productivity and coffee quality. 
One of the factors that has influenced the coffee productivity of farmers is their 
educational level. Higher levels of literacy in farmers correlate with their ability to 
improve productivity and coffee quality (Chapter 6). Also, the potential for literate 
farmers to increase their incomes from coffee has encouraged them to access the up-
to-date information and adopt technologies that enhance coffee production. 
Additionally, this study demonstrates that investing in improving the production 
capacity of smallholders has translated into increased productivity and production of 
better quality coffee thus improving returns on investment (Chapter 8). The strategies 
to improve productivity and production include smallholder labour mobilisation, 
improved extension services, incentives for smallholders and developing sustainable 
grower groups. 
 
Strategies for mobilising labour  
A strategy to improve the supply of labour prevails in the indigenous exchange 
system. The indigenous exchange is an integral part of traditional socio-economic 
life in transitional economies like PNG, and can positively influence the operation of 
the modern market system at the local level (e.g. Finney, 1987; Lummani, 2006; Inu, 
2015). Chapter 6 argued that exchanges often involve reciprocity of labour in 
subsistence production, which has been extended to the sourcing of labour for coffee 
production. Labour exchange arrangements for harvesting and weeding in the 
Neknasi and Korofeigu groups were universal among smallholders. To maintain the 
relational economy, coffee farmers constantly invest in socio-cultural obligations 
with their relatives who regularly assist them by providing labour for coffee tasks 
(Figure 6.6). Smallholders with larger coffee gardens recruit relatives and paid 
labourers to undertake some of their coffee tasks. The modes of ‘payment’ to 
relatives for providing labour include cash as a gift rather than a wage, cherry coffee 
and food which are sometimes ‘paid’ in combination. Hired labourers are paid in 
cash at market rates. When farmers with bigger gardens engage relatives, the amount 
of money and in-kind ‘payments’ transacted in the relational economy are much 






Innovative extension services 
Extension services are critical to enhancing the skills and knowledge levels of coffee 
growers. As shown in Chapter 6, the regular contacts and presence of coffee 
extension officers in coffee growing areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to 
farmers in the two smallholder study sites planting more coffee in the 1990s (Figure 
6.2). To boost smallholder production requires innovative and sustainable extension 
approaches that are complementary to each other for effectiveness in service delivery 
(e.g. Poulton et al. 2010; Ferris et al. 2014). For efficient smallholder extension, 
strategies should include:  
 The FDDE method as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 which seek to involve 
committed farmers who embrace coffee as one of their priority crops that meets 
their livelihood needs. This FDDE approach targets grower groups where a 
large number of farmers are easily contacted, and therefore the approach is 
cost-effective.  
 The CIC projects delivered through groups or partnerships can serve as 
incentives. If projects such as the village coffee rehabilitation project were 
channelled through grower groups, it would build the production capacities of 
smallholders with the supply of farm tools and nursery materials. Also, the CIC 
can partner with schools through the coffee curriculum and schools can raise 
coffee seedlings.  
 Extension services should be channelled through grower groups, where 
information can be communicated to and exchanged between many farmers. 
Farmers from the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups reported that they had 
improved their farming knowledge and skills through collective action 
(Chapter 8).  
 
Incentives for smallholders 
Providing incentives for smallholders can raise productivity, improve coffee quality 
and boost farmers’ morale so that they are likely to allocate more labour and time to 
coffee production. Chapters 6 and 8 demonstrated that with correct incentives 
provided by chain leaders and lead partners, smallholders can improve their 
production capacities. Some interventions that offer incentives for smallholders 
include cherry trading, participation in differentiated markets, freighting coffee from 





Trading of cherry provides incentives for farmers because they can make more 
income and also save labour and time than if they processed coffee to the parchment 
stage. The saved labour and time can then be deployed in other priority household 
activities. By selling ripe cherries, farmers would be relieved from pulping coffee, 
washing fermented beans, drying beans in the sun and providing security during the 
fermentation and drying periods. In Chapter 8, several chain leaders preferred to 
purchase cherries rather than parchment. These chain leaders confirmed that by 
buying cherry they were able to produce high-quality green bean at their central 
mills, which they cannot achieve with parchment beans bought from smallholders.  
 
Participating in differentiated markets 
Differentiated markets offer coffee farmers an alternative approach to capturing the 
long-term value of sustainability in the coffee value chain. There has been a steady 
growth since 2003 in exports to differentiated markets in PNG (Figure 8.2), although 
some report that prices were only slightly above conventional market prices (e.g. 
Powae, 2009; Ruben and Fort, 2012). However, participating in differentiated 
markets has other advantages. Coffee sold in differentiated markets is less affected 
by price fluctuations because prices in these markets are fixed in agreements and so 
they are more stable during periods of falling prices (Valkila and Nygren, 2009). For 
example, Fair Trade sets a floor price where a minimum price is paid to growers that 
covers the average cost of production and also pays a price premium for social 
development (Dragusanu et al. 2014). Furthermore, farmers participating in Fair 
Trade schemes produce good quality coffee and earn better margins (Chapter 8). 
 
This study established that interventions derived from market demands through 
certification had raised productivity, and farmers earned price premiums, which 
motivated them to continue producing coffee. The study further illustrates that the 
assistance of chain leaders to farmers is a targeted investment derived from the 
demands of the differentiated coffee markets. Because of targeted extension services, 
chain leaders received good quality coffee (Chapter 8). For instance, a chain leader in 
the Central Highlands purchased good quality parchment from smallholders and 




success of the chain leader stems from the previous capacity building of farmers over 
several years and the price premium it offered to its farmers.  
 
Market-focused support services such as coffee extension services associated with 
certification have ensured that the relationship between partners and growers is long 
term. The enduring partnerships have resulted in farmers delivering consistent 
quantity and quality of coffee to chain leaders (Chapter 8). The chain leaders are 
prompted to invest more by delivering farm inputs to growers, which further 
motivates growers to increase coffee production and address the quality problem. 
Thus, certification focuses on coordination of coffee production and targets 
differentiated markets. 
 
Freighting coffee from remote areas 
Coffee farmers who have poor access to markets can participate in the cash economy 
through the Freight Surety Scheme. The scheme is funded by the CIC and the state to 
airlift coffee of remote farmers, who are reliant on coffee as their major source of 
income (Chapters 4 and 5). The freight scheme has successfully put money into the 
pockets of disadvantaged farmers from isolated areas and has acted as an incentive 
for them to continue to produce coffee. The freight scheme is a community service 
for disadvantaged coffee farmers to access modern goods and services from coffee 
income and actively participate in the modern market system. 
 
Institutional partner support 
The farm inputs and training received from chain leaders and lead partners have 
created incentives for farmers to invest more resources in coffee farming (Chapters 6 
and 8). In this study, chain leaders, lead partners, and local politicians, assisted 
farmers to improve their capacities to produce coffee. Lead partners were active in 
mobilising farmers to form grower groups. They then provided training on coffee 
husbandry practices, processing and bookkeeping to build up the knowledge of the 
farmers. Chain leaders organised extension services, savings services, targeted 
training and offered cash advances to partner growers. During extension services and 
training sessions, chain leaders trained farmers on how to produce better quality 
coffee that targeted specific markets. Thus, farmers learnt what kind of coffee quality 




evident in the high-quality and large-sized coffee beans farmers produced in the 
Neknasi group as a result of the incentives they received (Chapter 8).  
 
Partnerships involving smallholder cooperatives with chain leaders and lead partners 
have a direct impact on raising coffee quality and the productivity of farmers. The 
grower groups in Chapter 6 revealed an average of 747 kg gb/ha, an increase of 96% 
in productivity, which was almost double the productivity of 382 kg gb/ha of the 
Central Highlands (UniQuest, 2013). Partnerships have helped coffee farmers in the 
Neknasi and Korofeigu groups to access support services like farm inputs, training, 
advisory services, market information and certification for their farms.  
 
Developing sustainable grower groups 
Institutional frameworks provide internal governance systems that are necessary for 
effective management of grower groups and undergird their sustainability. In the 
Neknasi group, compliance to Fair Trade imposed structures and regulations have 
aided leaders and members to pursue collective goals (Chapter 8). The group’s by-
laws and rules ensure the accountability of leaders and members alike, which are 
critical for successful group work (e.g. Stockbridge et al. 2003; Markelova et al. 
2009). The Fair Trade rules in the Neknasi group encompassed overall management 
of the group, however, for assets management, the group developed its own 
management rules which assisted them in effectively controlling their group assets 
(Box 8.1).  
 
Partners that provided institutional leadership by way of advisory services through 
training and mentoring of group leaders strengthened governance systems and 
sustained the cohesiveness of the cooperatives. Improved group governance systems 
assisted groups to remain cohesive in the face of declining contact with partners, as 
was the case with the Neknasi group (Chapter 8). Chain leaders and lead partners can 
curtail the undesirable attitudes of group leaders by insisting on the enforcement of 
group by-laws. For example, institutional support offered to groups can be attached 






Grower group mobilisation 
Partners’ involvement in the early stages of group mobilisation to form cooperatives 
is needed, as villagers are often unable to mobilise other villagers and form groups 
without external support. The teamwork concept based on democratic processes is 
often not well understood, and villagers may not have the social networks with other 
villagers and development partners to establish farmer groups. External inputs from 
lead partners and chain leaders can either initiate or formalise groups that have 
expressed an interest in engaging in collective action. 
 
To avoid prolonged dependence on lead partners, it is desirable that lead partners 
reduce the amount of support gradually over time so that grower groups can conduct 
their operations as independent commercial entities. Grower groups would then be 
guided from a distance rather than in a close supervisory relationship. As part of an 
exit strategy, lead partners can train and advise groups to keep proper records and 
comply with group meeting resolutions. Similarly, allowing for linkages with grower 
groups and chain leaders to grow and mature is likely to be sustained as market 
imperatives drive the relationship. The case study of the Neknasi group showed that 
when lead partners began to reduce their support gradually to the group, the group 
focused on consolidating their membership and eventually acquired a truck as part of 
this process (Box 8.1). 
 
Collective action in grower groups 
Collective action in grower groups offers more advantages to coffee farmers than if 
they were to operate independently, especially if they reside in remote areas in PNG 
(see Batt et al. 2009; Wollni and Brümmer, 2012). Some advantages of collective 
action include: reduced transaction costs; strong quality control systems; improved 
access to extension services and farm inputs; strengthened bargaining power; and, 
groups enabled to participate in differentiated coffee markets as discussed in Chapter 
8. Also, grower groups can advance and engage in social entrepreneurial activities as 
is the case with the Neknasi group (Box 8.1). Social entrepreneurship can accomplish 
short-term goals, which can manifest in the long-term positive transformation of 





The higher levels of social capital and group cohesion are usually associated with a 
group performing well (Figure 10.1). At the group mobilisation stage, the level of 
social capital would be low, and the group would lack cohesiveness and, so, it would 
be immature. As the group begins to have regular interaction with partners and 
conduct scheduled meetings, social capital levels start to rise. A group with high 
levels of social capital, independent, operating several businesses like the Neknasi 
group, and commencing to export coffee to overseas markets would indicate that the 
group is reaching maturity. 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Schematic representation of various stages of transition of grower 
groups from immature to mature groups (Source: Tom Kukhang, original idea). 
 
Transparent and accountable leadership in grower groups can improve social capital 
and member cohesion, thereby providing a foundation on which collective action can 
be built and sustained. The quality of group leadership and levels of trust amongst 
members varies between the Neknasi and Korofeigu groups. Chapter 8 showed that 
the Neknasi group had a higher degree of social capital and group cohesion than the 
Korofeigu group. This finding concurs with previous work in the PNG Highlands by 
Murray-Prior (2008) who argues that there was the likelihood of trust problems in 
cooperatives. However, the Neknasi group’s regular contact and interaction with 
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partners elevated trust levels with partners (Table 9.2). The cohesiveness of the 
group was also derived from the Fair Trade regulations on how the Neknasi group 
was to be organised and managed. Although there were failures among some leaders 
to conform to some of the rules governing the use of group assets, members had little 
to say publicly about the inadequacies of their leaders. At the village level, the 
subgroup leaders maintained a high degree of trust with their members that led to a 
cohesive group at the broader level and confidence levels were high. Also, the 
Neknasi group had four long-term partners, several businesses and a high degree of 
delegation of duties among members, all of which have developed higher levels of 
social capital (Table 10.1).  
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Supply Chain Linkages 
Partnerships in the coffee industry between farmers and chain leaders have generated 
mutual benefits. This thesis demonstrated that partnerships between European-owned 
plantations and village farmers existed in the past (Box 8.3). Effective linkages 
among coffee value chain actors can fill the void left by the departure of the early 
European planters. Productivity can be raised in the coffee industry when efficient 




technical expertise and the resources to increase productivity and produce better 
quality coffee. Smallholders need the support of chain leaders and lead partners, 
which was formerly provided by the European plantation planters. Also, smallholder 
farmers participating in partnerships receive price premiums from chain leaders as 
shown in Chapter 8. Thus, a systems perspective approach based on value chain 
partnerships facilitates efficiency in production systems, enhances profits and 
ensures collaborating partners mutually benefit. 
 
Chain leaders who are mostly located in urban centres need to engage actively in 
supply chain linkages, which this study has confirmed as an emerging trend (Chapter 
8). Some chain leaders have already instituted partnerships with growers and 
smallholder groups. For instance, the Productive Partnership in Agriculture Project 
(PPAP) is promoting the partnership concept among chain leaders, lead partners and 
coffee growers which must be encouraged further in the coffee industry. One of 
PPAP’s premises is to ensure that partner farmers and chain leaders appreciate that 
coffee enterprises are commercial entities. The industry would prosper when value 
chain actors including successful plantations are involved in supply chain linkages 
with farmers. This study showed three types of supply chain collaborations that can 
positively influence coffee production. They are chain leader-farmer partnerships, 
lead partner-farmer linkages and agro-nucleus setups (Figure 10.2).  
 
Coffee farmers have the potential to partner with chain leaders and lead partners, and 
to become involved in agro-nucleus setups. In Figure 10.2, the thick to the thin 
coloured arrows illustrate relationships that are likely to range from more sustainable 
to less sustainable. When support services are delivered through grower groups, 
partnerships or agro-nucleus setups, farmers operating as individuals will begin to 
align themselves with either cooperatives or agro-nucleus setups, with the intention 
to source support services and to benefit from them. The chain leader-driven 
partnerships and agro-nucleus setups would be sustainable and in many cases these 
partnerships ensure cost-effectiveness and are profit-driven. However, lead partners 
have a function to ensure the interests of growers are upheld, facilitate supply chain 
linkages, support chain leaders and agro-nucleus centres in extension delivery, and 
continue to serve coffee farmers in low market access areas. Low market accessible 




them to operate in these remote locations. In high market access areas, infrastructures 
such as good roads exist thus chain leaders are able to maintain regular contact with 
partner farmers. Moreover, successful plantations can also assume the role of chain 
leaders or agro-nucleus centres by providing centralised processing facilities and 
agro-services to villagers surrounding the plantation, as was the case with early 
European planters (Box 8.3).  
 
 
Figure 10.2: Coordinated coffee production system for PNG. 
 
Plantations and blocks that are struggling because of financial problems or labour 
constraints should be subdivided and portions subleased to settlers and villagers in 
partnership arrangements through formal agreements. The plantation or block owners 
can facilitate extension services and organise farm inputs with their partner farmers. 
The partner farmers in return would sell coffee to the plantation or block owner. 
Importantly, subdivision ensures an adequate labour supply from leasees and 
minimises cherry theft. As for the owner, there is an expectation that quality cherry 
coffee will be obtained from the leasees as illustrated in some of the present 
partnerships discussed in Chapter 8. The once abandoned or struggling plantations 
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Honest and transparent leadership is critical to the revival of the managed subsector. 
To be successful in business, the capacity to be a leader in the indigenous or 
relational economy as well as the modern market economy appears to be vital to 
group business success. Through the indigenous socio-economy, shareholders’ 
varied socio-economic interests are met, while through the modern market economy, 
enterprises are managed according to business imperatives. Business managers and 
owners also need to manage their farms prudently, make sound investment decisions 
and pursue community engagements to succeed. Some plantations are successful 
because they have judiciously managed their farm’s income while engaging in 
community relation activities.  
 
This chapter argued that collective action in grower groups and partnerships with 
chain leaders have proven to benefit coffee growers regarding improved productivity, 
better coffee quality and higher incomes. Through collective action and partnerships, 
farmers developed coffee production capacities and participated in differentiated 
markets. Also, developing the capacity of farmer groups has helped in transforming 
them into community institutions where learning and information exchange among 
member farmers can occur. Moreover, other interventions received from 
development partners have also bolstered collective action. The European planter-
landowner relationships during the early formative years of the coffee industry to 
maintain coffee quality was a good illustration of the mutual benefits that can be 
achieved through partnerships.  
 
Alternative approaches to providing extension services are needed as current 
programs intended for farmers are inconsistent, and their focus is short-term. This 
study pointed out that the entry points for extension services should include grower 
groups, partnerships and agro-nucleus models that involve farmers. The services 
chain leaders are providing are driven by market imperatives and, thus, the support 
they extend to coffee farmers are market-driven and cost-effective. 
 
In the next chapter, I provide conclusions for the thesis, make recommendations as a 












After discussing the factors causing the decline in coffee production and strategies to 
revive the PNG coffee industry in Chapters 9 and 10 respectively, this chapter 
concludes the thesis and makes some recommendations. The coffee industry grew 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, creating the backdrop for a thriving coffee plantation 
sector with mills which were accessible to smallholder farmers in the Highlands of 
rural PNG. While plantations were developed on alienated land, coffee cultivation 
among villagers grew swiftly on customary land outpacing plantation production by 
the mid-1960s. The sheer enthusiasm to attain wealth and the dream of replicating 
the modern lifestyles that the early European planters appeared to enjoy in their 
midst encouraged subsistence villagers to embrace coffee and adopt it into their 
agrarian system.  
 
This chapter summarises the influences of leadership, development dilemmas, 
commercial businesses in the transitional economy, the potential of smallholders to 
increase coffee production and the contribution of this study to current knowledge. 
Also, interventions are recommended to arrest the decline and facilitate the revival of 
the PNG coffee industry. Finally, areas for future research are also suggested. 
 
Development Dilemma 
Development theorists whose assumptions are drawn from Western models of 
development failed to appreciate the influences of non-market systems that prevail in 
transitional economies like PNG. Thus, many development initiatives mimicking 
Western models of development did not succeed in transitional economies. This 
implies that modern market values are sometimes not consistent with indigenous 
structures, practices, and values, which seem to have an enduring influence in many 




insight into the dilemmas of development in transitional economies because it 
considers traditional social, economic and political values and practices and their 
influence on the modern market economy. Also, through the hybridization lens, it 
reveals the potential economic opportunities arising from the coalescing of 
indigenous and modern market economic practices. 
 
The managed subsector is in long-term decline as local business managers, and/or 
owners are unable to pursue modern market imperatives to manage their plantations 
and blocks efficiently. The high input-high output plantation system of production is 
market-based, which is alien to the way locals practise agrarian subsistence 
production. Consequently, many local business managers and owners are unable to 
merge adequately capitalist production systems with local socio-economies. Thus, 
many coffee plantation business managers and owners in particular, use their 
plantations to accumulate ‘prestige’ capital by diverting coffee income into the 
relational economy (Chapter 7). In doing so, they fail to reinvest sufficient recurrent 
income in their plantations and blocks to maintain viability. The customary land 
tenure system in PNG also undermines collective action in group-owned plantations 
and blocks, which sometimes leads to internal conflicts among shareholders. 
Furthermore, the customary landowners believe that ‘purchasers’ of their land must 
share some of the company profits with them (Chapter 7). Plantation business 
managers and owners who are reluctant to participate in socio-cultural events in the 
community are likely to encounter reprisals such as cherry theft and harassing of 
plantation workers by local customary landowners. 
 
The social and economic activities of smallholder coffee farmers in the Highlands of 
PNG are socially embedded. Thus, smallholders pursue multiple livelihood strategies 
to sustain their way of life, and coffee production is one of them. In transitional 
societies, socio-cultural activities determine the household allocation of resources. 
The diverse livelihood strategies of farmers sometimes draw away resources, 
including labour, from being invested in coffee production into other areas (Chapters 
5 and 6). Also, smallholders concurrently engage in simple commodity production 
and subsistence farming on customary land, and, if land is short, this also affects the 






The rapid growth in the early stages of coffee development in the PNG Highlands 
was associated with the institutional leadership provided by the pioneer European 
planters. The European planters provided support services to surrounding village 
coffee farmers, which facilitated the growth of the industry. Also, the European 
planters were conscious of market demands and their support to village farmers was 
aimed at producing a product that met the requirements of the target markets 
(Chapters 8 and 10). The partnership between European planters and smallholders 
ensured the production of high-quality coffee. As a result, PNG built its reputation 
with overseas importers and coffee connoisseurs as producer of high-quality coffee. 
Moreover, many of the European planters recognised the need to maintain 
harmonious relationships with landowners and local villagers, thus they often had 
mutually beneficial partnership arrangements with landowners and local villagers to 
produce coffee. The alliances with landowners and villagers ensured relatively 
trouble-free plantation operations and enabled European planters to access labour for 
plantation tasks from the neighbouring communities.  
 
Moreover, pre- and post-independence local political leaders genuinely wanted 
citizens to engage in commercial activities and thus introduced the Plantation 
Redistribution Scheme and Twenty Hectare Development Scheme policies (Chapter 
4). In the 1970s and early 1980s, government funds earmarked for development 
purposes reached the intended recipients like coffee growers. However, more 
recently, funds such as NADP earmarked for farmers are not reaching them as a 
consequence of corrupt practices perpetrated by elites and politicians (Chapters 2, 5 
and 9). Local business leaders, managers and owners who manage their businesses 
transparently, and who possess sound local knowledge were factors required for 
success in entrepreneurial activities.  
 
Business Enterprises in the Transitional Economy 
The social and the economic aspects of commercial businesses are blurred and 
inseparable in rural PNG society. When one probes deeply into operational facets of 
businesses such as plantations and blocks, the underlying difficulties for market 
enterprises arise from values and practices that local people hold dear but which 




managers and owners with an adequate understanding of the indigenous economy 
and its influence on the modern cash economy are able to engage effectively in the 
market, while keeping their business sustainable (Chapters 2 and 10). Thus, resilient 
and successful plantations are deploying non-market values to enhance their modern 
market enterprises. This study found that the heightened level of community 
engagement associated with successful plantations was directly in response to 
meeting certain social obligations and demands (Chapter 7). However, the level of 
support accorded to original landowners of plantation land should be guided by a set 
of company rules to determine who is eligible to participate in these exchanges. It 
should also be ensured that the customary demands on the business do not become 
excessive to the point of undermining the viability of the firm. Businesses that are 
considerate of the indigenous socio-economy are deemed as ‘indigenous businesses’. 
Indigenous businesses are managed by ‘transitional business leaders’ who 
incorporate non-market and modern market values in their operations and thus are 
hybrid enterpreneurs and are more likely to succeed in rural areas of PNG (Figure 
11.1). This is illustrated by the early successes of OK Corporation (Box 7.3) and the 
present growth in Beser Coffee (Box 7.4). 
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Potential Among Smallholders 
Smallholder farmers have adapted coffee into their agrarian farming systems, as 
pointed out earlier. In essence, the PNG smallholders have harmonised the 
production of an introduced cash crop by employing non-market systems to produce 
coffee (Chapter 4). Smallholder farmers have extended indigenous labour exchange 
practices to coffee production to mobilise labour when they encounter labour 
shortages (Chapter 6). The social dimension of the society enables the production of 
commodity crops like coffee that are destined for modern markets. Moreover, the 
smallholder coffee production system is able to be accommodated by customary land 
tenure.  
 
Grower groups in PNG are socially embedded institutions, and so they are social 
enterprises (Chapter 8). Both traditional socio-cultural and modern demands on 
livelihoods can be achieved through collective action. Collective action is beneficial 
for the smallholder sector in ensuring production at the primary level is organised, 
enhances economies of scale and establishes entry points for extension services and 
other support services from partner organisations. Grower groups have attracted 
development partners who have helped smallholders to improve their coffee 
production capacities. Consequently, the productivity and quality of coffee from 
farmers in grower groups is better than that of independent farmers. Collective action 
has enabled grower groups to become mediums for the facilitation of other 
community development initiatives.  
 
Globalisation has given rise to partnerships through the expansion of formal markets. 
Partnerships enhance institutional collaboration which has mutually benefited chain 
leaders and smallholders, especially in high market accessible areas (Chapter 8). 
Chain leaders and lead partners are willing to collaborate with grower groups and 
improve the competitiveness of supply chain linkages among partners. These 
relationships are likely to be sustainable as the focus of the intervention from chain 
leaders is driven by market imperatives (Chapter 10). However, lead partners like the 
CIC have a role to ensure smallholders in remote areas are provided with extension 





Research Contribution to Current Knowledge 
This study adds to the knowledge of how the social embeddedness of livelihoods 
such as coffee farming influences coffee productivity and production, both positively 
as well as negatively. Thus, it affirms that the social embeddedness theoretical 
framework provides a better approach to investigating socio-economic problems in 
the coffee industry in PNG. My study further establishes that ‘transitional business 
leaders’ who are able to participate in the local socio-economy while prudently 
managing their businesses like plantations and blocks can be resilient and successful 
in their own communities in rural PNG. This study also made contributions in the 
areas of group action and value chain partnerships as strategies to raise productivity 
and ensure the consistent supply of improved coffee quality from smallholders. 
Collective action and partnerships have filled the vacuum created by the demise of 
plantations and their mills, which used to provide support services to smallholders in 
their vicinity. This thesis has recommended strategies to revitalise the PNG coffee 
industry, and these strategies are relevant and applicable to other agricultural sectors 
in PNG such as cocoa. 
 
Recommendations 
The recommendations generated from the thesis are categorised into two depending 
on whether the industry or the state should intervene. Their interventions are likely to 
produce positive outcomes on coffee productivity and production. 
 
Industry support 
1. The grower group approach is cost-effective and has a direct influence on 
improved productivity and coffee quality and should be the focus of extension 
services. Thus, institutional projects such as freight surety and others targeting 
smallholders should be channelled through groups and partnerships so that 
these interventions act as incentives for farmers and acts as a glue to hold the 
members together in the group.  
2. Training events for smallholder farmers should also incorporate financial 
literacy as well as traditional topics relating to coffee husbandry techniques. 
3. Through licensing, processors and exporters should be encouraged to partner 




4. A single management agency should be created to administer advisory services 
to the managed subsector and attached to a commercial bank or the CIC, so 
that its activities are supervised and monitored. Business managers, owners and 
shareholders of plantations and blocks require leadership and management 
training and the CIC can facilitate this. Also, successful plantations should be 
supported to assist smallholders, other struggling or abandoned plantations and 
blocks in their locality by providing agro-nucleus services. 
5. The managed subsector survey that the CIC was supposed to conduct should be 
revived as there is a lack of information on the plantations and blocks. 
 
State support 
1. Credit access should be facilitated through partnerships and agro-nucleus 
setups. 
2. The payments made for plantation land acquisition in the past was facilitated 
by traditional leaders, and customary landowners benefited very little from the 
proceeds. Professional social mapping should be conducted to identify 
customary landowners and allow them to become business partners with 
potential investors to revive some of the plantations. 
3. The government should rehabilitate rural roads, bridges and airstrips to enable 
coffee to reach markets. The state should also address lawlessness.  
4. Local entrepreneurs with social networks from within the localities should be 
allowed to acquire nearby plantations; this may help solve some of the land 
disputes on plantations.  
 
Future research areas 
1. This study shows the value of a social embeddedness perspective on economic 
practices in transitional societies like PNG which influences coffee production. 
Future studies embracing a social embeddedness approach are suitable in 
socio-economic studies where the productivity of smallholder farmers is 
affected by indigenous values and economic practices. 
2. More studies on smallholder groups or cooperatives should be conducted in 
other sites, which this study has not covered. There is limited information on 




3. Studies are required to identify why coffee growers distrust chain leaders. 
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This Standard was proposed by the Coffee Industry Corporation and prepared by the 
Biological Standards Committee of the National Institute of Standards and Industrial 
Technology (NISIT). The Standard was prepared in response to a need to standardize 
and upgrade the quality of coffee exported. 
 
This Standard takes into account the use of water-resistant and hermetically-sealable 
liners for jute bags; the removal of trade grades “AA”, “AB”, “C”, “X”, “E”, “PSC”, 
and “T”; as well as the inclusion of new grades Arabica “B” and, for Robusta, “R1”, 
“R2” and “RT”. It also allows for the separate size differentiation of a number of 
trade grades and the inclusion of a more descriptive definition of liquor quality. In 
addition, the numbering and sequencing of some clauses has been changed as a result 
of the revision of trade grades. Furthermore, a few words or terms deemed 
inappropriate were replaced with ones deemed appropriate to the Trade Grade 
Specifications in Tables 1 and 2 to reflect the true characters and descriptions. ISO 
referenced documents have been updated to current Standards.  
 
This Standard deals with parameters and criteria for liquor and physical quality for 
conformity.  
 
The term “normative” has been used in this Standard to define the application of the 
table to which it applies. A “normative” table is an integral part of a Standard. 
 
The second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (PNGS 1626:1993) which 
has been technically revised. The following key stakeholders were involved in the 
Green Coffee Working Group: 
 
- Coffee Industry Corporation  
- Papua New Guinea Coffee Export   
- Nowek Limited 
- Kosem Ltd 
- WR Carpenters 
- Public Private Partnership Projects   
- Niugini Highlands Coffee Exports  
- Michael Wheeler (International Consultant for PNG)  
















1. SCOPE  
 
This Standard specifies requirements for Green Coffee in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), including: 
a) standard parameters and criteria for liquor and physical quality;  
b) criteria for sampling, analysis and determination of grades; and  
c) specifications for marking and packaging. 
 
 
2. NORMATIVE REFERENCES 
 
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this 
document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the 
edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced 
document (including any amendments) applies.  
 
All documents are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this 
Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent 
edition of the Standards list below. 
 
ISO 668:2013 
Series 1 freight containers - Classification, dimensions and ratings 
 
ISO 3509  
Coffee and coffee products – Vocabulary. 
 
ISO 4072 
Green coffee in bags – Sampling. 
 
ISO 4149  
Green coffee – Olfactory and visual examination and determination of foreign 
matter and defects. 
 
ISO 4150 
Green coffee or raw coffee – Size Analysis – Manual and machine sieving 
 
ISO 6668 
Green coffee – Preparation of samples for use in sensory analysis. 
 
ISO 6673 
Green coffee – Determination of loss in mass at 105oC. 
 
 
3. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
For the purpose of this Standard the “CIC” denotes the PNG Coffee Industry 
Corporation; and “ISO” denotes the International Organization for 
Standardization. For the purpose of this Standard, the definitions in ISO 3509, 





3.1  Consignment 
The quantity of green coffee in bags, dispatched a received at one time and 
covered by a particular contract or shipping document. It may be composed of 
one or more lots. 
 
3.2  Lot 
A part of a consignment or a consignment presumed to be of uniform 
characteristics, consisting of not more than 1,000 bags of the same type, with the 
same marks and mass, containing green coffee assumed to have common 
properties of reasonably uniform character and to which a given scheme of 
examination can be applied. 
 
3.3  Full container load (FCL) 
One fully loaded container - of nominal length either 20 feet or 40 feet in 
accordance with ISO 668:2013 containing cargo for one consignee (importer). 
 
 
4.  GRADES AND TRADE TYPES 
 
4.1  Species grown 
Two species of coffee are grown and processed in Papua New Guinea: Arabica 
(Coffea Arabica) is generally grown at altitudes of 1000 m asl and more while 
Robusta (Coffea canephora) is grown in the lowlands. 
 
4.2  Trade grade designation 
 
4.2.1 Trade grade designations comprise “A”, “B”, “Y”, “Y2”, and “Y3” in the 
case of Arabica coffee, and “R1”, “R2” and “RT” in the case of Robusta 
coffee. 
 
4.2.2 All certified and specialty branded coffee shall be exported in accordance 
with the grades specified in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
4.3  Parchment coffee – Arabica 
 
4.3.1  General 
Dry Arabica coffee beans wrapped in the endocarp. 
 
Classes for Arabica parchment are defined in Clauses 4.3.2 to 4.3.5. 
 
4.3.2 Class 1 Arabica parchment 
Clean, sound, pale, even coloured Arabica parchment, which is substantially 
free of visible defects, has no off odours and is capable of yielding either “A” 
or “B” grade green bean. 
 
4.3.3 Class 2 Arabica parchment 
Clean, sound, pale coloured Arabica parchment, which has some visible 






4.3.4 Class 3 Arabica parchment 
Arabica parchment which does not have an excessive amount of visible 
defects and is capable of yielding “Y2” grade green bean. 
 
4.4  Parchment coffee – Robusta 
 
4.4.1  General  
Dry Robusta coffee beans shall be wrapped in the endocarp. 
 
Classes for Robusta parchment are defined in Clauses 4.4.2 to 4.4.3. 
 
4.4.2 Class 1 Robusta parchment 
Clean, sound, pale, even coloured Robusta parchment which is substantially 
free of visible defects and is capable of yielding “R1” grade green bean. 
 
4.4.3 Class 2 Robusta parchment 
Robusta parchment, which does not have an excessive amount of visible 
defects and is capable of yielding “R2” grade green bean. 
 
 
5.  PACKING FOR EXPORT 
 
5.1  Packing in bags 
 
5.1.1 Green coffee for export shall be packed in clean, sound, new, non-mineral oil 
jute bags free from tears, any sign of leakage or any objectionable odour. 
Bags for export coffee shall be between 1,020 and 1,070 mm long and 
between 535 and 610 mm wide. 
 
5.1.2 Where coffee is packed in jute bags with water-resistant and hermetically 
sealable liners, random sampling shall be undertaken by authorized CIC 
Provincial Inspectors prior to packing and sealing the liner within clean, 
sound, new, non-mineral oil jute bags free from tears, any sign of leakage or 
any objectionable odour. Quality assurance and certification shall be 
undertaken and cleared in designated ports prior to export.  
 
5.1.3  The net weight of a bag of green coffee for export shall be 60 kg at time of 
shipment, except for “Y3” grade, which may weigh less. 
 
5.2  Export bag labelling 
 
5.2.1 Bags of green coffee for export shall bear the following markings in black 
indelible food-grade ink, in letters not less than 50 mm high and 6 mm thick. 
The marks shall be placed in separate lines, centrally placed below the mouth 
or closure in the following order: 
 
a) The words “Papua New Guinea” or the abbreviation “PNG”. 
b) “Washed Raw Arabica/Robusta Coffee” according to contents. 




d) On the reverse side of the bag, the following marks shall be displayed in 
separate lines centrally placed in the following order: 
 
i) A rectangle placed breadth-wise below the mouth or closure of the 
bag and printed in black indelible food-grade ink so as to obscure any 
other markings required by this Clause. The rectangle shall be divided 
into three compartments. 
 
ii) Indelibly marked in black food-grade ink in figures not less than 50 
mm high, the following shall appear within the three compartments: 
 
1) In the left-hand compartment the number 166 being the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO) identification mark for 
PNG. 
 
2) In the central compartment a number up to four digits long 
allocated by the CIC to identify the exporter of the coffee. 
 
3) In the right-hand compartment a number up to five digits long 
being the exporter’s serial number for the particular lot of coffee. 
The serial number shall be one of a series commencing with the 
number “1” for the first consignment destined for export by the 
exporter in the year commencing on the first of October and will be 
preceded by either the letter “M” to represent that the shipment will 
be shipped to an International Coffee Organization (ICO) member 
country; or the letters “NM” to represent that the shipment will be 
shipped to an ICO non-member country. The series shall be 
renewed annually on the first of October. 
 
iii) Below the marked rectangle the following is to be displayed in 
separate lines and marked indelibly in food-grade ink in black 
characters not less than 50 mm high. 
 
1) A mark sufficient to identify the consignee of the coffee.  
 
2) A mark sufficient to identify the port of destination of the coffee. 
 
3) Such distinguishing marks as may be necessary to identify the 
grower or the exporter of the coffee. 
 
4) The prescribed mark for the grade of the coffee beans and, if 
appropriate, any third-party certification mark. 
 
5) At the discretion of the exporter, some writing to carry any special 








6) Where coffee is packed in jute bags with water-resistant and 
hermetically sealable liners, the bag shall be clearly marked and 
differentiated by a green vertical stripe in food-grade ink measuring 
at least 40 mm wide on the right hand side of both sides of the bag, 
from the top to the bottom in order to identify and prevent 
accidentally compromising the integrity of the bag. 
 
5.3  Packing in bulk containers 
 
5.3.1 The green coffee shall be packed in a 20 foot Standard Ocean-Going 
Container (see ISO 668). The bulk containers shall be clean, sound, dry, 
water and air tight, and shall be free of any objectionable odour. 
 
5.3.2 The containers shall be lined with clean and dry polythene or polypropylene 
liners that are free from tears, any signs of leakage and any objectionable 
odour. 
 
5.3.3 The maximum net weight of green coffee in bulk containers shall not exceed 
21,600 kg or 360 x 60 kg green coffee bags equivalent. All bulk weights shall 
be indicated clearly on every export document. 
 
5.3.4 When bulking is completed, authorized CIC Inspectors shall issue an 
Inspection Certificate and may put its seal on the bulked container. The 
sealing is final and shall not be tampered with until it reaches the port of 
destination. 
 




6.  DRAWING OF SAMPLES FOR ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Sampling for any purpose shall be carried out according to the provisions of ISO 
4072. 
 
6.2 Where samples are to be drawn from coffee stored for bulk shipments, such 
samples shall be drawn by one of the following two methods: 
 
a) Samples shall be drawn randomly at three to four intervals as the beans 
enter a bulk container; or 
 
b)  Samples shall be drawn randomly from bags neatly stacked and clearly 
marked in container lots prior to the actual bulking. 
 
Such lot samples shall be blended to obtain a fully representative bulk sample 







6.3 Where coffee is to be shipped in jute bags with water-resistant and hermetically 
sealable liners, random sampling should be done in accordance with the 
procedures outlined in ISO 4072. Sampling shall be undertaken by authorized 
CIC Provincial Inspectors prior to packing. 
 
 
7. MOISTURE CONTENT 
 
Green Coffee for export shall contain water at not less than 8% nor more than 
12.5% of total mass. Determination may be made according to ISO 6673 or by 
another method agreed upon by the parties concerned. 
 
 
8. OLFACTORY AND VISUAL EXAMINATION AND DETERMINATION 
OF FOREIGN MATTER AND DEFECTS 
 
8.1 Examination and determination shall be made according to the provisions of ISO 
4149. 
 
8.2 Allocation of grade to samples being examined shall be made according to the 
specifications set out in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
9.  SENSORY ANALYSIS 
 
9.1 Samples for sensory analysis shall be prepared according to the provisions of 
ISO 6668.  
 
9.2 Judgments be recorded in terms agreed by the parties concerned.  
 
9.3 Allocation of grade to sample being analyzed shall be made according to the 
specifications set out in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
10.  SIZE ANALYSIS 
 
Size analysis shall be carried out according to the provisions of ISO 4150 and 






Table 1: Papua New Guinea Green Coffee Specifications - Arabica (Normative) 




























Displayed as a Suffix to the 
designated grade, e.g. A20.  If a 
specific screen size is 
designated the coffee shall be 
uniform in size above 
designated screen size. No 










20 7.94 8.00 
19 7.54 7.50 
18 7.14 7.10 
17 6.75 6.70 
16 6.35 6.30 
15 5.95 6.00 




























Y May lack 
some 
uniformity in 
















Y2 Irregular cup 
profile; fair 
acidity and 






























NOTE: No foul or foreign flavour and odours relates to phenolic, engine oil, excessive mould and 





Table 2: Papua New Guinea Green Coffee Specifications - Robusta (Normative) 


























Displayed as a Suffix.  
Where a specific screen size 
is designated the coffee shall 
be uniform in size above 
designated screen size. 










18 7.14 7.10 
17 6.75 6.70 
16 6.35 6.30 



















beans.  No 
foreign matter.  
Shall be fit for 
human 
consumption. 




NOTE: No foul or foreign flavour and odours relates to phenolic, engine oil, excessive mould and 






Table 3: Defective Schedule (Normative). 
Description of defect 
Number of defects/ 
Foreign matter 
Defect equivalent 
Large stone (1 cm diameter) 1 2 
Medium stone (about 5 mm diameter) 1 1 
Small stone (less than 5 mm diameter) 3 1 
Large stick (3 cm length) 1 2 
Medium stick (2 cm length) 1 1 
Small stick (1 cm length) 3 1 
Pod 1 1 
Full black 1 1 
Partly black 5 1 
Full sour 1 1 
Partly sour 5 1 
Shells 5 1 
Pulper-cut/Brokens 5 1 
Floaters 5 1 
White/Old 5 1 
Parchment 2 1 
Husk/Hull 2 1 
Immature 5 1 
Water damage 5 1 
NOTE: Any other foreign matter and defect not included in this schedule may be assessed by the 
authority using this Standard or by an arbitration panel. 
 
 
